

131649Z JUL 84

2. ACCORDING TO AN ARENA MEMBER

AS OF EARLY MAY 1984, THE ARENA PARAMILITARY UNIT HEADED BY HECTOR ((REGALADO)), FORMER CHIEF OF SECURITY FOR D'AUBUISSON, WAS INTACT AND FUNCTIONING. HE SAID THAT MEMBERS OF REGALADO'S UNIT WERE MAINTAINING SMALL ARMS PROFICIENCY AT A PRIVATE FIRING RANGE IN THE NATIONAL STADIUM IN SAN SALVADOR AND CHECKING OUT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. THE ARENA MEMBER CLAIMED THAT REGALADO WAS ARRANGING THE PURCHASE IN THE UNITED STATES OF APPROXIMATELY 30 INGRAM SUBMACHINE GUNS, IN 9MM AND 45 CALIBRE. REGALADO, ACCORDING TO THE ARENA MEMBER, PERSONALLY SOLICITS FUNDS FOR HIS OPERATIONS FROM ARENA SYMPATHIZERS BUT DIVERTS SOME OF THESE FUNDS FOR HIS PERSONAL USE, A PRACTICE OF WHICH D'AUBUISSON IS ALLEGED TO BE AWARE. THE ARENA MEMBER ADDED THAT ARTURO ((DUENAS)) REGULARLY SUPPLIES REGALADO AND OTHERS WITH A VARIETY OF OFFICIAL SALVADORAN DOCUMENTS.

3. THE ARENA MEMBER STATED THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MEMBERS IN REGALADO'S PARAMILITARY UNIT IS RICARDO ((ROGEL)) WHO HANDLES "ERNESTO," "LUIS" AND "MARIO," THREE SALVADORANS FORMERLY INVOLVED WITH THE INSURGENTS. THE ARENA MEMBER SAID THAT A REGULAR PARTICIPANT IN REGALADO'S UNIT IS SALVATORI ((VENUTOLO)), WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS YOUNG, BLOND AND FAIR-COMPLEXIONED. WITHOUT ELABORATING FURTHER, THE ARENA MEMBER SAID THAT TWO CLOSE ASSOCIATES OF REGALADO, AMADEO ((MARTINEZ)) AND JORGE ((EABZEK)), ARE PROBABLY MEMBERS OF REGALADO'S PARAMILITARY UNIT AS WELL. THE ARENA MEMBER ADDED THAT PATRICIA ((MARTINO)), WHO WAS RUMORED TO BE REGALADO'S GIRLFRIEND, WAS A MEMBER OF THE PARAMILITARY UNIT WHO DISAPPEARED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AROUND APRIL/MAY 1983.

4- ACCORDING TO THE ARENA MEMBER, AMONG REGALADO'S CLOSEST COLLABORATORS IN THE SALVADORAN MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES ARE POLICE INSPECTOR ARNOLDO ((LINARES)) AND SALVADORAN ARMY LIEUTENANT DAVID ((KOCH)). THE ARENA MEMBER STATED THAT LINARES IS A KEY MEMBER OF THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL POLICE'S (PN) "DEATH SQUAD," THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CENTER (CAIN) WHICH THE ARENA MEMBER CLAIMED TO BE MUCH MORE ACTIVE THAN REGALADO'S UNIT. THE ARENA MEMBER SAID THAT KOCH IS A MEMBER OF EITHER THE BELLOSO OR ATLACATL BATTALION OF THE SALVADORAN ARMY. HE ADDED THAT LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARISTIDES ((MARQUEZ)), FORMER PN D-2 WHO WAS ASSIGNED ABROAD IN EARLY 1983, WAS ALSO A CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF REGALADO'S UNIT. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE 1981 EDITION OF THE "GENERAL DIRECTORY OF

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131649Z JUL 84

THE ARMED FORCES" (ESCALAFON) OF EL SALVADOR, ONE LIEUTENANT DAVID KOCH ARANA, BORN 12 FEBRUARY 1956, ENTERED ON DUTY ON 1 FEBRUARY 1975, WITH DATE OF RANK, 31 DECEMBER 1981. KOCH IS DESIGNATED AS AN "ENGINEER CAREERIST IN THE SALVADORAN MILITARY." NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AGENCIES CONSTANTLY BLAME CAIN FOR KIDNAPS, TORTURES AND KILLINGS OF ACADEMICIANS, STUDENTS AND OTHER CIVILIANS.)

5. THE ARENA MEMBER SAID THAT A GUATEMALAN CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH REGALADO'S PARAMILITARY UNIT IS LUIS ((MENDIZABAL)), OWNER OF BOUTIQUE EMILIO ON FIFTH AVENUE IN GUATEMALA CITY. ACCORDING TO THE ARENA MEMBER, MENDIZABAL'S ASSISTANCE TO REGALADO'S OPERATIONS INCLUDES THE PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS. THE ARENA MEMBER SAID THAT ROLANDO ((MATAHU)), A GUATEMALAN PARAMILITARY SPECIALIST, HAS ALSO WORKED CLOSELY WITH REGALADO. IN THE GUATEMALAN SECURITY SERVICES, THE ARENA MEMBER SAID ONE OF REGALADO'S CLOSEST SUPPORTERS WAS GENERAL GERMAN ((CHUPINA)) BARAHONA, FORMER POLICE CHIEF UNDER THE LUCAS ADMINISTRATION. THE ARENA MEMBER ADDED THAT (FNU) ((GUIDEL)), ALIAS: "EL GATO," WHO WAS KILLED WHILE IN PRISON, AND A PEDRO ((AREDONDO)) WERE CLOSE REGALADO COLLABORATORS. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO A RIGHTIST WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS TO OFFICIALS OF ARENA AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE, MENDIZABAL IS A LONGTIME FRIEND OF REGALADO AND A GUN SUPPLIER FOR ARENA. HE HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH REGALADO IN THE PAST ON DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES BOTH IN EL SAL VADOR AND GUATEMALA. HE IS MARRIED TO THE SISTER OF LUIS FERNANDO ((PIVERAL)), THE OWNER OF A LARGE FARM CALLED "LA SONRISA" (THE SMILE), A KNOWN HAVEN FOR RIGHTISTS. MENDIZABAL REPORTEDLY ALSO HAS LONGTIME LINKS WITH D'AUBUISSON.)

6. THE ARENA MEMBER ALSO NOTED THAT ONE ANIBAL "CHELE" (LNU), A SALVADORAN CIVILIAN, WAS VERY ACTIVE IN DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY BUT WAS NOT A MEMBER OF REGALADO'S PARAMILITARY UNIT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

: 031846Z AUG 84

SUBJECT: ROMERO MURDER CASE

AT MEETING ON 30 JULY 1984, ^{OFFICER} DEBRIEFED ^{30 JUL 84} ON HIS BACKGROUND INFO ON THE ROMERO MURDER. PROVIDED SEVERAL INTERESTING DETAILS,

^{OFFICER} RE ^{OFFICER} KNOWLEDGE OF THE ROMERO CASE, HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFO. ROMERO WAS MURDERED BY EXTREME RIGHTISTS, ANGRY BECAUSE OF HIS LEFTIST POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND THE THREAT HE POSED BY INCITING THE MASSES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO ^{OFFICER} ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) WAS INVOLVED IN THE PLOT, TO WHAT EXTENT HE WAS NOT SURE. HE WAS TOLD OF D'AUBUISSON'S INVOLVEMENT AND THE RIGHTISTS' COMPLICITY BY AIR FORCE CAPT. ROBERTO ((LEIVA)) JACOBO. SHORTLY AFTER THE MURDER OF ROMERO IN DECEMBER 1980, LEIVA TOLD ^{OFFICER} THAT THE MURDER WEAPON, A .22 CAL RIFLE, WAS SHUGGLED INTO EL SALVADOR FROM MIAMI ABOARD AESA AIRLINES (AEROLINEAS EL SALVADOR, S.A.). LATER, ^{OFFICER} SAW THE MURDER WEAPON AT THE

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HOME OF EDUARDO ((CORNEJO)), OWNER OF AESA. CORNEJO GAVE THE WEAPON TO LEIVA WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR DISPOSAL

IS UNAWARE OF WHAT HAPPENED TO IT.

5. LEIVA FURTHER TOLD THAT TWO CUBANS WERE CONTRACTED BY RIGHTISTS TO KILL ROMERO. LEIVA POINTED OUT ONE THE CUBANS TO AT PARTY AT THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS CLUB.

6. TOLD THAT BOTH LEIVA AND CORNEJO ARE STILL ACTIVE IN RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES AND THAT HE HAS ACCESS TO BOTH.

06 AUG 84

INVOLVEMENT OF COL. OSCAR EDGARDO ((CASANOVA)) VEJAR
IN MURDER OF AMERICAN NUNS

SOURCE SAID

1. [REDACTED] IN JULY 1984, [REDACTED] THAT SECOND BRIGADE COMMANDER, COL. OSCAR EDGARDO ((CASANOVA)) VEJAR WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ORDERING MURDER OF FOUR MARYKNOLL NUNS IN 1982. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] CASANOVA WAS COMMANDER IN ZACATEGOLUCA AT TIME OF THE MURDERS AND HAD INFORMATION RE THE SUSPECTED INVOLVEMENT OF THE NUNS IN LEFTIST ACTIVITIES. HE ALSO KNEW OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THEIR ARRIVAL IN EL SALVADOR ON THE DAY THEY WERE KILLED.

SOURCE CLAIMED

2. [REDACTED] THAT CASANOVA, WHO IS FIRST COUSIN OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE ((VIDES)) CASANOVA, WAS TRANSFERRED TO ARMY HQS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MURDER OF THE NUNS TO SHIELD HIM FROM THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION.

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-- SALVADORAN JUSTICE OFFICIALS TOLD US OFFICIALS LAST WEEK THAT THEY INTEND TO APPEAL THE AMNESTY OF CRIMINALS INVOLVED IN SEVERAL PROMINENT MURDER CASES INVOLVING US CITIZENS. SUCH CASES INCLUDE THE KILLING OF FOUR MARINE GUARDS IN 1983 AND THE PARKMOLL MURDER IN 1980.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-11-83 BY 1043
SALVADOR ARE CONSIDERING RETALIATION FOR THE MURDER OF
ARCHBISHOP ROMERO, THE NUNS AND "SOME AMERICANS"--PROBABLY THE
LABOR OFFICIALS WHO WERE GIVING ADVICE ON AGRARIAN

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[REDACTED]

IS QUITE PLAUSIBLE, BUT NOT REALLY NEWS. ORDER OF MONKS WHO ORDERED IS STILL COUNTED BY THE SALVADORAN PEOPLE. SOMEONE HAS EVER BROUGHT TO A VERY SATISFACTORY QUESTION, EVEN IN THE NUN'S CASE WHERE FIVE NATIONAL GUARDIANS WERE TRIED AND CONVICTED FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE EXECUTION, NOBODY BELIEVES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS WHO ACTUALLY GAVE THE ORDERS EITHER HAS BEEN OR WILL BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN FRACTIONS OF THE INSURGENTS HAVE TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF THIRTEEN, INCLUDING SIX AMERICANS, IN JUNE 1984, AND THE KIDNAPPING OF SALVADORAN QUARTERMASTER'S DAUGHTER IN SEPTEMBER. IT IS ONLY SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS THE INSURGENTS BELIEVE THAT A WAY TO GATHER SUPPORT FOR A CAUSE IN RECENT MONTHS HAS LOST SUPPORT OF LOCAL SALVADORANS. ONE OR BRING TO JUSTICE THE MURDERS OF THE ARCHBISHOP AS THE NUNS AND THE AMERICANS.

84

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON SALVADORAN PRISONER EXCHANGE

2. THE DEAL FOR THE PRISONER EXCHANGE WAS FINALIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE FOUR MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL COMMISSIONS (NOT JUST CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS AS FIRST REPORTED) OF FMLN COMPONENT PARTIES WILL BE SWAPPED FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS. A MAJOR HOLD UP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OCCURED WHEN THE FMLN INITIALLY REFUSED TO RELEASE MAJOR CARLOS NAPOLEON ((MEDINA)) GARAY BECAUSE OF HIS KEY ROLE IN THE "SLAUGHTER AT LAS HOIAS." ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF ((BLANDON)) SENT WORD THAT, BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM FAR RIGHTISTS IN THE MILITARY, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES, ESPECIALLY FROM MEDINA'S CLOSE FRIEND ARENA HEAD ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)), MEDINA'S RELEASE WAS A "SINE QUA NON" FOR THE DEAL. SO THE FMLN ACQUIESCED, RATIONALIZING THAT THEY WERE RETURNING MEDINA (LITERALLY) WITHOUT TESTICLES.

B. 15 FMLN WOUNDED WILL BE GIVEN SAFE-PASSAGE THROUGH

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[REDACTED]

THE SAN SALVADOR AIRPORT TO MEXICO FOR EACH ADDITIONAL SALVA
DORAN ARMY OFFICER RELEASED BY THE FMLN. THUS, 60 WOUNDED WILL
BE SENT ABROAD FOR TREATMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR ANOTHER FOUR
ARMY OFFICERS, BRINGING THE TOTAL OF THE ARMY OFFICERS TO BE
RELEASED TO EIGHT.

C. UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE RED CROSS, THE WOUNDED
WILL BE RELEASED IN GROUPS OF 15, EVERY FIVE DAYS. THE FIRST
GROUP WERE FLOWN TO MEXICO ON 26 AUGUST. SOURCE ASSUMES THAT
THE SECOND AND THIRD GROUPS HAVE, BY NOW, ARRIVED IN MEXICO.
THE REMAINING 30 WILL BE RELEASED IN TWO GROUPS DURING THE
SECOND WEEK OF SEPTEMBER. 40 OF THE TOTAL WILL BE FLOWN FROM
MEXICO TO SWEDEN, HOLLAND, BELGIUM, YUGOSLAVIA AND FRANCE
FOR TREATMENT IN HOSPITALS THERE. TEN WILL BE FLOWN TO SAN
JOSE FOR TREATMENT IN COSTA RICA. [REDACTED]

D. AFTER THE FIRST TWO GROUPS OF WOUNDED REACH MEXICO,
THE 4-FOR-4 PRISONER SWAP WILL BE EFFECTED. THE FOUR FMLN
OFFICIALS ARE SCHEDULED TO TRANSIT SAN JOSE ON 8 SEPTEMBER
EN ROUTE TO STOCKHOLM. (TO ALLOW THE POPULAR SOCIAL CHRISTIAN
MOVEMENT (MPPC) A CHANCE TO MAKE SOME POLITICAL HAY, A MEETING
OF THE ENTIRE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE MPPC WILL BE HELD IN
SAN JOSE 7-10 SEPT, AND SEVERAL WILL GREET THE FOUR RE-
LEASED FMLN OFFICIALS.) UNDER THE RULES OF THE GENEVA CON-
VENTION BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT NONE OF THE RELEASED WILL
RETURN TO COMBAT ZONES.

E. WHEN THE EXCHANGE IS COMPLETED, ON THE SAME DAY
SALVADORAN ARMY OFFICERS AND FMLN OFFICIALS WILL "ANSWER
(PLANTED) QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS" ABOUT THE SWAP. NEITHER
SIDE WILL HOLD PRESS CONFERENCES CLAIMING CREDIT. THIS IS
A CONDITION IMPOSED BY BLANDON WHO SEEKS TO MINIMIZE THE
BLOW-BACK FROM THE SALVADORAN FAR RIGHT, WHICH, BLANDON
TOLD (OR CONVEYED TO) THE FMLN, PRESIDENT NAPOLEON ((DUARTE))
FEARS AND, FOR THAT REASON, DUARTE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO
APPROVE THE EXCHANGE. AS PART OF THE PRIORITY FMLN CAMPAIGN
TO DISCREDIT DUARTE AND ANIMATE "NATIONALIST" (READ "NON PRO-
US GOVERNMENT") MILITARY OFFICERS, FMLN RESPONSES TO THE PRESS
WILL STRESS DUARTE'S OBSTINACY AND THE MILITARY'S ENLIGHTENMENT
IN THIS MATTER.

2. THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS WERE HANDLED BY THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH UNDER THE PERSONAL SUPERVISION OF ARCHBISHOP ARTURO
((RIVERA Y DAMAS)). AS REPORTED IN MAY FROM SAME SOURCE, A
MAIN TENET IN FMLN/FDR DIPLOMACY IS TO USE THE CHURCH AS AN
INTERMEDIARY TOWARD ACHIEVING DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE GOES.
THE ARCHBISHOP ACCEPTED ON THE CONDITION THAT THE FMLN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

"HUMANIZE THE WAR;" THUS, THE FMLN RELEASED EX DEFENSE ATTACHE (IDEL CASTILLO) AND, WHILE NEGOTIATING THE LATTER'S RELEASE AND AS THE FMLN HOPED, DIRECT SECRET CONTACTS WERE SPANNED BETWEEN FMLN OFFICIALS AND BLANDON REPRESENTATIVES. THESE CONTACTS WERE DISCREETLY ENCOURAGED AND MONITORED BY A FEW MAJORS AND JUNIOR COLONELS OF THE ARMY "PLANA MAYOR" WHO DO NOT FMLN PENETRATIONS "PER SE," BUT WHOSE COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATED PEACE EMBOLDENS THEM TO SUSTAIN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE FMLN. FROM WHAT SOURCE SAID, IN OUR PARLANC THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE CALLED "AGENTS OF INFLUENCE."

3. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SALVADORAN ARMY NEGOTIATORS SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT INFORM THE US GOVERNMENT OF SUBJECT EXCHANGE BUT FMLN OFFICIALS ASSUME THAT SAN SALVADOR IS TOO SMALL AND THE USG PRESENCE TOO PERVASIVE FOR THE DEATH TO HAVE GONE UNREPORTED TO THE USG. THUS, THE FMLN THINKS THAT THE USG CONDONES SUCH EXCHANGES/CONTACTS.

4. THE FMLN PLANS TO CONTINUE SUCH EXCHANGES TO IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE--MAINTAIN AND INCREASE SECRET, DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE SALVADORAN MILITARY; IMPROVE THE FMLN IMAGE; RESCUE PRISONERS. FOR THAT REASON THE FMLN IS HOLDING BACK CAPTURES WHO INCLUDE AT LEAST SIX SALVADORAN ARMY OFFICERS AND TWO HONDURAN ARMY OFFICERS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PLANS BY THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE TO AMEND
PRESIDENT DUARTE'S GENERAL AMNESTY PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE
PRISONERS CONVICTED IN THE AMERICAN NUNS CASE AND
THOSE IMPLICATED IN THE SHERATON HOTEL CASE

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[REDACTED] PROMINENT MEMBER OF THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) TOLD A FELLOW ARENA MEMBER THAT IF PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)) FOLLOWS THROUGH WITH HIS PROPOSAL FOR A GENERAL AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS, THAT ARENA WOULD AMEND THE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AMNESTY FOR THE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN CONVICTED OF MURDERING FOUR AMERICAN NUNS AND THE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN IMPLICATED IN THE MURDERS OF A SALVADORAN LABOR LEADER AND TWO AMERICAN LABOR ADVISORS AT THE SHERATON HOTEL. [REDACTED] SAID THAT BOTH OF THESE CRIMES WERE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND MOTIVE, AND DESERVED THE SAME CONSIDERATION FOR AMNESTY AS DO CRIMES OF SUBVERSION, TERRORISM, KIDNAPPING AND MURDER PERPETRATED BY LEFTIST INSURGENTS. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ARENA'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEPUTIES WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT A GENERAL AMNESTY SHOULD INCLUDE NOT ONLY LEFTIST INSURGENTS, WHO THEY SAY HAVE CAUSED CONSIDERABLE DESTRUCTION AND MISERY IN THE COUNTRY, BUT ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND SUSPECTS, INCLUDING SALVADORAN MILITARY PERSONNEL. [REDACTED] IF THIS PROVISION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN DUARTE'S PROPOSAL, THE ARENA FACTION WOULD VOTE AS A BLOC TO DISAPPROVE THE AMNESTY AND WOULD ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE OTHER CONSERVATIVE DEPUTIES TO DO THE SAME. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON ALLEGED THREAT TO REY PRENDES

MAJOR IVAN ((REYNALDO)) DIAZ, [REDACTED] CURRENTLY ON ASSIGNMENT TO GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE IN PARAGUAY; COL. ELMER ((GONZALEZ)) ARAUJO, CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF AND FORMERLY COMMANDER OF SONSONATE MILITARY DETACHMENT; AND CAPTAIN ((MORALES)) FIGUEIROA, CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO ESAF MAESTRANZA (GENERAL SUPPORT DEPOT) WERE PLANNING TO KILL REY PRENDES. THE MOTIVE FOR SUCH A PLOT, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED], WOULD BE TO PUT PRESSURE ON [REDACTED] TO DROP THE INVESTIGATION OF THE "CASO DE LAS HOJAS". THIS WAS A MASSACRE OF A NUMBER OF SALVADORAN INDIANS IN THE SONSONATE MILITARY DETACHMENT AREA OF OPERATIONS WHILE COL. GONZALES ARAUJO WAS SONSONATE COMMANDER. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: TRACE RESPONSE - COLONEL JOSE ADOLFO ((MEDRANO))

THE FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED]
AND [REDACTED] REPORTS [REDACTED] ON COLONEL JOSE ADOLFO
(MEDRANO):

A. MEDRANO CARRIED OUT THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE MISCONDUCT OR DERELICTION OF DUTIES OF MAJOR (NOW LT. COLONEL) MARIO DENIS ((MORAN)) ECHEVERRIA IN CONNECTION WITH HIS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE HOTEL SHERATON ON 3 JANUARY 1981. MEDRANO, A VERY THOROUGH AND CAREFUL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATOR, WAS THE NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER WHO LED THE INVESTIGATORY WORKING GROUPS WHICH BROKE THE CHURCHWOMEN AND SHERATON MURDER CASES. HE SHOWED TREMENDOUS COURAGE IN BOTH INVESTIGATIONS, RISKING HIS CAREER, HIS SECURITY, AND EVEN THE LIVES OF THIS FAMILY IN CONDUCTING A SERIOUS INVESTIGATION OF THESE MURDERS. HE CONTINUED TO ASSIST IN THE TWO CASES, EVEN AFTER HE COMPLETED HIS INVESTIGATION AND TURNED THE CASES OVER TO THE CIVILIAN TRIBUNALS.

REDAKED'S PROFESSIONAL CAREER
MAY HAVE BEEN NEGATIVELY AFFECTED BY HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH
THE [REDAKED] WHILE CONDUCTING THESE TWO INVESTIGATIONS. (DOI:
06 AUG 84 AND 26 FEB 83)

06 AUG 84 AND 26 FEB 83)
DURING A CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] POLOFF ON 22 OCT 1982. MEDRANO REPORTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED FIVE ANONYMOUS THREATENING TELEPHONE CALLS IN THE PAST THREE DAYS; ALL CALLS MADE TO HIS OFFICE AT NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS. CALLS WERE THE SAME: "IF LOPES SIBRIAN GOES TO JAIL, THEN YOU AND SOME

PAGE 0002
TOT: 15073-2 NOV 84

AMERICANS WILL DIE. MEDRANO REPORTED THESE CALLS TO THE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON MEDRANO. (DOJ) 25 OCT 82

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 291744Z NOV 84

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REQUEST BY SALVADORAN PRESIDENT THAT MILITARY HIGH
COMMAND REMOVE LT. LOPEZ SIBRIAN FROM THE ARMED FORCE

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] SALVADORAN PRESIDENT [REDACTED] MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND TO REQUEST THE REMOVAL OF LT. RODOLFO ISIDRO ((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN FROM THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: LOPEZ SIBRIAN WAS ACCUSED OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JANUARY 1981 MURDER OF TWO U.S. CITIZENS AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN SAN SALVADOR. THE SALVADORAN SUPREME COURT ABSOLVED HIM OF THIS CHARGE IN MID-NOVEMBER 1984. PRESENT AT THE MEETING, WHICH LASTED FOR TWO HOURS, WERE DEFENSE MINISTER GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA, VICE-MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA, VICE-MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC SECURITY COLONEL CARLOS REYNALDO ((LOPEZ)) NUILA, AND CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF COLONEL ADOLFO ONECIFERO ((BLANDON)).

2. [REDACTED] PRESIDENT DUARTE TOLD THE GROUP THAT HE HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO TRY TO DO SOMETHING TO OFFSET THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION TO FREE LOPEZ SIBRIAN. [REDACTED] DUARTE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LEGALLY, HE COULD DO NOTHING, BUT BELIEVED THAT HE COULD ELIMINATE SOME OF THE STRONG CRITICISM AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR FROM THE U.S. IF SOME ACTION, SUCH AS REMOVAL OF LOPEZ SIBRIAN FROM THE ARMED FORCES, WERE TAKEN.

3. [REDACTED] THE HIGH COMMAND OFFICERS APPRECIATED THE DIFFICULT POSITION IN WHICH THE LOPEZ SIBRIAN CASE HAS PUT THE PRESIDENT, BUT THEY TOLD DUARTE THAT THEY COULD NOT REMOVE LOPEZ SIBRIAN FROM THE ARMED FORCES AFTER HE HAD BEEN FOUND INNOCENT BY THE SUPREME COURT. THEY TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT

SUCH AN ACTION WOULD CREATE A VERY NEGATIVE REACTION IN THE OFFICER CORPS, ESPECIALLY AT THE CAPTAIN AND MAJOR LEVELS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE HIGH COMMAND FINALLY AGREED TO SEEK A WAY TO MOVE LOPEZ SIBRIAN OUT OF THE COUNTRY, TO A MILITARY POSTING AS AN ATTACHE, OR TO A FOREIGN MILITARY SCHOOL FOR AN EXTENDED COURSE.

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: AIR FORCE COMMANDER COLONEL JUAN RAFAEL ((BUSTILLO)) LEARNED OF THIS DECISION [REDACTED] AND BECAME EXTREMELY ANGRY. BUSTILLO SAID THAT MOVING LOPEZ SIBRIAN OUT OF THE COUNTRY WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND WOULD HAVE A VERY DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE OFFICER CORPS. BUSTILLO SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN AN EFFORT TO REVERSE THE DECISION.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: ALLEGED CONNECTION BETWEEN FORMER FDN OFFICIAL AND
ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON/LY

1. TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST FEATURE
ARTICLES ON A RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE AND INTERVIEWS GIVEN BY
FORMER ANSESAL CHIEF ROBERTO SANTIVANEZ. ACCORDING TO
SANTIVANEZ, FORMER FDN OFFICIAL RICARDO LAU RECEIVED \$120,000
FOR ARRANGING THE DEATH SQUAD EXECUTION OF ARCHBISHOP ~~ROBERTO~~
ARNULFO ROMERO IN 1980 AND WAS WORKING DIRECTLY FOR ROBERTO
D'AUBUISSON AT THAT TIME. SANTIVANEZ ADDED THAT COLONEL LAU
WAS SENT TO WORK IN GUATEMALA, TRAINING DEATH SQUAD KILLERS AND
ADVISED D'AUBUISSON DIRECTLY ON HOW TO CARRY OUT DEATH SQUAD
ACTIVITIES.

2. RESPONDING TO INTENSE CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN
ALLEGED HONDURAN/FDN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, [REDACTED] HAS
ALREADY EXAMINED THE POSSIBILITY OF A LINK BETWEEN RICARDO LAU
AND D'AUBUISSON AND HAS FOUND NO CONNECTION. IN ORDER TO BE

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NOV 1993

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

100 PERCENT CERTAIN, HOWEVER, REQUEST THAT [REDACTED] QUERY
[REDACTED] RE A POSSIBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN LAU AND
D'AUBUISSON. ADDITIONALLY, WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY DETAILS [REDACTED]
MAY PROVIDE ON THE MORE GENERAL SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE LINK
BETWEEN ELEMENTS WITHIN THE GOH/FBN AND SALVADORAN/Guatemalan
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS.4

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 001
TOR: 050222Z MAR 85

CHRONO

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS RE CHINO LAU

1. THERE IS NO CONFIRMED INFORMATION ON CHINO LAU'S ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS. DURING THE NICARAGUAN INSURRECTION LAU WAS THE COMMANDER ON A NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD DETACHMENT LOCATED IN THE STEEPLE OF A CHURCH. THE UNIT WAS FIRED ON BY INSURGENTS AND RETURNED FIRE KILLING SOME OF THE SANDINISTA INSURGENTS. LAU WAS VERY EFFECTIVE IN HONDURAS AS THE CHIEF OF THE FDN CI SECTION. BECAUSE OF THE FSLN ALLEGATIONS AGAINST LAU BASED ON THE ABOVE INCIDENT AND BECAUSE OF THE ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT UNITY WITH [REDACTED] AND HIS ORGANIZATION, LAU WAS REMOVED FROM HIS FDN POSITION. [REDACTED] THEN PLACED LAU IN THE HONDURAN ARMY CI SECTION BECAUSE OF HIS DEMONSTRATED ABILITY TO WORK EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE SANDINISTA INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT LAU DEPARTED HONDURAS A NUMBER OF MONTHS AGO. BELIEVE HE NOW RESIDES IN GUATEMALA.

2. [REDACTED] UNDERSTANDS FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH THE MEMBER OF THE OFFICIAL HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, LTC ERIC SANCHEZ, [REDACTED] THAT THE COMMISSION WAS ADVISED BY [REDACTED] THAT LAU HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO HONDURAN LEFTISTS IN 1981. SANCHEZ ALSO ALLEGED THAT LAU WAS A HITMAN SUPPORT HIS ALLEGATIONS. SANCHEZ PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO AUTHORITIES SHOWED THAT LAU WAS NOT IN HONDURAS AT THE TIME OF THE DISAPPEARANCES AND THEY COULD NOT VERIFY THAT LAU HAD CARRIED OUT ANYTHING BUT LEGITIMATE CI WORK [REDACTED] HAS BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF MISCONDUCT BY LAU. THERE ARE ONLY VAGUE RUMORS.

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PAGE 001
TOR: 301608Z MAR 85

CHRONO

SUBJECT: ALLEGED CONNECTION BETWEEN FORMER FDN OFFICIAL AND
ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON

1. [REDACTED] WAS QUERIED CONCERNING PARA 2 REF A
POSSIBILITY OF LINK BETWEEN RICARDO ((LAU)) AND D'AUBUISSON. HE
KNEW OF NO SUCH CONNECTION AND IN FACT HAD NEVER HEARD OF LAU.
NOR DID HE HAVE ANY INFORMATION OF THE MORE GENERAL SUBJECT OF
LINKS BETWEEN ELEMENTS WITHIN THE GQH/FDN AND
SALVADORAN/Guatemalan RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS. WE HAVE TASKED
HIM TO BE ALERT IN THE FUTURE FOR INFORMATION ON THESE SUBJECTS
AND WILL ADVISE YOU IMMEDIATELY IF HE COMES UP WITH ANY INFO.

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PAGE 001
TOR: 032255Z APR 85

SUBJECT: RICARDO LAU

1. [REDACTED] HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF RICARDO "CHINO" LAU [REDACTED]

2. ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY ASKED TO COMMENT, [REDACTED] PROVIDES FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO REF INQUIRY: WHILE RICARDO LAU WAS FREQUENTLY CITED AS ONE OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS FORMER NATIONAL GUARDSMEN IN THE FDN RANKS, I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY FDN PLOT TO HAVE HIM KILLED IN 1983, OR ANY OTHER TIME. C/A [REDACTED] REPEATEDLY PRESSED TO HAVE THE FDN GENERAL STAFF REMOVE RICARDO LAU FROM HIS POSITION AS HEAD OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, AND EVEN TO ASSIGN HIM OUTSIDE OF HONDURAS OR TO LESS VISIBLE POSITION. IT WAS ONLY AFTER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURING THAT THE FDN AGREED TO SEND RICARDO LAU TO GUATEMALA IN SOME LIAISON CAPACITY. AT NO TIME WAS HE OUT OF FAVOR WITH THE FDN LEADERSHIP. [REDACTED]

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TOR: 271609Z APR 85

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WIFE AS SECURITY CHIEF FOR MARIO ((RAUN)), OWNER AND MANAGER OF MEDICAL LAB AND PHARMACY. AFTER SIX MONTHS OF EMPLOYMENT WITH RAUN, SANTOS QUIT AND VOLUNTEERED FOR TRAINING WITH THE CIVIL DEFENSE AS A LOCAL COMMANDER. IN 1980, HE WAS ASSIGNED AS COMMANDER OF A CIVIL DEFENSE UNIT IN CUSCATANCINGO, NORTH OF SAN SALVADOR, WHERE HE SERVED FOR OVER ONE YEAR. DURING HIS TENURE AS CIVIL DEFENSE COMMANDER, SANTOS WAS SUSPECTED OF MURDERING SEVERAL PERSONS LIVING IN CUSCATANCINGO. IN 1981, HE WAS ARRESTED BY THE NATIONAL GUARD AND JAILED FOR THREE MONTHS ON CHARGES OF MURDERING A STUDENT. SANTOS WAS LATER RELEASED FOR LACK OF WITNESSES OR EVIDENCE. SANTOS WAS THEN TRANSFERRED TO THE TOWN OF ELPAISNAL IN SAN SALVADOR DEPARTMENT WHERE HE SERVED AS LOCAL COMMANDER FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR. DURING LATTER PART OF 1981 AND 1982, SANTOS WAS FREQUENTLY SEEN WITH SEVERAL ARMED MEN UNDER HIS COMMAND VISITING PROMINENT CITIZENS IN SAN SALVADOR ASSOCIATED WITH THE RIGHT WING, INCLUDING JOSE ALBERTO ((GONZALES)) GINER, JOSE LUIS ((MOLINS)) RUBIO, MARIO ((RAUN)) AND ARTURO ((MUYSCONDT)). IN 1983, SANTOS WAS TRANSFERRED TO VERAPAZ IN SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT WHERE HE DESERTED AFTER ALLEGEDLY STEALING 10,000 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION FOR DIFFERENT CALIBRE WEAPONS. ACCORDING TO GONZALEZ GINER, SANTOS SOLD THE AMMUNITION TO HIM AND GONZALEZ GINER TURNED ALL OF THE AMMUNITION OVER TO ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF AFTER THE INVESTIGATION BEGAN LEADING TO HIM. GONZALEZ GINER WAS NOT ARRESTED, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE HE WAS SON-IN-LAW OF JOSE FRANCISCO ((GUERRERO)), AT THAT TIME MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY FOR PRESIDENT ALVARO ((MAGANA)). IN MID-1984, SANTOS TURNED HIMSELF IN TO THE POLICE AND WAS JAILED FOR THREE MONTHS BEFORE BEING RELEASED FREE OF CHARGES. HE WAS DENIED PERMISSION TO RE-ENTER THE CIVIL DEFENSE.

3. BOTH SANTOS' FIRST AND SECOND WIVES ABANDONED HIM DUE TO SANTOS' ALCOHOLISM. AT THE END OF 1984, SANTOS WAS ARRESTED BY THE NATIONAL POLICE FOR INVOLVEMENT IN A DRUNKEN BRAWL AT A FUNERAL HOME. HE WAS JAILED FOR TWO MONTHS AND RELEASED. HE NOW REPORTEDLY ATTENDS "ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS." RECENTLY, SANTOS WAS HEARD BRAGGING THAT HE WAS EMPLOYED BY U.S. EMBASSY AND SERVED AS BODYGUARD FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR.

4. L/O IS REVIEWING THIS INFO ALONG WITH INFO PROVIDED TO HIM BY SANTOS IN EFFORT TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-UP ACTION.

032345Z MAY 85

SUBJECT: ALLEGATION OF D'AUBUISSON INVOLVEMENT IN ROMERO
ASSASSINATION

1. [REDACTED] CLARIFIED [REDACTED] REPORT ON 3 MAY: A SALVADORAN CITIZEN, ADELBERTO ((SALAZAR)) (DPOB: CA 1945, EL SALVADOR) WAS ARRESTED FOR STEALING A MOTORSCOOTER IN SAN SALVADOR CA 15 APRIL. THE MOTORSCOOTER BELONGED TO A MINOR CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) OFFICIAL WHO RECOGNIZED THE THIEF AS THE MAN WHO HAD APPEARED IN AN ARENA PARTY CAMPAIGN TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENT IN MARCH 1984, CLAIMING TO BE THE ASSASSIN OF MONSIGNOR OSCAR ARNULFO ((ROMERO)). (FYI: ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) INTRODUCED THE TAPED TV INTERVIEW STATING THAT THIS WOULD CLEAR HIM OF ANY SUSPICION OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ASSASSINATION.) WHEN TOLD HE WOULD BE CHARGED AS ROMERO'S ASSASSIN INSTEAD OF AS A MOTORSCOOTER THIEF, SALAZAR ADMITTED THE VIDEO TAPE HAD BEEN A HOAX, WHICH HE HAD BEEN HIRED TO PERPETRATE BY A HONDURAN MILITARY OFFICER ON BEHALF OF THE ARENA PARTY.

2. SALAZAR IS NOW UNDER PROTECTION OF THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL POLICE (HE CLAIMS HE WILL BE KILLED IF HE IS ALLOWED TO GO FREE) WHO ARE INVESTIGATING HIS STORY, AT THE BEHEST OF THE PDC. HE HAS SOMEHOW MANAGED TO INVOLVE THE C-2 OF BOTH THE HONDURAN AND SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES IN THE LATE 1983-EARLY 1984 PERIOD IN HIS PARTICIPATION THE INTERVIEW, IMPLYING THAT THEY ARRANGED THE INTERVIEW FOR ARENA. THE DETAILS SALAZAR PROVIDED IN THE TAPED INTERVIEW ARE SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED THAT INVESTIGATORS BELIEVE HE WAS BRIEFED BY EITHER A PARTICIPANT IN THE ACTION OR AN INVESTIGATOR AFTER THE FACT. HE ALSO HAS RAISED THE SPECTRE OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] INVOLVEMENT, IMPLYING LATTERS' KNOWLEDGE

CIA

STATE

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032345Z MAY 85

OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE TAPING.

4. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO PDC OFFICIALS ON SALAZAR CONVINCED THEM HE DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE KILLING (HE IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN IN A HONDURAN JAIL AT THE TIME), BUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CASE HAS LED THEM TO BELIEVE HE CAN IMPLICATE CURRENT ARENA MEMBERS, POSSIBLY D'AUBUISSON HIMSELF. SALAZAR DESCRIBED A "HIGH-RANKING ARENA MEMBER" WITH WHOM HE DEALT BEFORE MAKING THE VIDEO TAPE, AND THE DESCRIPTION FITS EITHER HUGO ((BARRERA)) OR ARMANDO ((CALDERON)) SOL. THE PDC DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER WAS INVOLVED IN THE ROMERO KILLING OR THE FALSE CONFESSION.

PAGE 0001

030033Z MAY 85

SUBJECT: ALLEGATION OF D'AUBUISSON INVOLVEMENT IN ROMERO ASSASSINATION.

1. [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 30 APRIL THAT A SALVADORAN CITIZEN WHO WAS RECENTLY ARRESTED ON SOME MINOR CHARGE WAS REVEALED TO BE THE SAME PERSON ARRESTED CA APRIL 1982 ON A CHARGE OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH HIS ARREST RECORD AND ADVISED HE WOULD BE PROSECUTED FOR THAT CRIME, HE CONFESSED THE 1982 MATTER HAD BEEN A HOAX PERPETUATED BY THE ARENA PARTY.

2. ACCORDING TO THE ARRESTEE, HE WAS IN JAIL IN HONDURAS IN EARLY 1982 WHEN APPROACHED BY A HONDURAN MILITARY OFFICER AND ADVISED HE WOULD BE FREED IF HE AGREED TO DO A "JOB" IN EL SALVADOR. HE ARRIVED IN EL SALVADOR AND WAS BRIEFED BY UNIDENTIFIED ARENA PARTY MEMBERS TO CONFESS TO PARTICIPATING IN THE 1980 ASSASSINATION. HE WAS SENT TO JAIL AND WAS QUIETLY RELEASED AFTER THE 1982 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS WITH ASSISTANCE TO ESCAPE TO MEXICO. IN THE INTERVENING YEARS HE HAS BEEN LIVING IN GUATEMALA AND RETURNED TO EL SALVADOR FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. HE ADVISED THE SALVADORAN POLICE THAT HIS CONFESSION WAS PART OF A PLAN TO "PUBLICLY SOLVE" THE CASE OF ROMERO'S ASSASSINATION SO THAT SUSPICIONS OF INVOLVEMENT OF ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) WOULD NOT TAINT LATTER'S CAMPAIGN FOR DEPUTY IN 1982.

3. EVENING 1 MAY, [REDACTED] REPORTED PRESIDENT DUARTE INTENDS TO INTRODUCE A MEASURE IN THE NEW LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY TO TRY D'AUBUISSON FOR THE DEATH OF ROMERO. AS A DEPUTY, HE CANNOT BE ARRESTED AND TRIED LIKE A REGULAR CITIZEN BUT WITH

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030033Z MAY 85

A TWO-THIRDS VOTE IN THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, HE CAN BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE NATIONAL CONCILIATION PARTY (PCN) IS ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN PURSUING A CASE AGAINST D'AUBUISSON. DUARTE ALSO PLANS TO REMOVE JOSE FRANCISCO ((GUERRERO)), THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MEMBER OF ARENA PRIOR TO BRINGING THE ACTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001

TOT: 041303Z MAY 84

SUBJECT:

FILE SUMMARY RICARDO SOL MEZA

1. FOLLOWING IS [REDACTED] TRACE RESPONSE,
DATED 23 DECEMBER 1983, ON RICARDO ((SOL))
MEZA [REDACTED].

"RICARDO SOL MEZA WAS BORN 24 JUNE 1946 IN SAN SALVADOR. SOL MEZA WAS AT ONE TIME THE OWNER OF THE SHERATON HOTEL DISCO AND ON THE SHERATON BOARD OF DIRECTORS. SOL MEZA [REDACTED] CONSISTS MAINLY OF [REDACTED] TRAFFIC DEALING WITH HIS SUSPECTED INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURDERS OF AIFLD OFFICIALS MIKE HAMMER AND MARK PEARLMAN. IN JUNE 1983 [REDACTED] SAN SALVADOR REPORTED THAT RICARDO AND BROTHER ENRIQUE WENT TO [REDACTED] TO HAVE U.S. VISA VALIDATED. [REDACTED] MESSAGE STATED THAT SINCE HIS IMPLICATION IN THE ABOVE MURDERS HE HAD BEEN ABSOLVED OF ANY WRONG DOING BY SALVADORAN COURTS AND "IT NOW APPEARS THAT HE WAS AN INNOCENT BYSTANDER."

[REDACTED] ON 30
MAY 1981 [REDACTED] source

REPORTED THAT THEN NATIONAL GUARD MAJOR MARIO DENIS ((MORAN)) DIRECTED A "DEATH SQUAD" PAYROLLED BY SALVADORAN BUSINESSMAN RICARDO SOL MESA, AND THAT SOL MESA AND MORAN USED THIS DEATH SQUAD TO KILL RODOLFO ((VIERA)), FORMER PRESIDENT OF SALVADORAN INSTITUTE OF AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATION (ISTA) AT THE SHERATON HOTEL ON 4 JANUARY 1981. [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT HAMMER AND PEARLMAN APPARENTLY WERE NOT TARGETS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT.

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"A. VIERA WAS A LONGSTANDING TARGET OF THE SOL MESA AND MORAN GROUP, AND THEY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF VIERA'S LENGTHY PRESENCE IN THE SHERATON HOTEL FOR DINNER ON 4 JANUARY 1981 TO ASSASSINATE HIM. THE ASSASSINATION WAS NOT PREPLANNED; THE DECISION TO MURDER VIERA WAS MADE ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT.

"B. THE DEATH SQUAD DESCRIBED ABOVE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAJORITY OF BANK BOMBINGS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT MONTHS IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF SAN SALVADOR, AS WELL AS FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS OF MANY INDIVIDUALS THOUGHT TO SUPPORT LEFTIST CAUSES. THE PAYROLL OF THE DEATH SQUAD IS ESTIMATED AT 20,000 COLONES MONTHLY (U.S. \$8,000) WITH MEMBERS NORMALLY PAID 100 COLONES DAILY (U.S. \$40.00) DURING THE PERIODS THEY ARE ASSIGNED TO WORK FOR THE SQUAD. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECTLY STATED IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MAJORITY IF NOT ALL MEMBERS OF THE SOL MESA AND MORAN DEATH SQUAD ARE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.)

"C. THE SOL MESA AND MORAN DEATH SQUAD OPERATES ON ITS OWN BUT IT IS THOUGHT TO HAVE CONNECTIONS THROUGH FORMER ARMY CAPTAIN EDUARDO ALFONSO AVILA WITH ANOTHER RIGHTIST GROUP WHICH IS INVOLVED IN SIMILAR ACTIVITIES."

2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (NOT REPORTED IN ABOVE)

FOLLOWS:

A. ON 22 OCTOBER 1981, THE SALVADORAN SUPREME COURT ISSUED AN ORDER THAT SOL MEZA BE RELEASED FROM PRISON. THE ORDER READ IN PART THAT THERE EXISTED NO LEGAL BASIS FOR SOL MEZA'S DETENTION. AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON, SOL MEZA DEPARTED EL SALVADOR. HE WAS REPORTEDLY SEEN IN GUATEMALA, SPAIN, COSTA RICA AND MEXICO.

B. IN JUNE 1983, [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT SOL MEZA WOULD BE REQUESTING A VISA. [REDACTED] FURTHER STATED THAT [REDACTED] FULLY INTENDED TO INFORM [REDACTED] OF THEIR EMBASSY'S STATE INTENTION TO ISSUE SOL MEZA VISA, SINCE CHARGES NO LONGER EXISTED AGAINST HIM IN EL SALVADOR. IN JANUARY 1985, SOL MEZA AGAIN REQUESTED ISSUANCE OF VISA FOR VACATION IN THE MIAMI AREA. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO ISSUANCE OF VISA. SUGGESTED LENGTH OF VISA WOULD BE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF 30 DAYS.

1 / 1

TOR: 142356Z MAY 85

SUBJECT: EMILIO ANTONIO ((MENDOZA))

EMBASSY

1. [REDACTED] LEGAL OFFICER (L/O), CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THE 1980 MURDER OF SALVADORAN ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ((ROMERO)), HAS REQUESTED [REDACTED] TRACES ON ARGENTINE MILITARY OFFICER, EMILIO ANTONIO ((MENDOZA)). ACCORDING TO INFO OBTAINED BY L/O, MENDOZA WAS SENT TO EL SALVADOR IN 1980 WITH SEVERAL OTHER ARGENTINES BY GENERAL ROBERTO ((VIOLA)). MENDOZA WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH SALVADORAN OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE G-II SECTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND ALLEGEDLY ADMITTED ACTUALLY SHOOTING ROMERO.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Case 19

PAGE 0001
010016Z JUN 85

SUBJECT: ALLEGATION OF ARENA INVOLVEMENT IN ROMERO
ASSASSINATION

1. *IN/STATE* THERE IS NO INFORMATION AT HQS WHICH INDICATES THAT [REDACTED] WAS INVOLVED IN ALBERTO ((SALAZAR)) FILM INTERVIEW OF MARCH 1984. IN FACT, THERE IS NO INFO AVAILABLE THAT ANY SUCH INTERVIEW WAS MADE OR BROADCAST.

2. THERE IS ONLY ONE DOCUMENT AT HQS WHICH MENTIONS A FILM OF ANY KIND BEING MADE THAT INVOLVES SALAZAR. APPARENTLY, A FILM WAS MADE AFTER SALAZAR'S RELEASE FROM PRISON IN DECEMBER 1983. SALAZAR WORKED WITH SALVADORAN MILITARY COL. PENA FILMING A VIDEOTAPE ON THE INFO HE KNEW ABOUT FPL PAYOFFS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCLUDING LT. BILLY JOYA AND AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED VICTOR MAUNEL ((REYES)).

3. ACCORDING TO OUR RECORDS, A SALVADORAN CITIZEN, ROBERTO ADALBERTO ((SALAZAR)), AKA RUIZ, AKA PEDRO, PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO SUBJECT OF REFS, WAS ARRESTED IN LATE NOVEMBER 1981 ON CHARGES OF SWINDLE AND BUNCO SCHEMES. PRIOR TO HIS ARREST, SALAZAR ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE [REDACTED] OFFICIALS IN HONDURAS THAT HE HAD INFORMATION REGARDING THE JOHN SULLIVAN CASE AND THREE OTHER MISSING SALVADORAN CITIZENS. SALAZAR COULD NOT GIVE PROOF OF HIS BONAFIDES AND CLAIMS, AND AFTER HIS ARREST [REDACTED] OFFICERS CONCLUDED HE WAS A FABRICATOR. SALAZAR WAS INCARCERATED FOR ONE AND HALF YEARS.

4. [REDACTED] SALAZAR WAS RELEASED FROM HONDURAS PRISON IN DECEMBER 1983 INTO THE CUSTODY OF COL. PENA WHEN

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NOV 1993

** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 010016Z JUN 85 [REDACTED]

SALAZAR REPORTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO AND WAS WILLING TO TELL ALL ON THE SUBJECT. PENA RETURNED SALAZAR TO EL SALVADOR, WHERE HE WAS DEBRIEFED BY [REDACTED] WHO, AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF DEBRIEFING, EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT HIS TRUTHFULNESS.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOT: 252321Z JUN 85

SUBJECT: SUPPORT TO *Embassy* EFFORT REGARDING SHERATON MURDER CASE

1. THE GROUNDWORK HAS BEEN LAID IN SAN SALVADOR FOR MOVING CAPTAIN AVILA TO TRIAL FOR HIS ROLE IN THE SHERATON MURDERS.

HAVE AGREED TO TESTIFY AGAINST AVILA, WHO EARLIER CONFESSED HIS COMPLICITY IN THE MURDERS. *State* TESTIMONY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSECUTION. SHE AND HER HUSBAND DEPOSED ON 24 JUNE AND WERE EXPECTED TO TESTIFY ON 25 JUNE BUT JUDGE HAS DELAYED TESTIMONY FOR 24 HOURS. *CIA* HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED THREATS, INCLUDING A CALL TO THE *State* CHILDREN ON NIGHT OF 24 JUNE. SECURITY HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO *State* IN SAN SALVADOR AND *State* HAS PROVIDED SECURITY TO FAMILY IN WASHINGTON AREA.

2. *State* HAS ASKED FOR *CIA* ASSISTANCE IN TWO WAYS:

A. *State* ANY INFO REGARDING THREATS TO WALKERS

B. THE JUDGE'S 24 HOUR POSTPONEMENT OF *State* TESTIMONY MAY GIVE AVILA TIME TO ESCAPE. MOST LIKELY DESTINATIONS SHOULD AVILA ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE WOULD BE GUATEMALA OR PANAMA, WITH COSTA RICA AS LESS LIKELY.

3. WILL WELCOME ANY ADDITIONAL PERTINENT FACTS OR SUGGESTIONS

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NOV 1993

"THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO) CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING, WITH RESPECT TO THE CELEBRATION OF THE 10TH OF THIS MONTH IN SAN SALVADOR:

3. IN THE FIGHT FOR PEACE, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY, THE MNR REAFFIRMS ITS WILL TO REMAIN UNITED AND STRENGTHEN THE FOH/FML ALLIANCE, PRESERVING ITS AUTONOMY AND OWN IDENTITY.

4. THIS SITUATION IS PRESENTED IN A CONTEXT OF GOVERNMENTAL VIOLENCE WHICH IS AN INDISPENSIBLE ELEMENT OF THE MILITARY PLAN OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY PROMOTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THROUGH THE ASSISTANCE, ADVICE, AND INTERVENTION OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, DEVELOPING A DIRTY WAR WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE ASSASSINATIONS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGRARIAN ADVISORS, OF THE NORTH AMERICAN MISSION AND MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN PRESS, ARCHBISHOP OSCAR A. DI MENDOZA, A. DI VANEZ (VANEZ) AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE FUR, AMONG THEM THE LATE ENRIQUE (ENARRERA), HAVE NEITHER TRIGGERED NOR CAUSED A SERIOUS INVESTIGATION BY PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND QUARTE.

4. THE RMR IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT ONLY THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION WILL PEACE BE ACHIEVED AND ALLOWED TO PUT TO REST A WAR WHICH HAS BEEN IMPOSED UPON THE PEOPLE. AS A RESULT IT IS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROLONGATION OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY CONFLICT WHICH BLOCKS DIALOGUE AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION."

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Figure 10.7.1

PAGE 001
TOT: 190436Z AUG 85

PIN.

SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF

ROM: DD1.0/CPAS.

INTENTS

2 EL SALVADOR: PROBE OF TERRORIST KILLINGS

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PAGE 002

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EL SALVADOR: PROBE OF TERRORIST KILLINGS

//PRESIDENT DUARTE HAS URGED HIS DEFENSE MINISTER TO ORDER POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY IN INVESTIGATING THE TERRORIST MASSACRE OF US AND SALVADORAN CITIZENS ON 19 JUNE. ANWHILE, THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL GUARD EARLIER THIS WEEK CAPTURED POSSIBLE SUSPECT IN THE KILLINGS.

SAID THE ATTACK HAD NOT BEEN COORDINATED WITH GUERRILLA LEADERS.//

COMMENT: //DUARTE'S ORDER COMES IN RESPONSE TO AN APPARENT LACK OF COOPERATION AMONG UNITS CHARGED WITH THE INVESTIGATION AND INDICATES THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN THAT THE OFTEN-COMPETITIVE POLICE AND MILITARY AGENCIES MAY BE HAMPERING THE PROBE. GREATER COOPERATION AMONG THE VARIOUS AGENCIES INVOLVED, TOGETHER WITH INFORMATION FROM [REDACTED] COULD LEAD TO OTHER ARRESTS. [REDACTED]

SECRET

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100101Z SEP 85

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT DUARTE TO THE
MINISTER OF JUSTICE TO INVESTIGATE NEW INFORMATION
ABOUT THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO

DOI: LATE AUGUST 1985

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[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. IN LATE AUGUST 1985, PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)) ORDERED THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE JULIO ALFREDO ((SAMAYOA)) TO LAUNCH AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION OF NEW INFORMATION OBTAINED BY DUARTE ABOUT THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP OF SAN SALVADOR OSCAR ARNULFO ((ROMERO)). DUARTE INSTRUCTED SAMAYOA TO EMPLOY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (SIU) AND ITS OVERSIGHT COMMISSION TO COMPLETE THE INVESTIGATION BY THE END OF OCTOBER 1985 AND TO ARREST ANY SUSPECTS IMPLICATED BY THE NEW EVIDENCE. [REDACTED] COMMENT: NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON THE CONTENT OF THE EVIDENCE. THE SIU WAS ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED TO INVESTIGATE THE 19 JUNE ZONA ROSA MASSACRE BUT WAS EVENTUALLY TO ASSUME OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES.)

2. BASED ON THE NEW INFORMATION OBTAINED BY DUARTE, SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL SALVADORAN CITIZENS ARE IMPLICATED IN THE ROMERO MURDER CASE. THE NEW EVIDENCE DOES NOT APPEAR TO INCRIMINATE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) PRESIDENT ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) ARRIETA, BUT SEVERAL OF HIS ASSOCIATES ARE POSSIBLE SUSPECTS. SAMAYOA, WHO HEADS THE SIU OVERSIGHT COMMISSION WHICH CONSISTS OF PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT ALVARO ERNESTO ((SALAZAR)) BRENES AND VICE-MINISTER OF INTERIOR CARMEN AMALIA BARAHONA PANTOJA DE ((MORALES)), EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY AND THAT OF THE OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS. SAMAYOA INDICATED THAT "POWERFUL PEOPLE" IN THE SALVADORAN SOCIETY WOULD BE INVESTIGATED

AND THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO THREATS AGAINST THE LIVES OF COMMISSION MEMBERS.

3. DUARTE'S ENTHUSIASM FOLLOWING THE ARREST OF SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH CONDUCTED THE ZONA ROSA MASSACRE LED TO HIS DECISION TO PROCEED WITH A SIMILAR INVESTIGATION OF ROMERO'S MURDER. DUARTE IS CONFIDENT THAT THE INFORMATION WHICH HE PROVIDED TO SAMAYOA WILL LEAD TO THE ARREST OF ONE OR MORE SUSPECTS IN THE ROMERO MURDER CASE. HIS GOAL IS TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF PUBLIC SUPPORT GENERATED BY THE ZONA ROSA INVESTIGATION BY MAKING A SIMILAR PUBLIC DECLARATION OF THE SIU'S FINDINGS IN THE ROMERO CASE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DIST: 17 SEPTEMBER 1985
COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS
SUBJ: MILITARY CONCERN OVER PDC PUBLICITY CONNECTING
THE MILITARY WITH THE BOGUS CONFESSION
CONCERNING INSURGENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1980
MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO
DOI: EARLY SEPTEMBER 1985

SUMMARY: IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1986, ECMFA C-V CHIEF COLONEL PENA WAS THREATENING TO ASK TO BE RELIEVED OF DUTY OVER PUBLICITY CONNECTING HIM WITH A BOGUS CONFESSION CONCERNING THE 1980 MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO WHICH ARENA LEADER D'AUBUISSON USED IN THE 1984 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. PENA INDICATED THAT, IF NECESSARY, HE WOULD IMPLICATE THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE MATTER. PENA ALSO DESCRIBED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ROBERTO SALAZAR, WHO HAD FABRICATED THE CONFESSION TO ROMERO'S MURDER. PRESIDENT DUARTE AND HIS SECRETARY OF INFORMATION LE CHEVALIER HAVE INDICATED THAT THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE MATTER IS INTENDED TO BUILD A CASE AGAINST D'AUBUISSON. LE CHEVALIER HAS INFORMED PENA AND THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND THAT THEY ARE GUILTY OF NOTHING MORE THAN BEING DUPED. DUARTE, HOWEVER, IS DISPLEASED THAT SENIOR MILITARY WERE AWARE THAT THE CONFESSION WAS FALSE BUT DID NOTHING ABOUT IT. AS OF 4 SEPTEMBER, MOST SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS CONTINUED TO BE CONCERNED THAT THE CASE WILL GET OUT OF HAND.

2. AT THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER 1986, COLONEL RICARDO ((PENA)) ARBAIZA, THE CHIEF OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR SECTION (C-V) OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMCFA), WAS THREATENING TO ASK TO

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[REDACTED]

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BE RELIEVED OF DUTY OVER PUBLICITY CONNECTING HIM WITH A BOGUS CONFESSION REGARDING THE 1980 MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP OF SAN SALVADOR OSCAR ARNULFO ((ROMERO)) USED BY NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) LEADER ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) ARRIETA IN THE 1984 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. PENA HAD DRAFTED A LETTER TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA DENOUNCING THE ACCUSATIONS BEING MADE AGAINST HIM IN THIS RESPECT BY SECRETARY OF INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL HOUSEHOLD GERARDO ((LE CHEVALIER)) AND THREATENING TO GO TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE MATTER. PENA SAID THAT IF HE DID GO TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, HE WOULD STATE THAT HIS ACTIONS IN THIS CASE WERE CARRIED OUT ON ORDERS FROM CHIEF, EMCFA, GENERAL ADOLFO ONECIFERO ((BLANDON)).

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE TAPE IN QUESTION SHOWS ROBERTO ADALBERTO ((SALAZAR)) COLLIER CLAIMING TO BE "COMANDANTE LOBO" OF THE POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES (FPL) AND TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO. D'AUBUISSON USED THE TAPE IN 1984 AS PROOF THAT THE LEFT, NOT THE RIGHT, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER. SALAZAR HAS NOW STATED THAT HE WAS PAID TO MAKE THE TAPE. THE SALVADORAN PRESS HAS BEEN CARRYING FULL-PAGE ADVERTISEMENTS BY THE "CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC WORKER MOVEMENT" (MODC) USING THE GOVERNING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S (PDC) SYMBOL WHICH LABEL SALAZAR'S CURRENT STATEMENTS AS TRUTH AND D'AUBUISSON'S 1984 ASSERTIONS AS LIES AND WHICH CALL FOR D'AUBUISSON TO SUBMIT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL ON THE MATTER. A SOURCE WITH GOOD ACCESS HAS EXPLAINED THAT THE NAME "CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC WORKER MOVEMENT" IS A COVER FOR THE CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS JULIO ADOLFO ((REY)) PRENDES AND REY'S VICE MINISTER ROBERTO EDMUNDO ((VIERA)) WHEN THEY PREFER NOT TO PUT AN OFFICIAL STAMP ON THEIR WORK.)

[REDACTED] COMMENT: SALAZAR IS A COMMON CRIMINAL, WHO, WHILE IN PRISON, BECAME FAMILIAR WITH MANY NAMES ASSOCIATED WITH SUBVERSION IN EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS. WITH THESE NAMES, HE CONSTRUCTED HIS TALES IN ORDER TO DUPE THE FIRST NAIVE PERSON WILLING TO PLAY THE ROLE OF INVESTIGATOR.)

4. PENA RECOUNTED HOW HE HAD BECOME INVOLVED IN SALAZAR'S CASE IN 1983 WHEN HE WAS SALVADORAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN HONDURAS. SALAZAR HAD BEEN POINTED OUT TO HIM AS AN FPL LOGISTICS OFFICER DURING A VISIT BY MILITARY ATTACHES TO HONDURAS' CENTRAL PRISON TO WHICH SALAZAR HAS BEEN SENTENCED FOR A COMMON CRIME. ALTHOUGH SALAZAR WOULD NOT SPEAK WITH PENA AT THE TIME, HE REQUESTED THAT PENA VISIT HIM TWO WEEKS LATER. DURING THE VISIT, SALAZAR TOLD PENA THAT HE WAS AN FPL LOGISTICS OFFICER AND THAT IN THIS CAPACITY, HE HAD PAID THE HONDURAN MILITARY CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE (C-11) \$1,500,000 TO PERMIT THE DELIVERY OF ARMS TO SALVADORAN INSURGENTS, AND THAT THE FPL HAD CONSENTED TO THE HONDURAN C-11'S REQUEST THAT HE BE PERMITTED TO CAPTURE TWO TRUCKS CARRYING ARMS FOR THE INSURGENTS TO COVER HIS COOPERATION IN THE ARMS SHIPMENT. SALAZAR ASKED PENA FOR HELP IN LEAVING HONDURAS BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE HONDURAN C-11 WOULD HAVE HIM KILLED WHEN HE LEFT PRISON. PENA

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION TO SALVADORAN MINISTER VIDES, WHO TOLD HIM TO FORGET SALAZAR BECAUSE SALAZAR COULD BE LYING.

5. PENA SPOKE AGAIN WITH SALAZAR, WHO CLAIMED TO KNOW HOW THE ASSASSINATION OF ROMERO WAS CARRIED OUT AND HOW ROBERTO ((VIERA)), DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF AGRARIAN REFORM (ISTA), AND TWO U.S. ADVISORS FROM THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD) WERE KILLED IN THE SHERATON HOTEL IN SAN SALVADOR IN 1982. PENA WAITED FOR SOME TIME BEFORE DOING ANYTHING FOR SALAZAR. HE THEN ASKED A SALVADORAN MILITARY DOCTOR ATTENDING A MEDICAL CONGRESS IN HONDURAS TO SPEAK TO GENERAL BLANDON ABOUT SALAZAR. BLANDON SET ORDERS THAT PENA BRING SALAZAR TO EL SALVADOR.

6. PENA CONSEQUENTLY BROUGHT SALAZAR TO SAN SALVADOR AND TURNED HIM OVER TO THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DNI). THE DNI INTERROGATED SALAZAR AND, IN RESPONSE TO HIS CLAIM THAT HE HAD HIDDEN IN GUATEMALA INCRIMINATING PHOTOGRAPHS OF HONDURAN MILITARY MEMBERS, HAD PENA TAKE HIM TO GUATEMALA, WHERE THEY FOUND NOTHING. PENA THEN TOOK SALAZAR TO HONDURAS AND THE DNI INSTRUCTED PENA TO LET SALAZAR GO. PENA, HOWEVER, WAS AFRAID THAT IF SALAZAR WERE KILLED, HE, PENA, WOULD BE ACCUSED. HE THEREFORE ASKED THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY ATTACHE FOR HELP IN MAKING A VIDEO TAPE OF SALAZAR TO TURN OVER TO JOURNALISTS WHO COULD THEN TESTIFY THAT PENA HAD LET SALAZAR GO FREE AND HAD ALSO PROTECTED HIM FOR SOME TIME. THE TAPE WAS THEREFORE MADE IN THE HOME OF THE VENEZUELAN ATTACHE IN THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTS. ACCORDING TO PENA, THAT WAS THE EXTENT OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SALAZAR. PENA REMARKED THAT IN HIS OPINION, THE PUBLICITY WHICH LE CHEVALIER AND OTHERS WERE PROMOTING IN THIS CASE WAS NOT DESIGNED AS MUCH TO IMPLICATE D'AUBUISSON AS TO CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR BLANDON AND VIDES, THEREBY OPENING THE WAY TO APPOINTING CURRENT VICE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY COLONEL CARLOS REYNALDO ((LOPEZ)) NUILA AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY. (COMMENT: WHEN SALAZAR WAS INTERROGATED BY DNI, SENIOR DNI OFFICIALS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT HIS TRUTHFULNESS.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SAID THAT BOTH DUARTE AND LE CHEVALIER HAVE INDICATED THAT THE PUBLICITY BEING GIVEN TO SALAZAR'S CASE IS INTENDED TO BUILD A CASE AGAINST D'AUBUISSON FOR COMPLICITY, IF NOT ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN ARCHBISHOP ROMERO'S DEATH. LE CHEVALIER HAS INFORMED PENA, WHO HAS CALLED ON MEMBERS OF HIS MILITARY SCHOOL GRADUATION CLASS OR TANDA FOR ASSISTANCE, THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE SALVADORAN HIGH COMMAND ARE GUILTY OF ANYTHING EXCEPT BEING DUPED BY SALAZAR. LE CHEVALIER HAS ASKED PENA TO CONVEY THESE COMMENTS TO MEMBERS OF HIS TANDA TO ELIMINATE FEARS OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE HIGH COMMAND

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AND THE GOVERNMENT. LE CHEVALIER ALSO TOLD PENA THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR HIM TO ASK TO BE RELIEVED OF DUTY.

ARRESTED IN SAN SALVADOR IN APPROXIMATELY MID-APRIL 1985 FOR ATTEMPTING TO STEAL A MOTORCYCLE BELONGING TO AN ACTIVE PDC MEMBER, THE OWNER RECOGNIZED SALAZAR FROM ARENA'S TAPE OF SALAZAR AND IMMEDIATELY INFORMED THE PDC OF SALAZAR'S ARREST. BY EARLY MAY, PDC LEADERS, WITH DUARTE'S APPROVAL AND LED BY LE CHEVALIER IN THIS INSTANCE, HAD DECIDED TO ATTEMPT TO BRING D'AUBUISSON TO TRIAL OVER SALAZAR'S TAPED STATEMENTS CONCERNING ROMERO'S KILLING.

10. DUARTE HAS INDICATED THAT HE IS DISPLEASED WITH THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND OVER ONE PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE CASE. THIS IS THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY AND THE EMCFA WERE AWARE THAT THE INFORMATION ON THE VIDEO TAPE WHICH ARENA USED IN THE 1984 CAMPAIGN WAS FALSE BUT MADE NO EFFORT TO DISCREDIT THE INFORMATION OR INFORM ANYONE, ESPECIALLY DUARTE AND THE PDC. DUARTE HAS VOICED HIS DISPLEASURE TO VIDES.

[REDACTED]

12. AS OF 4 SEPTEMBER, THE MOST SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EL SALVADOR (ESAF), INCLUDING VIDES, CONTINUED TO BE CONCERNED THAT THIS CASE COULD GET OUT OF HAND. PENA HAS INFORMED BLANDON THAT, IF NECESSARY TO SAVE HIS OWN REPUTATION, HE WOULD IMPLICATE THE ENTIRE MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THIS SCANDAL. PENA'S THREAT HAS BEEN INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT PENA WOULD BEAR BLANDON FOR ANY UNWARRANTED DENIAL. IN TURN, WOULD PASS RESPONSIBILITY TO VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA; AND FLORES WOULD BE OBLIGED TO KICK THE MATTER UP TO VIDES. TO PREVENT THIS, VIDES HAS BEEN ADVISING DUARTE TO LET THE MATTER DROP. DUARTE HAS ASSURED VIDES THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW THE MILITARY HIERARCHY SUFFER SUCH A FATE AND WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THE INCIDENT IS PUT TO REST.

13. [REDACTED] COMMENT: D'AUBUISSON HAS RESPONDED PUBLICLY BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, DESCRIBING THE CHARGES AS A FARSE AND A LIE MOUNTED BY AN INCOMPETENT GOVERNMENT. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THIS ISSUE IS GOING TO FADE AWAY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.)

14. [REDACTED] COMMENT: BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COL PENA APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLY UNDERSTATING HIS OWN ROLE IN CREATING THE SALAZAR MYTH. THIS IS BECAUSE PENA WAS IN PART MISLED BY SALAZAR, WHOSE INITIAL CONTACT WITH PENA WAS ON THE BASIS OF A CALCULATED APPEAL TO PENA'S EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN FAITH. SALAZAR ESSENTIALLY CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN BORN AGAIN AND TO REQUIRE COL PENA'S SPIRITUAL GUIDANCE. THIS RESULTED IN PENA DEVELOPING AN UNSHAKEABLE FAITH IN SALAZAR'S TRUTHFULNESS, WHICH HE SUSTAINED FAR BEYOND THE POINT WHERE A MORE OBJECTIVE OBSERVER WOULD HAVE DROPPED THE MATTER.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 0001
TOT: 121745Z APR 86

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: TRACES - HANS CHRIST

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. HANS RUDOLF W. (CHRIST) ACHIM AKA HANS ACHIM (CHRIST) HOOPE, [REDACTED] WAS BORN 21 FEB 1951, SANTA TECLA, EL SALVADOR; HAS SALVADORAN AND GERMAN PASSPORTS.

2. 4 APR 81 WITNESS [REDACTED] BELIEVED CHRIST AND RICARDO (SOL) MEZA COMMITTED THE MURDERS. [REDACTED] SAW CHRIST IN THE DOORWAY AT END OF HALL BECKONING TO SOMEONE NEAR THE OPPOSITE END OF THE PASSAGEWAY ADJOINING THE LOBBY. SHORTLY AFTER [REDACTED] HEARD GUNFIRE AND WHEN [REDACTED] ENTERED THE RESTAURANT SAW CHRIST TALKING INTO HAND HELD RADIO, AND SOL MEZA BENDING OVER MARK D. (PEARLMAN), WHO STILL ALIVE. PEARLMAN DIED ENROUTE TO HOSPITAL. CHRIST WORE DARK BLUE SUIT AND SOL MEZA A BLUE ZIPPERED JACKET. NO WEAPONS WERE VISIBLE BUT COULD HAVE BEEN CONCEALED IN JACKETS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CHRIST HAD VISA FOR US AND ENTERED IN SALVADORAN PASSPORT BUT WANTED VISA IN GERMAN PASSPORT ALSO TO TRAVEL AS GERMAN CITIZEN. ACCORDING EASTERN FLT 198 MANIFEST CHRIST DEPARTED

[REDACTED]

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NOV 1993

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OF REMAIN FOR MIAMI 8 APR 81 1TH WITEL MARIA EDELMIRA (AGUILAR)
LL CHRIST, USING SALVADORAN PPTS 0398196 AND
0396676, RESPECTIVELY. SEARCH OF CHRIST EL SALVADOR HOME 10 APR
DISCLOSED WEAPONS WITH GOES MARKINGS (INF). ON 15 APRIL 81
CHRIST WAS ARRESTED BY [REDACTED] IN MIAMI IN CONNECTION WITH
SHERATON MURDERS. ON 10 SEPT 81, DEPT JUSTICE REPORTED
SALVADORAN COURTS DECLARED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO DENY BAIL TO
SOL MEZA AND, SINCE CASE DEPENDED ON OUTCOME OF CASE AGAINST SOL
MEZA, EXTRADITION HEARING DELAYED INDEFINITELY.

4. ON 27 FEB 82 CHRIST WAS OUT ON BAIL AND WAS IN MIAMI,
AND REQUEST BY GOES FOR EXTRADITION PROCESSED BY US DIST COURT
FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA. ON 28 MAR 82 CRIMINAL
APPELLATE COURT CONFIRMED SUSPENSION OF CASE AGAINST CHRIST AND
SOL MEZA FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE; CASE AGAINST CHRIST FORMALLY
DISMISSED 23 JUNE 82 BY US MAGISTRATE. ON 27 SEPT 82 ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE REQUESTED CASE BE REOPENED BECAUSE OF NEW
EVIDENCE. ACCORDING CHRIST'S LAWYER, 13 OCT 82, CHRIST IN
QUITO.

5. [REDACTED] WITNESS, VISITED EMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 9
NOV 82 AND REPORTED [REDACTED] INTIMIDATED AND THREATENED AGAINST
IDENTIFYING LT. RODOLFO ISIDRO (LOPEZ) SIBRIAN DURING [REDACTED]
TESTIMONY. [REDACTED] IDENTIFIED CHRIST FROM PHOTO AS ONE OF SIX MEN
IN COFFEE SHOP ON DAY OF MURDER, BUT WOULD NOT IDENTIFY LOPEZ.
WITHOUT HER IDENTIFICATION CASE AGAINST LOPEZ WAS DISMISSED, AND
CASE AGAINST CHRIST DEPENDED ON LOPEZ' CASE.

6. ACCORDING 28 NOV 82 NEWS ARTICLE, DURING TRIAL OF TWO
FORMER NATIONAL GUARD (GN) CORPORALS INVOLVED IN THE KILLINGS,
JOSE DIMAS (VALLE) ACEVEDO AND SANGIAGO (GOMEZ) GONZALEZ, SAID
THEY MET LT. LOPEZ SIBRIAN AND CHRIST IN HOTEL PARKING LOT AND IT
WAS THERE THEY WERE GIVEN WEAPONS AND ORDERED TO EXECUTE THE
THREE OFFICIALS. ONE MAN WAS GIVEN A WINDBREAKER TO CONCEAL HIS
GUN. THAT SAME EVENING THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY CHRIST TO THE
HOTEL. HE LED THEM TO THE SALON DE LAS AMERICAS, HERE THE
THREE OFFICIALS WERE HAVING PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. CHRIST POINTED
OUT THE THREE VICTIMS TO THEIR EXECUTIONERS. ACCORDING TO
CHRIST'S LAWYER, JUAN RAMON (ROSALES) Y ROSALES, CHRIST WAS
INNOCENT, AND HAD RESULTS OF AN EIGHT-HOUR POLYGRAPH TEST
ADMINISTERED IN MIAMI TO PROVE IT. ACCORDING NEWS ARTICLE,
CHRIST REPORTED TRAVELLING TO US. HIS LAYER HAD ADVISED HIM TO
GO TO CHILE. HERE THERE IS NO EXTRADITION TREATY ITH GOES. ON
24 JAN 83 [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT CHRIST REPORTED TO HAVE
BEEN SEEN IN MIAMI, FLORIDA.

7. A SUMMARY OF THE SHERATON HOTEL MURDER INQUIRY INDICATED
[REDACTED]

SID VIERA, MICHAEL (HAMMER), AND MARY PEARLMAN WERE
ENTERED IN THE SALON DE LAS AMERICAS AT THE SHERATON HOTEL, SAN
SALVADOR, 3 JANUARY 1981. LT LOPEZ AND HIS BODYGUARD, VALLE,
DROVE FROM GN HQS TO CHRIST HOME THEN TO SHERATON HOTEL. THEY
MAINTAINED RADIO CONTACT WITH ARMY CAPT. EDUARDO ERNESTO ALFONSO
AVILA. AVILA HOM THEY MET AT HOTEL PARKING LOT. CHRIST
ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE AND AVILA BELIEVED ACCOMPANIED BY
GIRLFRIEND. THEY WENT TO COFFEE SHOP FOR DINNER, AND CHRIST
RECOGNIZED VIERA, HAMMER AND PEARLMAN WHEN THEY ENTERED. APPROX
2200 HRS SOL MEZA, HIS WIFE, AND MAJOR MARIO DENIS (MORAN) AND
HIS WIFE ARRIVED, ESCORTED BY GN SANTOS ANGEL (URIBE) AND
SANTIAGO (GOMEZ) GONZALEZ, AND BODYGUARDS JULIO (CARRILLO)
SARMIENTO AND ISMAEL HERCULES (REYES), EMPLOYED BY SOL MEZA.
APPROX 2300 HRS CHRIST, LOPEZ AND AVILA MET AT LOPEZ' VEHICLE,
AND LOPEZ REPORTEDLY INSTRUCTED VALLE ACEVEDO TO KILL THE
PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTO SALVADORENO PARA LA TRANSFORMACION
AGRARIA (ISTA) AND TWO FOREIGNERS WITH HIM. LOPEZ ORDERED GOMEZ
TO ACCOMPANY VALLE, THEY ACCOMPANIED LOPEZ TO HIS CHEVROLET,
WHERE HE GAVE GOMEZ A 9MM INGRAM SUB MACHINEGUN AND AVILA GAVE
VALLE A 45 CAL INGRAM SUB MACHINEGUN WITH SILENCER. AVILA GAVE
GOMEZ A KHAKI WINDBREAKER JACKET TO CONCEAL THE WEAPON. CHRIST
LED GOMEZ AND VALLE INTO THE HOTEL AND AT THE DOORWAY TO THE
SALON DE LAS AMERICAS, GESTURED TOWARD THE VIERA
PARTY, INDICATING TO GOMEZ AND VALLE THESE WERE THE MEN TO BE
KILLED. GOMEZ AND VALLE REPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT THE
ASSASSINATION, RETURNED TO THE PARKING LOT, AND WENT TO THE
AVILA RESIDENCE, WHERE VALLE RETURNED THE INGRAM AND GOMEZ
RETURNED THE WINDBREAKER TO AVILA. LOPEZ THEN INSTRUCTED THEM
TO RETURN TO GN HQS, AND LOPEZ AND POSSIBLY AVILA RETURNED TO
THE HOTEL TO VERIFY EVENTS.

PAGE 001
TOT: 121938Z SEP 86

SUBJECT: GENERAL JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA)) MERINO

A. JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA)) MERINO WAS BORN 25 JUNE 1933 IN SAN VICENTE, EL SALVADOR. HE WAS FROM A LOWER TO LOWER-MIDDLE CLASS FAMILY AND ATTENDED THE INSTITUTO SANTO TOMAS, A SECONDARY SCHOOL IN HIS HOME TOWN. IN 1953 HE ENTERED THE MILITARY ACADEMY, WHERE HE STUDIED LIBERAL ARTS AND MILITARY SCIENCE. WHILE IN SCHOOL, HE HAD FEW FRIENDS, ALTHOUGH HE DID DEVELOP A STRONG SENSE OF LOYALTY TO THE MILITARY. AFTER HIS GRADUATION, HE HELD MOSTLY ADMINISTRATIVE POSTS. FROM 1974 TO 1977, HE WAS PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (ANTEL) A PRESTIGIOUS POST ALWAYS FILLED BY THE MILITARY. IN 1977, GARCIA EXPECTED TO BE DESIGNATED AS PRESIDENT; INSTEAD HIS FELLOW OFFICERS CHOSE GENERAL CARLOS ((ROMERO)) AND GARCIA BELIEVED THAT HE WAS SIDELINED BECAUSE OF HIS REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AND INTEGRITY. IN 1978, ROMERO APPOINTED HIM MILITARY COMMANDER OF SAN VICENTE, A FORM OF INTERNAL EXILE, BECAUSE OF GARCIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN A PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE PRESIDENT.

B. ON 27 FEBRUARY 1979, REPORTED COLONELS ANTONIO ((GONZALEZ)) ELIZONDO, JOSE GUILLERMO GARCIA AND FORMER ARMY COLONEL JUAN ANTONIO ((MARTINEZ)) WERE INVOLVED IN A COUP PLOT AGAINST PRESIDENT ROMERO. ON 15 FEBRUARY 1979, FORMER ARMY GENERAL JOSE ALBERTO ((MEDRANO)), WAS CALLED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. MEDRANO TOLD PRESIDENT ROMERO THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED, AND COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY REPLACING THE RANKING MINISTERS.

C. ON 5 OCTOBER 1979 PRESIDENT ROMERO INDIVIDUALLY CONTACTED COLONELS JOSE EUGENIO VIDES CASANOVA, JAIME ABDUL GUTIERREZ AND JOSE GUILLERMO GARCIA, AND PERSONALLY ACCUSED THEM OF BEING INVOLVED IN A COUP PLOT. EACH DENIED THE ACCUSATION. ON 30 MAY 1979 SEVERAL MAJORS OF THE 1963 MILITARY CLASS AND VIDES, GUTIERREZ AND GARCIA HELD INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS IN WHICH THEY REACHED AN AGREEMENT TO POOL MILITARY RESOURCES IN PLANNING A POSSIBLE COUP AGAINST PRESIDENT ROMERO.

D. IN OCTOBER 1979, GARCIA HELPED PLAN THE COUP THAT TOPPLED THE ROMERO REGIME AND INSTEAD OF SEEKING A SEAT ON THE JUNTA, FORMED TO RULE THE COUNTRY, HE CHOSE TO BECOME MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WHERE HE GAINED OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND BECAME, IN EFFECT, THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE AND WAS FREE TO PURSUE HIS FOREMOST GOAL--PRESERVING THE COHESION OF THE ARMED

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2. SANTIVANEZ SERVED AS SALVADORAN CONSUL IN NEW ORLEANS FROM NOVEMBER 1983 UNTIL OCTOBER 1984, WHEN HE WAS FIRED AS COUNSEL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR. IT WAS BELIEVED THAT HE WAS THE SOURCE OF TWO NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLES, BOTH PUBLISHED IN MARCH 1984, IN WHICH ALLEGATIONS WERE MADE THAT LEADING SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS WERE INVOLVED IN DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES, AND THAT A TOP SALVADORAN POLICE OFFICIAL WAS INFORMANT. HE ALSO CONDUCTED A PRESS INTERVIEW IN MARCH 1983 WHERE HE STATED THAT FORMER FDN OFFICIAL COLONEL RICARDO "CHINO" ((LAU)), RECEIVED \$120,000.00 FOR ARRANGING THE DEATH SQUAD EXECUTION OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ((ROMERO)) IN 1980 AND WAS WORKING DIRECTLY FOR THEN ARENA PRESIDENT AND KNOWN RIGHT WINGER ROBERTO ((D'AUBUSSION)). SANTIVANEZ ADDED THAT COL. LAU WAS SENT TO

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PAGE 0002
010345Z OCT 86

WORK IN GUATEMALA, TRAINING DEATH SQUAD KILLERS AND ADVISED
D'AUBUISSON DIRECTLY ON HOW TO CARRY OUT DEATH SQUAD
ACTIVITIES. HIS ALLEGATIONS HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SEVERAL
QUERIES TO [REDACTED], THE LAST BEING MARCH 1985, FROM THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE HPSCI.
CIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A VARIETY OF SOURCES HAVE ACCUSED ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) OF COMPLICITY IN THE MURDER OF ROMERO. ALTHOUGH THE BULK OF THE REPORTING IS CREDIBLE, THERE IS NOTHING THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS HARD PROOF. SEVERAL REPORTS ON THE ROMERO ASSASSINATION CLAIM THAT D'AUBUISSON AND HIS COLLEAGUES HELD MEETINGS IN EARLY 1980 TO PLAN THE KILLING. ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES, THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WERE ASKED TO DRAW LOTS TO DETERMINE WHO WOULD CARRY OUT THE ACT. SOME SOURCES CLAIM THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL COMPRISED THE HIT SQUAD AND THAT A FORMER MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD FIRED THE FATAL SHOT.

IN ADDITION TO D'AUBUISSON, SEVERAL OTHER NAMES HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ROMERO'S MURDER:

A. WALTER ((NUSA)).

IDENTIFIED
AS ONE WALTER ANTONIO ((ALVAREZ)). ALVAREZ WORKED AT ALMACENES PACIFICO IN SAN SALVADOR. ALVAREZ APPEARS TO HAVE LIVED IN LA HERMITA SECTION OF APOPA, SAN SALVADOR. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, SEVERAL GUNMEN TOOK ALVAREZ AWAY FROM A SOCCER GAME ON 27 SEPTEMBER 1981, SHOT HIM SEVERAL TIMES AND LEFT HIS BODY ON THE ROAD WHICH LEADS TO MARIONA PRISON

B. CAPTAIN EDUARDO ((AVILA)).

[REDACTED]

C. LTC. ARISTEDES ((MARQUEZ)), FORMER CHIEF OF INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE, [REDACTED]

D. LTC. MARIO DENIS ((MORAN)), NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HIS CASE WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF [REDACTED]

E. INSPECTOR MISAEL ((RIVAS)) ROMERO, DETECTIVE SIGIPREDO ((PEREZ)) LINARES, JOSE LUIS ((ALAS)) ROMERO, LUIS ((RODRIGUEZ)), AND FNU ((SANTIN)), SUPPOSED MEMBERS OF [REDACTED] DEATH SQUAD WHICH KILLED ROMERO.

F. LT. FRANCISCO ((AMAYA)), [REDACTED] SUPPOSEDLY PARTICIPATED IN THE PLANNING OF THE ARCHBISHOP'S MURDER.

G. CAPTAIN FNU ((VEGA)) VALENCIA, NATIONAL GUARD, WAS ACCUSED BY DOCTOR HECTOR ((REGALADO)), CHIEF OF ARENA'S PARAMILITARY UNIT, OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION, AND OF USING AN EXPLOSIVE BULLET.

H. REGALADO IS SUSPECTED BY SOME AS BEING A CONSPIRATOR IN THE ASSASSINATION, AND OF MANUFACTURING THE EXPLOSIVE BULLET THAT KILLED ROMERO. SUPPOSEDLY, REGALADO, WHO IS A DENTIST BY PROFESSION, HAD USED HIS DENTIST TOOLS IN THE PAST TO FABRICATE SPECIAL BULLETS FOR OTHER ASSASSINATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE ARENA PARAMILITARY UNIT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REF: 0005072 JUN 87

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3. IN LATE DECEMBER 1982

4. [REDACTED] REPORTED [REDACTED] THAT COL MORAN TOLD A GROUP OF HIS CLOSE FRIENDS HE WAS WILLING TO RESIGN AND

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LEAVE THE ARMED FORCES ONLY IF LIEUTENANT COLONEL RENE EMILIO (PONCE), THEN CHIEF OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, WAS NAMED AS HIS SUCCESSOR. PONCE, WHO HAD SERVED AS MORAN'S SECOND IN COMMAND IN THE TREASURY POLICE, WAS A CLOSE FRIEND. ACCORDING TO MORAN, PONCE SHARED HIS VIEWS ON HOW THE TREASURY POLICE SHOULD BE RUN AND WOULD MAINTAIN THE TREASURY POLICE AS A NEARLY AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION WITHOUT PARTISAN POLITICAL CONNECTIONS. MORAN STATED THAT ARENA HOPED TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE TREASURY POLICE BY NAMING A SYMPATHIZER TO THE DIRECTOR'S POSITION.

5. [REDACTED]
REPORTED THAT MORAN, PRESIDENT OF THE RIO LEMPA HYDROELECTRIC COMPANY (CEL), WAS PLOTTING AGAINST THE LIVES OF COLONEL ADOLFO ((BLANDON)) MEJIA, THEN COMMANDER OF FIRST INFANTRY BRIGADE, AND COL. JUAN RAFAEL ((BUSTILLO)), AIR FORCE COMMANDER. IT WAS BELIEF THAT MORAN WAS A CLOSE FRIEND OF FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER, GENERAL JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA)).

7. ON 23 APRIL 1985, [REDACTED]
RECEIVED INFORMATION [REDACTED] THAT COL MORAN, FORMER CHIEF OF THE TREASURY POLICE AND THEN HEAD OF CEL, WAS VERY ACTIVE IN DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES. MORAN WAS SUPPOSED TO BE DIRECTING THE ACTIVITIES OF TWO LEFTIST GUERRILLAS RECRUITED BY THE RIGHT TO COMMIT ASSASSINATIONS, BOMBINGS, AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE GUERRILLAS WERE CALLED "LOS ANGELITOS" AND HAD A NATURAL COVER AS LEFTIST GUERRILLAS. ACCORDING TO THE LIAISON SERVICE SOURCE, MORAN DID NOT MEET THEM DIRECTLY BUT USED RICARDO ANTONIO ((ROGEL)) AS HIS INTERMEDIARY.

261817451287

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: REDUCTION OF INTENSITY OF COMMANDERS FEELINGS AT
25 SEPTEMBER COMMANDERS MEETING

DOI: 25 SEPTEMBER 1987

TEXT: 1. AT THE 25 SEPTEMBER 1987 COMMANDERS' MEETING A SMALL GROUP OF COMMANDERS LAUNCHED AN AGGRESSIVE VERBAL ATTACK AGAINST THE VICE-MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY, CARLOS REYNARD ((LOPEZ))

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[REDACTED]

NUTLA, THE VICE MINISTRY AS AN INSTITUTION, AND THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT OF THE VICE MINISTRY. THIS GROUP CONSISTED OF 3RD BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL RENE EMILIO CIPONCELLI, ARCE BATTALION COMMANDER COLONEL ROBERTO MAURICIO COLABENZI, DM 7 COMMANDER COLONEL JOSE EMILIO COCHAVES (CACHES), DM 6 COMMANDER COLONEL NAVIDAD DE JESUS (CACERES), DM 4 COMMANDER COLONEL JUAN CARLOS (CARRILLO) SCHLENKER, AND COLONEL ELMER (GONZALEZ) ARAUJO. (FIELD COMMENT: COL. GONZALEZ ARAUJO IS CURRENTLY UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY BY THE VICE MINISTRY FOR HIS ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN THE 1983 "LAS HOJAS" MASSACRE, ONE OF THE BETTER KNOWN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES OF THE EARLY 1980'S.) BASICALLY, THIS GROUP DEMANDED THAT:

A. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT BE DISBANDED, OR AT LEAST COMPLETELY REORGANIZED UNDER MILITARY CONTROL.

B. LOPEZ NUTLA RESIGN IMMEDIATELY.

C. THE INSTITUTION OF THE VICE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY BE ABOLISHED AND ITS FUNCTIONS ASSUMED BY THE MILITARY.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] - MILITARY ATTACHE OF EL SALVADOR
IN PARAGUAY

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PAGE 001
TOR: 112326Z OCT 88

SUBJECT: FRANCISCO ((AMAYA)) ROSA

2. LT. FRANCISCO RAMON ((AMAYA)) ROSA DOB 1 NOVEMBER 1956, FROM 1983 TIME FRAME AMAYA WAS ACTIVE FROM 1979 UNTIL 1983 IN RIGHT WING DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES. AMAYA WAS SUSPECTED OF PARTICIPATING IN THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ARNULFO ((ROMERO)) IN 1981, AND WAS THE LEADER OF A UNIT THAT KIDNAPPED AND EXECUTED SIX LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR) IN 1980. AMAYA REPORTEDLY ATTENDED A MEETING IN 1981 WITH THE CONSPIRATORS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF TWO U.S. CITIZENS IN SAN SALVADOR. IN NOVEMBER 1983, AMAYA WAS PLACED ON THE AVLOS WATCHLIST FOR POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

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TOT: 161814Z JAN 89

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: OFFER BY SALVADORAN JUSTICE MINISTER TO FORMER
DRIVER OF ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON FOR INFORMATION
IMPLICATING D'AUBUISSON IN THE MURDER OF ARCH-
BISHOP ROMERO

DOI: EARLY JANUARY 1988

TEXT: 1. IN EARLY JANUARY 1988, [REDACTED] MEMBER OF THE
NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE PARTY (ARENA) [REDACTED], HONORARY PRESIDENT FOR LIFE OF ARENA, TOLD
ANOTHER MEMBER OF ARENA THAT JULIO ((SAMAYOA)), JUSTICE MINISTER OF
EL SALVADOR, HAS CONTACTED A MAN NAMED GRACIANO (LNU) IN MARIONA
PRISON AND OFFERED LUCRATIVE INCITEMENTS FOR INFORMATION IMPLICATING
D'AUBUISSON IN THE 1980 MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ANULFO ROMERO.
THE ARENA MEMBER STATED THAT GRACIANO, WHOM THE ARENA MEMBER FAILED
TO FURTHER IDENTIFY BY LAST NAME, WAS D'AUBUISSON'S PERSONAL DRIVER
IN 1979-1980 AND HAS BEEN PROVIDED SECURITY PROTECTION INSIDE MARIONA
SINCE HIS CONFINEMENT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE ARENA MEMBER DID NOT
STATE WHY GRACIANO WAS IN PRISON OR WHEN HE ENTERED PRISON.)

2. THE ARENA MEMBER STATED THAT GRACIANO HAD ASKED "COMANDANTE"
[REDACTED], WHO IS A SALVADORAN OFFICIAL ASSIGNED TO MARIONA AND A
CLOSE ARENA CONTACT, TO INFORM OFFICIALS IN ARENA OF SAMAYOA'S OFFER.
GRACIANO TOLD [REDACTED] THAT SAMAYOA HAD OFFERED A LARGE SUM OF MONEY
AND RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES IN RETURN FOR INFORMATION
IMPLICATING D'AUBUISSON IN THE ROMERO MURDER.

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PAGE 001
TOT: 010605Z FEB 89

2. EL SALVADOR: GUERRILLAS PRESS URBAN ATTACKS

SALVADORAN INSURGENTS ARE CONTINUING URBAN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE WAKE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF THEIR PEACE PROPOSAL. THE MILITARY THWARTED AN ATTACK ON THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE LAST WEEK, BUT INSURGENTS IN RECENT DAYS HAVE KILLED A GOVERNOR AND ATTACKED ECONOMIC TARGETS AND THE RESIDENCES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE GUERRILLAS ALSO ARE PLANNING STRIKES AND ECONOMIC SABOTAGE THIS WEEK FOR VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE'S VISIT. [REDACTED] INDICATE REBELS MAY BE PLANNING TO ATTACK THE US EMBASSY [REDACTED]

COMMENT: THE REBELS PRESUMABLY HOPE HIGH-VISIBILITY ATTACKS WILL CONVINCE SAN SALVADOR AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS THAT THEY REMAIN A VIABLE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FORCE. THE GUERRILLAS PROBABLY ALSO HOPE PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS WILL PROVOKE A VIOLENT RESPONSE THAT WOULD DISCREDIT THE GOVERNMENT AND INCREASE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON SAN SALVADOR TO CONSIDER THEIR PEACE PROPOSAL. THE INSURGENTS ARE LIKELY TO RESUME ASSASSINATING MAYORS, WHICH THEY HAD PROMISED TO STOP IF THE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE PEACE PROPOSAL, AND WILL CONTINUE OTHER ACTIVITIES AIMED AT DISRUPTING THE 19 MARCH ELECTION. [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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0 5 2 0

Page 0001
DOT: 10/0001/2 MAR 89

SUBJECT: MAJOR MAURICIO DE JESUS BELLERAN GRANADA

1. EVIDENCE APPEARS TO IMPLICATE FIFTH
BRIGADE MAJOR MAURICIO DE JESUS ((BELLERAN)) GRANADA WITH DIRECT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAN SEBASTIAN KILLINGS.

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SUBJECT: "LA CEBADILLA"/SAN SEBASTIAN (AND

2. RECENT WASHINGTON POST NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ON THE "LA CEBADILLA", ALSO REFERRED TO AS THE SAN SEBASTIAN CASE, MENTION MAJOR MAURICIO DE JESUS ((BELTRAN)), LT. ARNOLDO ANTONIO ((VASQUES)) AND LT. MANUEL DE JESUS ((GALVEZ)) GALVEZ AS BEING UNDER ARREST FOR THE KILLINGS.

END OF MESSAGE

SHOULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE COMPETENT TRIBUNALS FOR LEGAL ACTION.

TEXT: 1. ON 9 MARCH 1989, THE SPECIAL HONOR COMMISSION (SHC) OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES (ESAF) PRESENTED ITS FINDINGS IN THE SAN SEBASTIAN CASE TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE. ACCORDING TO THE SHC'S REPORT, THE SAN SEBASTIAN KILLINGS WERE FOUND TO BE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF MAJOR MAURICIO DE JESUS ((BELTRAN)) GRANADOS, THE 5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE S-11. THE SHC ALSO FOUND THAT THE 10 PERSONS KILLED HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) BUT THEIR KILLING WAS A CRIMINAL ACT.

2. THE SHC'S REPORT PROVIDES AS BACKGROUND TO THE FINDINGS THE STORY AS ORIGINALLY PUT OUT BY MAJOR BELTRAN AND A LIST OF ALL THE PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY THE SHC. THE REPORT THEN PROVIDES A TRUE ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS, BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS, AND THE SHC'S CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. PRECIS OF ACTUAL EVENTS:

-ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1988, THE 2ND SECTION OF THE 2ND COMPANY OF THE "JIBOA" BATTALION OF THE 5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, UNDER THE COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT ARNOLDO ANTONIO ((VASQUEZ)) ALVARENGA, WHICH HAD BEEN OPERATING IN THE AREA FOR A NUMBER OF DAYS, RECEIVED THE ORDER TO CAPTURE A SUPPOSED INSURGENT NAMED JOSE MARIA ((FLORES)) WHO RESIDED IN THE TOWN OF SAN FRANCISCO, SAN SEBASTIAN JURISDICTION. THIS MISSION WAS CARRIED OUT AND THE CAPTURED INSURGENT WAS RELIEVED OF TWO M-16 RIFLES, EXPLOSIVES, PROPAGANDA, AND TWO BLACK UNIFORMS WHICH HE HAD IN THAT PLACE. AT APPROXIMATELY 0730 HOURS LOCAL ON 21 SEPTEMBER, 1ST LIEUTENANT MANUEL DE JESUS ((GALVEZ)) GALVEZ, COMMANDER OF THE 2ND COMPANY, MET UP WITH THE 2ND SECTION, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COMMAND GROUP; HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT OF THE CAPTURE FROM HIS SECTION COMMANDER.

-BASED ON THE INTERROGATION OF THE CAPTURED INSURGENT, THREE OTHER SUSPECTED PERSONS WERE DETAINED; WHILE THIS WAS BEING CARRIED OUT AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER (30-40) OF PEOPLE HAD BEEN GATHERED IN THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE SCHOOL, WHICH LED TO THE TOWN OF LA CEBADILLA. THESE PERSONS HAD BEEN GATHERED TOGETHER SO THAT THE MILITARY COULD COMMUNICATE TO THEM THE MILITARY'S CONCERN THAT THEY WERE BEING USED BY THE FMLN FOR TERRORISTIC PURPOSES.

-AT APPROXIMATELY 1130 HOURS LOCAL ON THE SAME DAY, MAJOR BELTRAN ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. BELTRAN IS THE S 1 OF THE 5TH BRIGADE. BELTRAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO INTERROGATORS AND ARRIVED BY HELICOPTER.

-AS A RESULT OF THE INTERROGATIONS OF THE PRISONERS, SIX MORE PERSONS WERE DETAINED, MAKING A TOTAL OF 10.

-BETWEEN 1300-1400 HOURS LOCAL, MAJOR BELTRAN TOOK THE DECISION TO KILL THE 10 PERSONS AND WAS OPPOSED IN THIS DECISION BY THE TWO LIEUTENANTS, WHO MAINTAINED HIS WAS AN ILLEGAL ORDER WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE THE MILITARY PERSONNEL. FROM THAT MOMENT ON, MAJOR BELTRAN ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE UNIT AND BEGAN GIVING DIRECT ORDERS TO SUBORDINATES. HE ORDERED SGT. JORGE ALBERTO ((TOBAR)) GUZMAN TO GO ALONG THE ROAD TO LA CEBADILLA AND SET UP AN AMBUSH USING THE CAPTURED EQUIPMENT.

-SGT. GUZMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY SOME SOLDIERS, ESTABLISHED THE AMBUSH AT APPROXIMATELY 1530 HOURS LOCAL. THE CIVILIANS WERE LED BY VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE TROOP TO THE SELECTED LOCATION. A MINE WAS EXPLODED AND A HAND GRENADE WAS THROWN, RESULTING IN AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF DEAD BUT THE MAJORITY OF THE CIVILIANS WOUNDED, WHO WERE THEN KILLED BY MEMBERS OF THE UNIT ON THE ORDERS OF MAJOR BELTRAN.

-A POSTER AND SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA WERE LEFT IN THE PLACE WHERE THE DEAD WERE TO JUSTIFY OR SIMULATE AN INSURGENT AMBUSH. THE LEG OF ONE SOLDIER WAS SMEARED WITH BLOOD AND HE WAS EVACUATED TO THE BRIGADE ON THE ORDERS OF MAJOR BELTRAN. IN THAT SAME HELICOPTER WAS TRANSPORTED THE CAPTURED EQUIPMENT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE EXPLOSIVES WHICH WERE LATER DESTROYED.

-DURING THE FOLLOWING DAYS, MAJOR BELTRAN SPREAD THE FALSE VERSION OF EVENTS AND ORDERED ALL SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL TO STICK TO THAT STORY.

-IN ORDER TO LEND CREDENCE TO HIS FALSE VERSION OF EVENTS, MAJOR BELTRAN SELECTED A SOLDIER WOUNDED IN ANOTHER OPERATION TO PRESENT AS THE SOLDIER ALLEGEDLY WOUNDED IN THE SUPPOSED AMBUSH. THIS VERSION OF EVENTS IS BASED ON THE SPONTANEOUS DECLARATIONS MADE TO THE SHC BY THE MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WERE PRESENT AT THE SCENE.

B. CONCLUSIONS:

-THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1988, IN THE TOWN OF SAN FRANCISCO, SAN SEBASTIAN, SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT, WERE NOT THE RESULT OF AN INSURGENT AMBUSH BUT INVOLVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE 5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

-THE 10 PERSONS DETAINED AT THAT TIME AND WHO WERE SUBSEQUENTLY KILLED, ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION OBTAINED AND THE MATERIAL CAPTURED, WERE INVOLVED IN PARTICIPATING IN FMH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.

-PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY, THAT IS TO SAY THE DECISION AND PLANNING OF THE CRIMINAL ACT, FALLS ON MAJOR BELTRAN.

-ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE EVENTS WERE:

LT. ARNOLDO VASQUEZ ALVARENGA
SGT. JORGE ALBERTO TOBAR GUZMAN
SGT. RAFAEL ((ROSALES)) VILLALOBOS
CPL. HERNAN ((AYALA)) ARIAS
PVT. JOSE CARLOS ((HERNANDEZ)) MATUTE
PVT. FRANCISCO ((PONCE)) RAMIREZ
PVT. FERMIN ((CRUZ)) CASTRO
PVT. JOSE ALFREDO ((MENDEZ)) BELTRAN

ALTHOUGH THESE PERSONS COULD BE CHARGED LEGALLY WITH THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE, THIS WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED AS, ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SHC, AT NO TIME DID THEY SUPPORT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY MAJOR BELTRAN, BUT ON THE CONTRARY OPPOSED HIS ORDERS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF MILITARY HIERARCHY. THEIR ACTIONS CAN BE EXPLAINED BY THE DAMAGING EFFECTS AND THE DYNAMIC OF THIS WAR AND IN THE DIFFICULT BALANCE BETWEEN SUBORDINATION TO COMMAND AND CARRYING OUT ILLEGAL ORDERS.

-THE ACTS CARRIED OUT CONSTITUTE A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE WHICH REGULATES THE ARRESTS MADE BY PERSONNEL OF THE VARIOUS UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

-THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH BRIGADE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE AT ANY TIME OF THE REALITY OF THE EVENTS UNTIL HIS INTERVIEW BY THIS COMMISSION.

-THESE KINDS OF ACTIONS, WHICH BY THEIR NATURE ARE ISOLATED TO AND ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PERSONS WHO CARRIED THEM OUT, ARE UNJUSTIFIABLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE INSTITUTION AS A WHOLE AND AFFECT THE ACHIEVEMENTS MADE BY THE MILITARY IN RECENT YEARS IN THE AREAS OF PROFESSIONALISM AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THEY DO, HOWEVER, INDICATE THE NEED FOR A REVIEW OF MILITARY POLICY IN THESE MATTERS IN ORDER TO RENEW EFFORTS AND TO REACH THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVELS (OF PROFESSIONALISM AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS).

PAGE 0001
201650Z MAR 89

SUBJECT: STATUS OF ARISTIDES ALFONSO MARQUEZ, ALLEGED
MEMBER OF 1983 DEATH SQUAD

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE, FYI.

STATE DEPT
2. REQUESTED TRACES ON ARISTIDES ALFONSO
((MARQUEZ))

TRACES ON MARQUEZ WERE FORWARDED TO [REDACTED] ON 14 NOVEMBER 1987, AND RECENTLY UPDATED TO INCLUDE
ADDITIONAL 1983 INFORMATION MISSING FROM MARQUEZ' FILE WHEN THE
1987 TRACES WERE DONE. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PROVIDED TO
[REDACTED] IS REPEATED BELOW, FYI.

A. BEGIN QUOTE. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION DATED DECEMBER
1983 [REDACTED] ONE LT. COL.
ARISTIDES MARQUEZ, WHO IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH SUBJECT, WAS
HEAD OF THE RIGHTWING DEATH SQUAD IN THE NATIONAL POLICE, WHICH
HAD ENGAGED IN NUMEROUS POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS, INCLUDING THE
MARCH 1981 MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ROMERO.

B. [REDACTED] A RIGHTIST DEATH SQUAD HAD
EXISTED WITHIN THE NATIONAL POLICE SINCE DECEMBER 1979, AND HAD
ENGAGED IN NUMEROUS POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS. THE SQUAD
MAINTAINED A CLANDESTINE PRISON IN THE CITY OF LA LIBERTAD, EL
SALVADOR. THE PRISON WAS USED FOR DETENTION, INTERROGATION,
AND EXECUTION OF SUSPECTED LEFTISTS AND LEFTIST SYMPATHIZERS.
THE GROUP WAS HEADED BY LT. COL. ARISTIDES MARQUEZ, POSSIBLY
IDENTICAL WITH SUBJECT, WHO WAS CHIEF OF THE INVESTIGATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL POLICE.

C. [REDACTED] IN NOVEMBER

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1983 MARQUEZ WAS DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL POLICE. HE WAS VERY CLOSE TO DR. HECTOR ANTONIO REGALADO, THEN NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) PARAMILITARY LEADER. SOURCE BELIEVED MARQUEZ SUPPLIED FALSE LICENSE PLATES, CARS AND MEN FOR REGALADO'S USE. SOURCE DESCRIBED MARQUEZ AS A VERY MEAN PERSON WHO SHOULD BE FEARED.

D. SOMETIME AFTER JOSE N. DUARTE FUENTES INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR, MARQUEZ WAS ASSIGNED TO PANAMA CITY AS MILITARY ATTACHE. THIS ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE OF SALVADOR WAS PROBABLY DUE TO MARQUEZ' ALLEDGED INVOLVEMENT I) DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES. COL. MARQUEZ WAS ACCREDITED AS SALVADORAN DEFENSE ATTACHE TO CHILE IN FEBRUARY 1988. HE WAS DOWNGRADED FROM A COLONEL TO A CAPTAIN ASSIGNED AS LIAISON OFFICER TO THE CHILEAN ARMY -- A MOVE ATTRIBUTED TO "NEEDS OF THE SERVICE". WHILE ASSIGNED TO CHILE HE REPORTEDLY WAS MARRIED TO ANA ELISA HIRELERMANN DE MARQUEZ, DOB 1 OCTOBER, YEAR UNKNOWN. NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS REFLECTED IN OUR FILES. E)D OF QUOTE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 001
TOR: 281716Z APR 89

281641Z APR 89
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] DEATH OF ARGENTINE DOCTOR
IN EL SALVADOR

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2. AS FOLLOW UP [REDACTED] GUSTAVO ((ISLAS)) CACERES, ARGENTINE NATIONAL AND MEDICAL DOCTOR, WAS KILLED IN AN ATTACK ON 9 APRIL 1989 BY SALVADOREAN AIR FORCE ELEMENTS ON A SUSPECTED CENTRAL COMMAND POST OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF CENTRAL AMERICAN WORKERS (PRCA) IN NORTHERN SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT. THE PRCA IS ONE OF THE FIVE FACTIONS MAKING UP THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN), AN ARMED MARXIST-LENINIST INSURGENCY WHICH HAS BEEN FIGHTING THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR FOR OVER 10 YEARS. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN ALLEGATIONS BY THE FMLN AND ITS FRONT GROUPS THAT THE SITE OF THE ATTACK WAS A FIELD HOSPITAL, HOLLS OF FILM TAKEN AT THE SITE AND DEVELOPED INDICATE THAT IT WAS A GUERRILLA BASE CAMP AND CENTRAL COMMAND POST. THE FILM SHOWS THAT ISLAS AND THE FRENCH NURSE WERE ARMED AND IN UNIFORM AT THE TIME THEY DIED.

3. ISLAS WAS IDENTIFIED BY SOME LETTERS HE HAD IN HIS POSSESSION.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
101: 142036Z JUL 89

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SAN SALVADOR MAYOR CARLOS ALFONSO FIGUEROA MORALES

[REDACTED]

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE, FYI.

2. [REDACTED] REPORTED SUSPICIOUS INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE RESIDENCE OF SAN SALVADOR MAYOR, CARLOS ALFONSO ((FIGUEROA)) MORALES ON 24 JUNE 1989. SINCE ARMANDO ((CALDERON)) SOL IS THE SAN SALVADOR MAYOR, HQS BELIEVES FIGUEROA MORALES IS AN EMPLOYEE WITHIN THE SAN SALVADOR MAYOR'S DEPARTMENT. THE FOLLOWING ARE [REDACTED] TRACES ON FIGUEROA MORALES, DOB 12 APRIL 1952:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

C. [REDACTED] CAPTAIN CARLOS ALFONSO ((MORALES)) FIGUEROA (NOTE REVERSAL OF NAMES), AN EX-COMPANY COMMANDER OF MILITARY DETACHMENT SIX AT SONSONATE, IMPLICATED IN LAS HOJAS MASSACRE OF PEASANTS WAS ARRESTED AND UNDER DETENTION IN THE GENERAL STAFF. THE ARREST AND DETENTION WERE ILLEGAL DUE TO ARRESTING OFFICERS' FAILURE TO GIVE HIM FORMAL NOTIFICATION OF THE PURPOSE OF ARREST. SUBJECT IS CONSIDERED AN AUTHENTIC HERO BECAUSE HE HAS AT LEAST FIVE BATTLE WOUNDS, IS A DECORATED AND HIGHLY RESPECTED FIGHTING OFFICER.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TOR: 081812Z NOV 89

081811Z NOV 89

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON BOMBING OF FENASTRAS HEADQUARTERS

3. FOLLOWING THE 31 OCTOBER EXPLOSION AT FENASTRAS HEADQUARTERS, NATIONAL POLICE BOMB SQUAD TECHNICIANS CONDUCTED A PERIPHERAL INVESTIGATION OF THE BLAST. COMMENT: FENASTRAS REPRESENTATIVES DENIED THE BOMB SQUAD DIRECT ACCESS TO THE SCENE. IN ADDITION, FENASTRAS REPRESENTATIVES DENIED ENTRY TO A TEAM OF DETECTIVES FROM THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNIT AND TO A TEAM FROM THE NATIONAL POLICE INVESTIGATION BATTALION.) THE BOMB SQUAD OBSERVED THAT THE BOMB DETONATED ON THE CEMENT PASSAGWAY LOCATED BETWEEN THE MAIN ENTRANCE DRIVEWAY, AND THE OUTER MASONRY WALL OF THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING. THE BOMB SQUAD ESTIMATED THE CRATER CAUSED BY THE EXPLOSION TO BE 80 CENTIMETERS IN DIAMETER AND 30 CENTIMETERS DEEP. THE BLAST EXPANSION WAVE CAUSED INTERIOR DAMAGE TO THE TWO-STORY BUILDING AND TO THE BUILDING'S ROOF. 22

4. THE BLAST HURLED DEBRIS FROM THE OUTER MASONRY WALL AWAY FROM THE BUILDING AND INTO THE STREET. THE STEEL SLIDING DRIVEWAY GATE WAS ALSO HURLED APPROXIMATELY SIX METERS ACROSS THE STREET. IN ADDITION, THE BLAST THREW A PICK-UP TRUCK, WHICH HAD BEEN PARKED IN FRONT OF FENASTRAS, TWO METERS ACROSS THE STREET. THE BLAST ALSO CAUSED DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE FENASTRAS HEADQUARTERS. BASED ON THE EXTENSIVE PROPERTY DAMAGES AND THE SIZE OF THE CRATER, THE BOMB SQUAD TECHNICIANS DEDUCED THAT THE EXPLOSION WAS CAUSED BY A BOMB COMPOSED OF APPROXIMATELY 20 ROUNDS OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES, PROBABLY TNT.

5. THE BOMB SQUAD ALSO INTERVIEWED A STREET VENDOR, VICTOR MANUEL ((RAMIREZ)), WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN TWO MALES APPROACH THE STEEL GATE TO THE FENASTRAS DRIVEWAY PRIOR TO THE EXPLOSION. ACCORDING TO RAMIREZ, THE GATE WAS PARTIALLY OPENED. THE FIRST MALE REMAINED OUTSIDE OF THE DRIVEWAY AND THE SECOND MALE, WHO WAS CARRYING A CLOTH BAG, BENT DOWN AND DEPOSITED THE BAG INSIDE THE GATE ON THE DRIVEWAY. RAMIREZ CLAIMED THAT SOON THEREAFTER HE SAW A SMALL PUFF OF SMOKE WHERE THE SECOND MALE WAS STANDING. ACCORDING TO RAMIREZ, THE MEN THEN FLED THE AREA.

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6. AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBING, NINE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND OVER 50 WOUNDED. THOSE KILLED WERE JOSE DANIEL ((LOPEZ)) MELENDEZ, THE FENASTRAS SECRETARY OF CONFLICTS; VICENTE SALVADOR ((MELGAR)), AN ANDA WORKERS UNION (SETA) MEMBER; ROSA HILDA ((SARAVIA)) DE ELIAS, A FENASTRAS MEMBER; JULIA TATIANA ((MENDOZA)) AGUIRRE, A FENASTRAS MEMBER; LUIS EDGARDO ((VASQUEZ)) MARQUEZ, A FENASTRAS MEMBER; FEBE ELIZABETH ((VELASQUEZ)) RAMIREZ, THE FENASTRAS SECRETARY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AM UNITS AND MPTL MEMBER; RICARDO HUMBERTO ((CESTONI)), VELASQUEZ' HUSBAND; ANA PATRICIA ((CHACON)), A 13-YEAR-OLD; CARMEN CATALINA ((HERNANDEZ)) RAMOS, AM UNITS MEMBER; AND JUAN MANUEL ((TEJADA)) ROSALES, AM UNITS MEMBER.

TOR: 191544Z OCT 90

191544Z OCT 90

SUBJECT: - FMLN INFILTRATOR WITH
FENASTRAS BOMBING

2. IN EARLY OCTOBER 1990, THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL GUARD (GN) RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED HUMAN SOURCE INFORMATION THAT THE IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALION (BIRI) "BELLOSO" HAD 26 FMLN INFILTRATORS WITHIN ITS RANKS. THE SOURCE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS. THE GN SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED THIS INFORMATION TO BIRI BELLOSO.

3. ON 15 OCTOBER 1990, WHILE ON OPERATIONS IN CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT, A BIRI BELLOSO SOLDIER, SAUL ERNESTO ((ARIAS)) FERRUFFINO, WAS REPORTED MISSING BY HIS UNIT. HE WAS CAPTURED TWO HOURS LATER BY ANOTHER BIRI BELLOSO UNIT. AFTER FIRST CLAIMING HE HAD MERELY BEEN LOST, ARIAS LATER ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO DESERT.

4. BECAUSE OF THE GN REPORT, THE BIRI BELLOSO COMMANDER DECIDED TO SEND ARIAS TO THE GN FOR INVESTIGATION/INTERROGATION. DURING QUESTIONING BY THE GN, ARIAS MAINTAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO DESERT BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN MISTREATED BY HIS SERGEANT. THE GN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (D-2) ORDERED A POLYGRAPH FOR ARIAS RE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT WITH THE INSURGENTS. ARIAS FAILED THIS POLYGRAPH.

5. WHILE THE POLYGRAPHER WHO ADMINISTERED THE TEST LEFT THE ROOM TO WRITE UP THE REPORT, THE OTHER POLYGRAPHER ENTERED THE ROOM AND INTRODUCED HIMSELF AS A MEMBER OF A "HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION" AND ADVISED ARIAS TO TELL HIM THE TRUTH. ARIAS THEN ADMITTED THAT HE JOINED THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SALVADORAN TRADE UNIONS (FENASTRAS) IN JANUARY 1989 AND LATER BECAME AFFILIATED WITH THE PRTC. HE SAID THAT IN APRIL 1990 TWO INSURGENTS ("CARLOS" AND "WALTER") GAVE HIM THE MISSION OF INFILTRATING THE BIRI BELLOSO, FOR WHICH THEY WOULD PAY HIM 1,300 COLONES A MONTH.

6. FOLLOWING THIS ADMISSION, ARIAS WAS SENT BACK TO THE GN INTERROGATORS. HE THEN CONFESSED THE FOLLOWING:

AT 1120 HOURS 31 OCTOBER 1989 IN THE COMPANY OF OTHER PRTC MEMBERS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF EL SALVADOR, "JORGE," "ANA," "WALTER," "CARLOS," "SILVIA," AND "ROSA," HE WENT TO FENASTRAS HQS WHERE CARLOS AND ROSA ENTERED AND PLACED A BOMB IN THE HQS WHILE THE REMAINDER OF THE GROUP PROVIDED "SECURITY" OUTSIDE. CARLOS WAS CARRYING A BLACK BRIEFCASE OR SMALL SUITCASE, IN WHICH THE BOMB WAS CONCEALED. IMMEDIATELY AFTER PLACING THE BOMB, THEY WENT TO THE UNIVERSITY. ARIAS STATES HE DOES NOT KNOW FOR WHAT REASONS THE BOMB WAS PLACED AT FENASTRAS, NOR WHO ORDERED IT.

7. THE GN SUBSEQUENTLY ADMINISTERED A SECOND POLYGRAPH WHICH SHOWED NO DECEPTION INDICATED RE QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE VERACITY

[REDACTED]

OF ARIAS' STATEMENTS THAT THE INSURGENTS PLACED THE BOMB. THERE WAS DECEPTION INDICATED TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ARIAS WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED (OTHER THAN PROVIDING SECURITY) IN THE BOMBING (HE ANSWERED NO).

[REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED] ADVISED THE LEGAL ATTACHE IN GENERAL TERMS OF THIS INFORMATION. HE INTENDS TO SUGGEST THAT THE CASE BE TURNED OVER TO THE GOES, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNIT (SIU). THE LEGAL ATTACHE NOTED THAT AN FBI POLYGRAPH TEAM WILL VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND COULD POSSIBLY BE USED IN THIS CASE.

[REDACTED]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

3. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE PERPETRATORS WORE POLICE UNIFORMS. [REDACTED] A GROUP OF INSURGENTS HAD 25 NATIONAL POLICE UNIFORMS TO WEAR DURING SOME OF THEIR OPERATIONS. ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [REDACTED] ON THIS WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL.

NOV 1993

161846Z NOV 89

161845Z NOV 89

"UCA RECTOR ELLACURIA AND NINE OTHER UCA OFFICIALS APPARENTLY STAYING WITH HIM WERE SHOT AND KILLED DURING THE NIGHT OF 16-17 NOVEMBER BY UNKNOWN PARTIES. HIS HOUSE WAS RANSACKED."

"THE ULTRA RIGHT IN ARENA HAS STEADILY LOST INFLUENCE IN THE PARTY SINCE THE ELECTION OF CRISTIANI, AND IT WOULD REQUIRE A MAJOR REVERSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FORTUNES FOR THE ULTRA RIGHT TO BEGIN TO REGAIN ITS PAST INFLUENCE."

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10H: 162229Z NOV 89

162220Z NOV 89

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1430 HOURS LOCAL TIME

DOI: 16 NOVEMBER 1989

TEXT: A U.S. EMBASSY ARMORED VEHICLE TRAVELING ON THE ROAD FROM ILOPANGO AIR BASE INTO SAN SALVADOR WAS STRUCK BY A RIFLE ROUND WHILE PASSING NEAR THE SOYAPANGO AREA. THE U.S. EMBASSY OFFICER RIDING IN THE CAR AND THE CAR'S DRIVER WERE UNHARMED.

2. AT 0030 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 16 NOVEMBER, THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA (UCA) RECTOR, IGNACIO ((ELLACURIA)), UCA VICE RECTOR IGNACIO ((MARTIN-BARO)) AND FOUR OTHER PRIESTS WERE KILLED BY UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECTS AT ELLACURIA'S RESIDENCE NEAR THE UCA CAMPUS. THE COOK AND DAUGHTER WERE ALSO KILLED. THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS HAS GAINED ACCESS TO THE RESIDENCE GROUNDS AND IS REPORTING ELLACURIA'S DEATH. THE SALVADORAN SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (SIU) IS INVESTIGATING THE CASE. INFORMALLY, SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICIALS HAVE BLAMED THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT FOR ELLACURIA'S KILLING. FURTHER DETAILS WILL BE REPORTED SUBSEQUENTLY AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.)

comment:

3. THE FMLN TOOK OVER THE NATIONAL POLICE DETACHMENT HEADQUARTERS IN CUSCATANCINGO DURING THE NIGHT OF 16 - 16 NOVEMBER; HOWEVER, AS OF 1015 LOCAL TIME ON 16 NOVEMBER, THE POLICE HAD REGAINED CONTROL OF THE BUILDING. THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS GUNFIRE IN THE AREA OF THE NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS

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NOV 1993

AND THE TREASURY POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN SAN SALVADOR. SEPARATELY, THE FIRST INFANTRY BRIGADE HAS POSITIONED FOUR 105MM HOWITZERS NORTH OF THE FIRST BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS TO SUPPORT ESF ELEMENTS FIGHTING IN THE NORTHERN SUBURBS OF SAN SALVADOR.

4. DURING FIGHTING IN SOYAPANGO ON THE AFTERNOON OF 15 NOVEMBER, AIR FORCE ELEMENTS SUFFERED EIGHT WOUNDED AND CONFIRMED 60 INSURGENTS KILLED. AIR FORCE UNITS REENTERED SOYAPANGO IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 16 NOVEMBER, SUPPORTED BY AIR FORCE HELICOPTER GUNS. THE AIR FORCE BELIEVES THAT INSURGENTS WHO HAD BEEN HOLDING POSITIONS IN URBANIZATION LOS CONACASTES IN SOYAPANGO HAD MOVED TO URBANIA GUADALUPE. THE BELLOSO IMMEDIATE REACTION INFANTRY BATTALION IS STILL POSITIONED NORTH OF THE URBANIA GUADALUPE, BUT IS NOT ENGAGED IN COMBAT.

5. THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS HAS CALLED FOR A TRUCE TO ALLOW THE RED CROSS AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO EVACUATE WOUNDED FROM THE CONFLICTIVE AREAS. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT A TRUCE WILL BE CALLED.

6. SALVADORAN PRESIDENT ALFREDO ((CRISTIANI)) HAS AGAIN CONDEMNED CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO THE FMLN. CRISTIANI CLASSIFIED THE FMLN ATTACKS AS ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST DEFENSELESS PEOPLE AND STATED THAT IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT THESE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN SUPPORT SUCH ACTS. HE HAS AGAIN CALLED UPON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION TO REMAIN CALM AND TO CONTINUE COOPERATING WITH THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. ALSO, COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT OSCAR ((ARIAS)) HAS CONDEMNED THE FMLN OFFENSIVE AND IS URGING THE FMLN TO GO TO CARACAS ON 20 NOVEMBER AND TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS BEGUN IN SEPTEMBER.

7. AS OF THE EVENING OF 15 NOVEMBER, AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF INSURGENTS WERE IN A GULLY IN COLONIA LAS MAGNOLIAS IN THE AYUTUXTEPEQUE/CUSCATANCINGO AREA AND WERE USING THE GULLY AS A STAGING AREA. THEY APPEARED TO BE ABLE TO COME AND GO FROM THIS AREA AT WILL; THERE WAS NO COMBAT IN THE AREA.

THE INSURGENTS APPEARED TO BE IN CONTROL OF CIUDAD DELGADO AS OF LATE 15 NOVEMBER. THE INSURGENTS SEEMED TO BE ENTERING AND LEAVING CIUDAD DELGADO AT WILL. ALSO, A MEMBER OF THE SALVADORAN GREEN CROSS STATED THAT THE INSURGENTS

APPEARED TO BE IN CONTROL IN APOPA, NORTH OF SAN SALVADOR, AS OF LATE 15 NOVEMBER. INSURGENTS IN APOPA WERE MOUNTING REGULAR FOOT PATROLS IN THE TOWN.

COMMENTS: REPORTS FROM APOPA SEEM TO CORROBORATE THE ABOVE INFORMATION THAT THE INSURGENTS ARE IN CONTROL OF APOPA.)

8. ESF ELEMENTS BATTLING INSURGENTS IN MEJICANOS ARE REPORTING THAT PROGRESS AGAINST THE INSURGENTS IS SLOW. CIVILIANS IN MEJICANOS AND OTHER NORTHERN SAN SALVADOR SUBURBS ARE TRYING TO LEAVE THE AREAS; HOWEVER, THE INSURGENTS ARE NOT ALLOWING THEM TO LEAVE. AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EL SALVADOR, ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST BRIGADE FOUND A CAR FILLED WITH MOLOTOV COCKTAILS. THE CAR LOOKED LIKE A PRESS CAR. THE CAR HAD THE LETTERS "T.V." IN ITS WINDOW. MOST PRESS ELEMENTS IN EL SALVADOR PUT THE LETTERS "T.V." IN THEIR CAR WINDOWS TO CLEARLY IDENTIFY THEMSELVES TO BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INSURGENTS.

9. ON 16 NOVEMBER, PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY LEADER "JOAQUIN VILLALOBOS" SPOKE DURING A "RADIO VENCEREMOS" BROADCAST AND URGED THE INSURGENTS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING.

PAGE THREE
TO: 172447Z NOV 89

1. AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN EL SALVADOR, [REDACTED] BELIEVE THAT REPORTING FROM ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES ABOUT EVENTS IN THE COUNTRY IS IMPORTANT. [REDACTED]

2. FOLLOWING ARE REQUIREMENTS [REDACTED]

A. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING INDICATES THAT LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR) OPPOSED THE RECENT FMLN OFFENSIVE. IS THIS INFORMATION ACCURATE?

B. HAVE FDR LEADER GUILLERMO UNGO AND OTHER FDR OFFICIALS TAKEN REFUGE IN FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN SAN SALVADOR, AS SOME REPORTING INDICATES? WHAT IS THEIR MOTIVATION FOR DOING SO?

C. WERE FDR LEADERS PRIVY TO STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL DETAILS CONCERNING THE OFFENSIVE? REPORTING GENERALLY HAS INDICATED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE PROBABLY SOME IN THE FMLN LEADERSHIP WHO

[REDACTED]

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NOV 1993

RELIEVED THAT THE OFFENSIVE WOULD SPARK THE LONG-DISCUSSED GENERAL INSURRECTION, THE GOALS OF THE FMLN ARE LESS AMBITIOUS BUT ALMOST EQUALLY IMPORTANT. REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FMLN WANTS TO SHOW INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, ESPECIALLY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, IT CONTINUES TO BE A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH, AND TO PORTRAY THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR (GOES) AND THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES (ESAF) AS REPRESSIVE AND IN THE WORST POSSIBLE LIGHT. FMLN LEADERS ALSO WANT TO AGGRAVATE TENSIONS WITHIN THE GOES AND IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY AND THE U.S. THEY ALSO DESIRE CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOES IN THE DIALOGUE PROCESS, CONCESSIONS THEY PERCEIVED AS NOT FORTHCOMING.

D. THE MURDER OF SIX JESUITS AND TWO LAY PEOPLE AT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (UCA), INCLUDING THE RECTOR AND VICE RECTOR, IS FRONT PAGE NEWS HERE.

SOME REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE DEED COULD HAVE BEEN DONE BY FMLN ASSASSINS, DISGUISED AS SALVADORAN SECURITY OR MILITARY PERSONNEL. PAST REPORTING ALSO HAS INDICATED THE FMLN PLANNED TO MURDER MEMBERS OF THE SALVADORAN LEFT WHOM THEY BELIEVED EXPENDABLE IN ORDER TO FURTHER PORTRAY THE GOES AND ESAF AS ABUSERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

E. HOW WILL THE CURRENT SITUATION AFFECT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FDR AND FMLN? PAST REPORTING HAS SHOWN THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY STRAINED. WILL THE OFFENSIVE FURTHER STRAIN THE RELATIONSHIP, OR WILL EVENTS, SUCH AS THE UCA MURDERS, AGAIN MOVE THEM CLOSER?

F. COMMENT ON CONTINUED CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR THE FMLN, DESPITE SANDINISTA COMMENTS THAT THEIR SUPPORT HAS ENDED?

TOT: 170053Z NOV 89

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TOT: 201456Z NOV 89

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[REDACTED]

DIST: 20 NOVEMBER 1989
COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR
SUBJ: TEMPORARY FMLN HALT TO OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO
ALLOW BAENA SOARES TO ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT CEASE-FIRE
NEGOTIATION
DOI: 19 NOVEMBER 1989

TEXT: 1. ON 19 NOVEMBER 1989 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID THAT THE FARRABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) HAS ORDERED A STANDDOWN FROM MILITARY ACTIVITY TO GIVE MARIO ((BAENA)) SOARES, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES (OAS), THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARRANGE AN END TO THE FIGHTING DURING HIS IMPENDING VISIT TO SAN SALVADOR.

2. [REDACTED] PCES GENERAL SECRETARY JORGE SHAFIK ((HANDAL)) TOLD HIM [REDACTED] THAT FMLN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SPOKEN WITH BAENA SOARES IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND PROMISED HIM THE FMLN TROOPS WILL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTIVITY WHILE BAENA SOARES TRIES TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE FMLN. HANDAL SAID THE FMLN WANTS BAENA SOARES TO TALK TO PRESIDENT ALFREDO ((CRISTIANI)) AND THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO EL SALVADOR DURING HIS STAY IN SAN SALVADOR. (FIELD COMMENT: BAENA SOARES IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN SAN SALVADOR ON 20 NOVEMBER, ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTING.)

3. [REDACTED] THE FMLN LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO HAVE ONE NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMAND: THE REMOVAL FROM THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES OF MEMBERS OF THE "TANDONA" WHO HOLD MOST SENIOR ESAF POSITIONS. THE FMLN BELIEVES THAT THE ONLY PERSON CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE FMLN IS THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO EL SALVADOR. [REDACTED] TWO REASONS WHY SHAFIK HANDAL AND THE OTHER FMLN LEADERS BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. WILL FINALLY ACCEDE TO THE REMOVAL OF THE TANDONA:

A. THE U.S. PRESIDENT HAS STEADFASTLY SUPPORTED SALVADORAN PRESIDENT ALFREDO CRISTIANI IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT HAS ABSTAINED FROM GIVING SIMILAR SUPPORT TO THE SALVADORAN MILITARY.

B. THE U.S. CONGRESS HAS ALREADY TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN ATTEMPTING TO LIMIT MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR, WHICH HAS BEEN A HELP TO THE FMLN AND WHICH THE FMLN WILL USE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS TO DENIGRATE THE TANDONA.

4. [REDACTED] THE FMLN HAS CHANGED ITS VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE U.S. [REDACTED] THE FMLN HAD LOOKED UPON IGNACIO ((ELIACURIA)), THE RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA-JOSE SIMEON CANAS (UCA) WHO WAS ASSASSINATED ON 16 NOVEMBER, AS THE ONLY PERSON WORTHY OF THE FMLN'S TRUST WHO WAS CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FMLN AND THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO EL SALVADOR WAS CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING SUCH AN AGREEMENT, BUT THAT THE FMLN DID NOT CONSIDER HIM TRUSTWORTHY.)

5. SHAFIK HANDAL TOLD THE SENIOR PCES MEMBER THAT WHILE BAENA SOARES IS THE KEY IN ACHIEVING CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS, THE FMLN IS ALSO USING ITS POLITICAL ALLIES AND OTHERS TO TRY AND EFFECT A SETTLEMENT. GUILLERMO ((UNGO)), LEADER OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY [REDACTED]

6. FURTHER, THE FMLN IS SENDING MARIO ((LUNGO)), A PCES MEMBER,* TO CARACAS TO IMPRESS UPON VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES ((PEREZ)) THE IMPORTANCE OF MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS. (SOURCE COMMENT: LUNGO WILL BE ACCOMPANIED TO CARACAS BY RAFAEL ((MENJIVAR)), A POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES (FPL) MEMBER.)

SAID THAT THE FMLN LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT IF THE TANDONA STAYS IN POWER AFTER THE OFFENSIVE, THE LEGAL AND ILLEGAL LEFT--THE UNIONS, THE DEMOCRATIC CONVERGENCE, AND FMLN MEMBERS--WILL BE DEPRIVED OF FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES AND UNABLE TO FUNCTION.

THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT LIKELY TO ACCEDE TO ANY DEMAND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF OFFICERS FROM THE "TANDONA," THE SALVADORAN MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS OF 1966. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THOSE CITED BY THE PCES MEMBER.)

[REDACTED]

RNDD

PAGE 003
TOT: 221720Z NOV 89

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIST: 22 NOVEMBER 1989

COUNTRY: GUATEMALA/EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: REQUEST BY THE CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF GUATEMALA FOR
SUPPORT BY ORGANIZED LABOR FOR A PASTORAL MESSAGE
CONDEMNING THE SLAYING OF CLERGYMEN IN EL SALVADOR

DOI: 16 NOVEMBER 1989

TEXT: 1. ON 16 NOVEMBER 1989, ISMAEL ((BARRIOS)) RABANALES, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL FEDERATION OF GUATEMALAN WORKERS (FECETRAG), RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM MONSIGNOR EFRAIN ((HERNANDEZ)) VALLE, PUBLIC RELATIONS DIRECTOR OF THE GUATEMALAN ARCHBISHOP'S CURIA, REQUESTING THAT BARRIOS, AS A LEADER OF ORGANIZED LABOR, ISSUE A DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR A PASTORAL MESSAGE CONDEMNING THE SLAYING IN EL SALVADOR OF SIX CLERGYMEN AND TWO WOMEN WHO WERE PART OF THEIR HOUSEHOLD.

2. HERNANDEZ TOLD BARRIOS THAT GUATEMALAN ARCHBISHOP PROSPERO ((PENADOS)) DEL BARRIO HAD CALLED AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF LATIN AMERICAN BISHOPS AND HAD ASKED HERNANDEZ TO COLLECT EXPRESSIONS OF BACKING FOR A CONDEMNATION OF THE DEED FROM ALL GUATEMALAN SECTORS PRIOR TO THE BISHOPS' GATHERING, TO ADD MORAL WEIGHT AND HELP EXPEDITE THE ISSUANCE OF A JOINT PASTORAL MESSAGE CONDEMNING THESE AND ALL OTHER KILLINGS CONNECTED WITH THE LATEST OUTBURST OF VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR AND URGING ALL PARTIES INVOLVED TO IMMEDIATELY RESUME NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS.

3. HERNANDEZ ALSO TOLD BARRIOS THAT PENADOS HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONTACT FIRST OF ALL THE POPULAR SECTORS SUCH AS THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND LEADERS OF THE UNITED LABOR AND POPULAR ASSOCIATIONS (UASP) UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION, SINCE THE SLAIN CLERICS HAD GIVEN THEIR LIVES FOR THE POOR OF EL SALVADOR AND CENTRAL AMERICA. HERNANDEZ, HOWEVER, ADDED THAT BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE ALSO BEING ASKED FOR STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH PENADOS WAS DELIBERATELY EXCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES FROM HIS REQUEST, TO AVOID A POLITIZATION OF THE BISHOPS' MESSAGE.

4. BARRIOS, IN TURN, AUTHORIZED HERNANDEZ TO QUOTE HIM AS SUPPORTING THE BISHOPS' CONDEMNATION OF THESE CRIMES, AS THE FECETRAG SECRETARY GENERAL, AFTER HERNANDEZ ASSURED BARRIOS THAT THE CONDEMNATION WILL INCLUDE A STRONG DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE REGION AND REJECTION OF WHAT BARRIOS

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CONDEMNATION OF THE KILLINGS IS URGENT.)

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
[OT: 041407Z DEC 89]

SUBJECT: "NEWSWEEK" MAGAZINE REPORTED ARTICLE OF 2 DECEMBER

1. [REDACTED] FOLLOWING FROM UPI, 3
DECEMBER 1989.

2. BEGIN QUOTE. NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE REPORTED THAT
RIGHT-WING POLITICAL LEADER ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON TOLD HIS
ADVISERS SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE ABOUT IGNACIO ELLACURIA THE
NIGHT BEFORE THE JESUIT PRIEST WAS SLAIN ALONG WITH FIVE OF HIS
COLLEAGUES NOVEMBER 16.

THE NEWSWEEK ARTICLE QUOTED U.S. OFFICIALS WHO SAW A CIA
REPORT. ELLACURIA, EL SALVADOR'S LEADING LEFTIST INTELLECTUAL,
AND THE FIVE OTHER JESUIT PRIESTS WERE DRAGGED FROM A HOME AND
SHOT TO DEATH. WITNESSES REPORTED SEEING MEN IN UNIFORM CARRY
OUT THE ATTACK, WHICH OCCURED IN AN AREA UNDER GOVERNMENT
CONTROL.

D'AUBUISSON, THE IDEOLOGICAL LEADER OF PRESIDENT ALFREDO
CRISTIANI'S RIGHT-WING ARENA PARTY, HAS BEEN SUSPECTED OF BEING
INVOLVED IN RIGHT-WING DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY AND THE 1980
SLAYING OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO. HE DENIES ANY
INVOLVEMENT. END QUOTE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOT: 050051Z DEC 89 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: TEXT OF NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NEWSWEEK ARTICLE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THERE ARE TWO PICTURES ACCOMPANYING
THE ARTICLE, ONE OF ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) AND ANOTHER OF THREE OF
THE DEAD JESUITS WITH A CROWD GATHERED AROUND THEM.

WAS D'AUBUISSON INVOLVED?

CITING A CIA REPORT, U.S. OFFICIALS TOLD NEWSWEEK LAST WEEK THAT ON THE NIGHT BEFORE SIX JESUIT PREISTS WERE NURDERED IN EL SALVADOR LAST MONTH, RIGHTIST POLITICAL LEADER ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON RAILED AGAINST SEVERAL OF THE VICTIMS TO HIS ADVISERS AND TOLD THEM THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE ABOUT THE PRIESTS. ONE OF THE PRIESTS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, WAS FATHER IGNACIO ELLACURIA, WHO WAS KILLED ALONG WITH SEVEN OTHERS. ASKED ABOUT D'AUBUISSON'S REPORTED COMMENTS, CIA SPOKESMAN (AN OFFICER IN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE) REPLIED, "I CAN'T HELP YOU ON THAT."

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE KILLINGS, SUSPICION FOCUSED ON THE SALVADORAN RIGHT. D'AUBUISSON HIMSELF IS WIDELY BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN BOTH THE RIGHT-WING DEATH SQUADS OF THE EARLY 1980S AND THE 1980 ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO. HE DENIES THE CHARGES. EARLIER THIS YEAR VICE PRESIDENT DAN QUAYLE TRAVELED TO SAN SALVADOR AND WARNED D'AUBUISSON ABOUT HUMAN-RIGHTS ABUSES. STILL, D'AUBUISSON WAS PLACED BACK ON THE GUEST LIST AT THE U.S. EMBASSY THIS SUMMER.

PROOF OF ANY D'AUBUISSON ROLE IN THE MURDERS COULD SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF PRESIDENT ALFREDO CRISTIANI, BECUASE D'AUBUISSON IS THE IDEOLOGICAL LEADER OF THE RULING ARENA

[REDACTED]

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NOV 1993

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
PAGE 0002
TOT: 050051Z DEC 84 [REDACTED]

PARTY. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, D'AUBUISSON'S ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT, IF PROVEN, COULD ENDANGER U.S. MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR. SAID A KEY U.S. SENATOR OF THE POSSIBLE D'AUBUISSON ROLE: "THE EXPLOSIVE EFFECT OF THIS CAN'T BE OVERESTIMATED."

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

050001Z DEC 89

1. ACTION REQUESTED: [REDACTED] COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE REGARDING SPECIAL TASKINGS BY AMBASSADOR IN SUPPORT OF INTENSIVE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE KILLING OF CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (UCA) RECTOR ELLACURIA AND OTHER JESUITS.

THE INVESTIGATOR IS A NATIVE SALVADORAN WITH EXTENSIVE POLICE INVESTIGATIVE EXPERIENCE. HE WILL WORK WITH THE EMBASSY'S LEGAL OFFICER, WHO IS THE FOCAL POINT OFFICER FOR THE CASE, AS A SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR WITH ALL THE AUTHORITY NECESSARY TO DEVELOP AND PURSUE LEADS.

TO CONFRONT D'AUBUISSON WITH THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (INCLUDING THE "NEWSWEEK" REPORT) THAT HE OR HIS CRONIES MAY BE RESPONSIBLE. IN SHORT, HE WILL "SHAKE THE TREE" HARD AND BE PREPARED TO STEP ON TOES AND BRUISE [REDACTED] POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC EQUITIES IF NECESSARY.

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10/2/72 DEC 89

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF
EMBASSY TASK FORCE ON THE JESUIT KILLINGS

2. SUMMARY: ON 4 DECEMBER 1989 AN EMBASSY TASK FORCE WAS ESTABLISHED TO ACT AS A COORDINATING BODY AND FOCAL POINT FOR ALL MISSION INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE MURDERS OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS AND TWO OTHER PERSONS ON 16 NOVEMBER 1989. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR CALLED IN FROM MEXICO CITY [REDACTED] BEGAN THE WEEK INTERVIEWING NUMEROUS PERSONS WHO ARE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT TO THE INVESTIGATION. AMONG THOSE INTERVIEWED: ROBERTO D'AUBIUSSON, COLONEL RENE ((PONCE)) AND SEVERAL POLICE OFFICERS ON DUTY IN THE VICINITY OF THE CRIME SCENE ON THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERS. AS OF 9 DECEMBER 1989 THE INVESTIGATION CONTINUES ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS, AND A LACK OF EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES HAS PREVENTED THE INVESTIGATION FROM BEING NARROWED TO SPECIFIC SUSPECTS.

3. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY THE EMBASSY LEGAL ATTACHE, BEGAN THE INVESTIGATION WITH AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT ALFREDDO ((CRISTIANI)). CRISTIANI MADE IT CLEAR HE WANTED THIS CASE CLEARED-UP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WOULD COOPERATE IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. CRISTIANI ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE INVESTIGATION FOCUS FIRST ON THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. HE WANTED THE MILITARY INVESTIGATED FIRST BECAUSE THE PRESS AND CHURCH ARE POINTING THE FINGER IN THAT DIRECTION AND CRISTIANI WANTS THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION CLEARED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ALLOW THEM TO GET ON WITH THE BUSINESS OF FIGHTING A WAR. CRISTIANI ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IF THE INVESTIGATION INDICATED MILITARY OFFICERS WERE INVOLVED, THEY WOULD BE PROSECUTED. THERE WILL BE NO COVER-UP.

4. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR LED TO PRESIDENT CRISTIANI'S WISHES AND HAS FOCUSED THE INVESTIGATION ON THE MILITARY. HE INTERVIEWED CHIEF OF STAFF COLONEL RENE ([PONCE]) ON 4 DEC AS WELL, AND RECEIVED PONCE'S ASSURANCES THAT THE MILITARY WOULD COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INVESTIGATION. PONCE ASKED FOR GUIDANCE/ SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHERE THE ARMY SHOULD BEGIN. UNFORTUNATELY, [REDACTED] HAS OBSERVED THAT TO DATE THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL ANSWER GIVEN TO PONCE ON THIS POINT.

5. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR AND LEGAL ATTACHE INTERVIEWED ALL OF THE UNIT COMMANDERS ON DUTY IN THE AREA OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA (UCA) ON THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERS. MILITARY DETACHMENTS SIX AND SEVEN HAD SQUADS IN THE AREA AS DID THE TREASURY POLICE. ALL OF THE SQUAD LEADERS FROM DM-6 AND DM-7 REPORTED HEARING THE GUN SHOTS WHICH WERE PROBABLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE KILLINGS OF THE PRIESTS; BUT THEY ALL SAID THEY DID NOT ASSOCIATE THE SHOTS WITH THE UCA CAMPUS, BUT RATHER THOUGHT THERE WAS A FIREFIGHT NEAR THE AREA. THE TREASURY POLICE UNIT

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NOV 1993

6. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BELIEVES THE MILITARY OFFICERS TOLD THE TRUTH AND WILL BE IN FURTHER USE TO THE INVESTIGATION. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNIT (SIU) SUBSEQUENTLY CONDUCTED INTERVIEWS OF ALL THE MEN POSITIONED NEAR THE UCA ON THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERS AND CONCLUDED THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE ANY OF THEM WERE INVOLVED.

8. PERHAPS TRYING TO SHOW HIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE, D'AUBUISSON MADE SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHERE THE INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE DIRECTED. HE SUGGESTED THAT A SPECIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW BOARD (SIMILAR TO A U.S. GRAND JURY) BE ESTABLISHED TO QUESTION WITNESS AND PROVIDE THE PUBLIC WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT SOMETHING WAS BEING DONE TO SOLVE THIS CASE. WHEN THE INVESTIGATOR AND LEGAL ATTACHE AGREED THIS WOULD BE USEFUL D'AUBUISSON IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND LITERALLY ORDERED HIM TO ESTABLISH THE REVIEW BOARD. IN RETROSPECT THIS WAS PROBABLY A PLOY ON D'AUBUISSON'S PART TO IMPRESS HIS AUDIENCE. THIS IS THE IMPRESSION BECAUSE, AS OF THIS WRITING, THE REVIEW BOARD IS NOT EVEN ESTABLISHED, MUCH LESS FUNCTIONING.

10. ON 7 DECEMBER D'AUBUISSON CALLED THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR AND REQUESTED A PRIVATE MEETING. AT THE MEETING, D'AUBUISSON SAID THAT HE HEARD FROM A SOURCE WITHIN THE SALVADORAN AIR FORCE (FAES) THAT FAES GENERAL JUAN RAFAEL ((BUSTILLO)) MAY HAVE HAD A PART IN THE MURDERS OF THE JESUITS. D'AUBUISSON SAID BUSTILLO SPOKE TO HIS SENIOR OFFICERS THE DAY BEFORE THE MURDERS AND STATED AT THAT

11. D'AUBUISSON'S MOTIVES FOR GIVING UP THIS INFORMATION ARE VERY SUSPICIOUS TO SAY THE LEAST. SEVERAL QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO WHY D'AUBUISSON GAVE THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR THIS INFORMATION. FIRST, AND FOREMOST, IS THE QUESTION OF WHY D'AUBUISSON WOULD "RAT" ON GENERAL BUSTILLO WHEN BUSTILLO IS SEEN AS A D'AUBUISSON MAN. IT IS NO SECRET IN THE MILITARY THAT D'AUBUISSON ADVOCATED BUSTILLO FOR THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE POSITION OVER GENERAL LARIOS. ALSO, LEIVA IS KNOWN TO BE OUT OF FAVOR AT THIS TIME, AND JUST RECENTLY WAS REMOVED FROM HIS POSITION AS FAES S-2. BECAUSE OF THESE QUESTIONS AND THE

FACT D'AUBUSSON WAS THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION, THE TASK FORCE
DECIDED NOT TO APPROACH BUSTILLO OR LEIVA DIRECTLY, BUT RATHER
ALLOW THE INVESTIGATION TO CONTINUE AND SEE IF ANY SUBSTANTIVE
EVIDENCE IS FORTHCOMING. AN EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO DESCRIBELY
DIRECT PONCE'S INVESTIGATION TOWARD THE FACTS AS WELL, BUT NOT TO
EXCLUDE THE OTHER SERVICES.

12. AS THE WEEK DREW TO A CLOSE A SENSE OF FRUSTRATION SET
IN: THE CHURCH IS OBSTRUCTING THE INVESTIGATION, EYE WITNESSES ARE
NOWHERE TO BE FOUND AND THERE IS PRECIOUS LITTLE IN THE WAY OF
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. ADD TO THIS A LACK OF A SPECIFIC MOTIVE FOR
THE KILLINGS AND AN INVESTIGATION THAT HAS NOT DEVELOPED ANY LEADS
WHICH COULD NARROW THE INVESTIGATION TO A SPECIFIC GROUP. ALTHOUGH
THE INVESTIGATION IS STILL YOUNG, TIME WILL WORK AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT, AND POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE.

13. [REDACTED] WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS [REDACTED]
FOR INFORMATION ON THE MURDERS. THIS INFORMATION WILL
BE SANITIZED AND PASSED TO THE TASK FORCE FOR FOLLOW-UP. TO DATE
THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR HAS BEEN VERY COOPERATIVE.

14. [REDACTED] HAS TASKED [REDACTED] CONTACTS TO DEVELOP INFORMATION
AND/OR LEADS WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL TO THE INVESTIGATION. [REDACTED]
WHO
CLAIMS TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AN EYE WITNESS TO THE MURDERS, THE
EYE WITNESS IS TERRIFIED HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER AND REFUSES TO GO
TO THE POLICE. [REDACTED] IS ATTEMPTING TO CONVINCE [REDACTED] TO INTRODUCE
HIM TO THE EYE WITNESS SO THAT [REDACTED] CAN CONVINCE HIM TO GET IN TOUCH
WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY. AT THIS POINT THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO THIS
HAPPENING IS THE FACT THE EYE WITNESS DOES NOT TRUST THE U.S.
EMBASSY; HE BELIEVES IT IS TRYING TO PROTECT THE MILITARY. [REDACTED]
WILL CONTINUE TO SPEAK TO [REDACTED] AND IS OPTIMISTIC [REDACTED] WILL
HAVE A PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH THE EYE WITNESS AS EARLY AS
DECEMBER. THE TASK FORCE HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THIS INFORMATION IN
GENERAL TERMS AND IS PREPARED TO OFFER THE EYE WITNESS FULL
PROTECTION IN RETURN FOR HIS TESTIMONY.

[REDACTED]
FEELING IS THAT BOTH THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY SINCERELY WANT TO SOLVE THIS CRIME,
IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN THE FACT U.S. AID COULD BE ENDANGERED IF
THERE IS A COVER-UP.

20 Dec 89
1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: CAPTAIN ALFONSO CHAVEZ GARCIA

[REDACTED]

1. FBIS, DATED 13 DECEMBER 1989, NOTED THAT CAPTAIN ALFONSO {{CHAVEZ}} GARCIA AND NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF GENERAL HERIBERTO {{HERNANDEZ}} WERE ACCUSED BY SALVADORAN ARMY OFFICERS OF HAVING CARRIED OUT AND AUTHORIZED THE MURDER OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS.4

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

PAGE 003
TIME: 011014Z JAN 90

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: NATIONAL POLICE ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
MURDERS OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CENTRAL AMERICA

DOI: MID-DECEMBER 1989

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. IN MID-DECEMBER 1989 [REDACTED]
SAID THE NATIONAL POLICE RECEIVED ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL
HOUSEHOLD TO CONDUCT A COMPLETE AND HONEST INVESTIGATION OF THE
MURDERS OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS AND TWO OTHER PERSONS WHICH OCCURRED ON
16 NOVEMBER 1989 AT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (UCA). [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SAID SENIOR POLICE OFFICIALS IN TURN ORDERED THE NATIONAL
POLICE DETECTIVE DIVISION TO CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
THE MURDERS AND PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY SUPPORT TO THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU) INVESTIGATION. [REDACTED]
SENIOR POLICE OFFICIALS ARE COMMITTED TO SOLVING THE MURDERS AND
BRINGING THE GUILTY PARTIES TO JUSTICE, WHETHER THEY ARE FROM THE
POLITICAL RIGHT OR LEFT, OR THE MILITARY.

2. THE NATIONAL POLICE ROLE HAS CONSISTED OF PROVIDING
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE SIU, INCLUDING BALLISTIC COMPARISONS,
FINGERPRINT WORK AND ROUTINE INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE NATIONAL POLICE ALSO CONDUCTED A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION, WHICH FAILED TO TURN UP ANY PHYSICAL EVIDENCE THE
INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE NATIONAL POLICE INVESTIGATION
CORRESPONDED WITH THAT OBTAINED BY THE SIU: THE AREA SURROUNDING THE
UCA CAMPUS WAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES (ESAF)
AND SECURITY FORCES PERSONNEL; THERE WAS NO GUERRILLA ACTIVITY
REPORTED IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA AROUND THE UCA ON THE NIGHT OF THE
MURDERS; AND THERE WERE NO ABANDONED OR STOLEN VEHICLES LEFT IN THE
AREA TO PROVIDE CLUES AS TO THE AUTHORS OF THE CRIME.

3. [REDACTED] EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT THE
ESAF WAS INVOLVED IN THE MURDERS. HE SAID HE BASED THIS OPINION ON
THE FACT THERE WAS APPARENTLY NO GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN THE IMMEDIATE
AREA AROUND THE PRIESTS' RESIDENCE PRIOR TO THE MURDERS, AND THAT
THERE WAS A HEAVY MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. HE ADDED, HOWEVER,
THAT WHILE MANY IN THE NATIONAL POLICE SUSPECT ESAF PARTICIPATION IN
THE MURDERS, NO PROOF EXISTS TO IMPLICATE THE MILITARY IN THE CRIME.

[REDACTED]

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NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

6. ANOTHER INJUSTICE WHICH SUBJ WANTED TO TALK ABOUT WAS LEIVA'S CONNECTION TO THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO. SUBJ SAID THAT HE AND SOME FELLOW OFFICERS WATCHED THE TV ACCOUNTS OF THE ALLEGED DIARY OF ALVARO RAFAEL ((SARAVIA)), AND THE DAMAGING INFORMATION ENTERED THEREIN CONCERNING THE MURDER. PER SUBJ, HE AND HIS FELLOW OFFICERS, TO A MAN, RECOGNIZED THE HANDWRITING IN THE DIARY AS BELONGING TO LEIVA, AND NOT SARAVIA. HE SAID THAT THIS COULD BE PROVEN, BUT NOBODY HAS THUS FAR OFFICIALLY MADE THE CONNECTION.

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT [REDACTED] - NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
INVESTIGATION INTO THE JESUIT MURDERS

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.
2. IN EARLY JANUARY 1990 NEW INFORMATION SURFACED INDICATING THAT THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES (ESAF) PROBABLY WAS INVOLVED IN THE MURDERS OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS AND TWO OTHER PERSONS ON 16 NOVEMBER 1989. BELOW IS AN OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE CASE SINCE THE NEW INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED. THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT IS CLOSE TO SOLVING THE MURDERS AND HAS INDICATED A MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENT IS IMMINENT. TO DATE THREE ESAF OFFICERS ARE UNDER ARREST AND APPROXIMATELY 45 ENLISTED PERSONNEL ARE BEING DETAINED PENDING FURTHER INVESTIGATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE CASE IS ATTRACTING TOO MUCH PUBLICITY WHICH MAY PLACE UNNECESSARY PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO CONCLUDE ITS INVESTIGATION TOO SOON.

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NOV 1993

3.

4. [REDACTED], AT AN UNSPECIFIED TIME IN MID-DECEMBER 1989 COLONEL GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO, DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY, TOLD LT. COLONEL MANUEL ANTONIO HERMENEGILDO ((RIVAS)) MEJIA, DIRECTOR OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU), THAT HE (BENAVIDES) ORDERED A GROUP FROM THE IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALION ATACATL TO GO TO THE CAMPUS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA (UCA) ON THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERS. BENAVIDES APPARENTLY TOLD RIVAS OF HIS DEED BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTION AND WAS ASKING RIVAS FOR ASSISTANCE. RIVAS IN TURN SHARED THIS INFORMATION WITH HIS PREDECESSOR AT THE SIU, COLONEL NELSON IVAN ((LOPEZ Y LOPEZ)), CURRENT C-1 IN THE HIGH COMMAND (ESTADO MAYOR), WHOM THE ESTADO MAYOR HAD CHARGED TO WORK WITH THE SIU ON THE INVESTIGATION. LOPEZ Y LOPEZ THEN TOLD COLONEL CARLOS ANGEL ((AVILES)), APPARENTLY HIS CLOSE FRIEND WHO IS CURRENTLY THE C-5 AT THE ESTADO MAYOR, OF BENAVIDES' PLIGHT.

AVILES EXPLAINED THE CHAIN OF ACQUISITION [REDACTED] BECAUSE HE FELT HE HAD TO HAVE A "SAFETY NET" IN THE EVENT THINGS WENT BAD.

5.

[REDACTED]
PONCE IMMEDIATELY CALLED IN AVILES, WHO DENIED HAVING TOLD [REDACTED] ANYTHING OF THE KIND. PONCE THEN CALLED FOR LOPEZ Y LOPEZ, AND IT WAS AVILES WHO WENT TO SEARCH FOR HIM. WHEN LOPEZ Y LOPEZ ARRIVED NEARLY AN HOUR LATER, HE DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

██ PONCE SAID THAT
THE INFORMATION SHOULD INDEED BE INVESTIGATED, BUT AS A RUMOR.

6. [REDACTED] GENERAL ((LARIOS)) [REDACTED] ADVISED [REDACTED] THAT HE (LARIOS) HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THE ALLEGATIONS AND CONSIDERED THEM TO BE SERIOUS CHARGES. HE SAID THE MATTER WOULD BE INVESTIGATED AND THAT PRESIDENT ALFREDO ((CRISTIANI)) WOULD BE ADVISED IMMEDIATELY. [REDACTED]

8. ON 9 JANUARY [REDACTED] REPORTED THAT LT. JOSE RICARDO ((ESPINOZA)) GUERRA AND LT. GONZALO ((GUEVARA)) CERRITOS, BOTH SECTION COMMANDERS IN THE BIRI ATLACATL, AS WELL AS LT. YUSHSY RENE ((MENDOZA)) VALLECILLOS FROM THE MILITARY SCHOOL, WERE PLACED UNDER ARREST AND ARE BEING HELD AT NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS. NO LEGAL JUSTIFICATION HAS YET BEEN GIVEN FOR THESE ARRESTS, ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THIS IS A POLITICAL MOVE DESIGNED TO SHOW THE PUBLIC PROGRESS IS BEING MADE IN THE INVESTIGATION. COLONEL BENAVIDES IS REPORTEDLY UNDER "BARRACKS ARREST."

9. PRESIDENT ALFREDO ((CRISTIANI)) APPEARS TO BE EARNING VALUABLE POLITICAL POINTS FOR HIS "MANAGEMENT" OF THIS INVESTIGATION AND HE APPEARS TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND CHURCH. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE INVESTIGATION IS BEING DRIVEN BY A DEADLINE OF 23 JANUARY, WHEN THE U.S. CONGRESS BEGINS ITS NEXT SESSION. CRISTIANI (AND OTHERS) WANT THIS INVESTIGATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THAT DATE AND PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED TO THE ARMY AND THE SIU TO COMPLETE THEIR INVESTIGATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PAGE 0004
TOR: 120017Z JAN 90

10. ON 8 JANUARY CRISTIANI NAMED A MILITARY HONOR TRIBUNAL TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE. THE TRIBUNAL IS COMPRISED OF ARMY OFFICERS AND TWO CIVILIAN LAWYERS. THERE IS CONCERN IN THE EMBASSY THAT THE TRIBUNAL WILL BECOME THE LEAD INVESTIGATING BODY, REPLACING THE SIU, GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT "THE FOX IS INVESTIGATING THE CHICKENS" AND THAT THE SIU WILL LOSE PRESTIGE AS AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE BODY (THE SIU IS AN EMBASSY CREATION). TO AVOID THE SITUATION THE EMBASSY IS ASKING THAT THE HONOR TRIBUNAL ISSUE AN ORDER TO THE SIU TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SIU INVESTIGATE THE MURDERS IN AN INDEPENDENT MANNER AND REPORT THE RESULTS TO THE TRIBUNAL. IN EFFECT, THE TRIBUNAL'S ORDER WOULD BE A FORM OF CHARTER FOR THE SIU AND WOULD PRESERVE THE SIU'S IMAGE AS INDEPENDENT.

11. THE LATEST EVENTS IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDERS HAS FOSTERED AN OPTIMISTIC FEELING BOTH IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE EMBASSY.

THERE IS ALSO A DEGREE OF SKEPTICISM AND ALL POSSIBLE LEADS ARE BEING INVESTIGATED. POSSIBILITY THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS WILL CREATE FURTHER TENSIONS WITHIN THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY THE "TANDONA." THE TANDONA WAS ALREADY UNDER FIRE FROM YOUNGER OFFICERS AND THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS MAY ONLY FUEL THAT FIRE.

END OF MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

PAGE: 0001
TOR: 180000Z JAN 90

[REDACTED]

180000Z JAN 90

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY IDENTITY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





3. SUBJ'S REMARKS [REDACTED] CONCERNING
COLONEL GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO REFLECT POPULAR
BELIEF AMONG OBSERVERS IN COUNTRY. MOST WHO KNOW BENAVIDES FIND
IT HARD TO BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE ORDERED THE JESUIT MURDERS.
AS SUBJ SAYS, ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) IS BLAMED FOR PRACTICALLY
EVERYTHING BAD WHICH OCCURS IN EL SALVADOR. IN THE CASE OF THE
JESUITS, THE INVESTIGATION HAS FAILED TO INDICATE THAT THERE IS
EVEN A REMOTE CONNECTION BETWEEN D'AUBUISSON AND THE MURDERS.

[REDACTED]

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NOV 1993

PAGE 0002
TOR: 18000017 1AN 90

THE SAME APPLIES FOR INVOLVEMENT OF THE AIR FORCE. THERE IS NO PROOF AT THIS TIME THAT THE AIR FORCE PLAYED ANY PART IN THE MURDERS. STATION UNILATERAL SOURCES HAVE CONJECTURED THAT COLONEL LEIVA MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED, BUT, AS IN THE CASE OF D'AUBUISSON, THERE IS NO HARD INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE IT.



1001 191852Z JAN 60

1855Z JAN

SUBJECT - KIDNAPPINGS AND MURDERS OF HECTOR
((FLORES)) AND GILDA ((FLORES))

1. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST ANY INFORMATION
MIGHT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN ON SALVADORAN INVOLVEMENT IN
SUBJECT

2. THE MURDERS OF HECTOR ((FLORES)) AND GILDA
((FLORES)) IN GUATEMALA HAVE GENERATED A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLICITY
AND SPECULATION AS TO WHO IS RESPONSIBLE. ((FLORES)) IS VERY
INTERESTED IN DETERMINING IF THERE IS ANY INDICATION BEYOND
RUMOR OR SPECULATION OF SALVADORAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAP/MURDERS
AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION THAT MAY
DEVELOP.

3. ((FLORES)) IS VERY INTERESTED IN DETERMINING IF THERE IS ANY
INDICATION BEYOND RUMOR OR SPECULATION OF SALVADORAN INVOLVEMENT
IN THE KIDNAP/MURDERS AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION THAT
MAY DEVELOP.

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NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 221748Z JAN 90

[REDACTED] 221752Z JAN 90 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: LT. COL. GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO

[REDACTED]

2. AS HQS AWARE, LT. COL. GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO, DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY SCHOOL AND PREVIOUSLY C-2 OF THE GENERAL STAFF, IS THE PRINCIPAL OFFICER IMPLICATED IN THE NOVEMBER 1989 MURDER OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS.

[REDACTED]

3. BIO DATA: LT. COL. GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO
POB: SAN SALVADOR

OCC: MILITARY GRADUATE OF ESCUELA MILITAR, 1966

PROMOTIONS: SUB. LT.: 11 NOV 1966
LT.: 31 DEC 1969
CAPT.: 31 DEC 1973
MAJOR: 31 DEC 1978
LT. COL.: 31 DEC 1982
COLONEL: 31 DEC 1986

ASSIGNMENTS:

1963-1966: CADET
NOV 1966 - MAY 1969: AIR FORCE


[REDACTED]


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NOV 1993

PAGE 0002
TOR: 221748Z JAN 90

MAY 1969 - OCT 1969: 2ND MILITARY ZONE, SONSONATE
OCT 1969 - APRIL 1970: NATIONAL POLICE
APRIL 1970 - MARCH 1971: FIRST BRIGADE
APRIL 1971 - JAN 1973: ESTADO MAYOR
JAN 1973 - DEC 1973: ESTADO MAYOR OF THE PRESIDENCY
DEC 1973 - APRIL 1974: INSTRUCTION CENTER FOR RECRUITS
APRIL 1974 - DEC 1975: NATIONAL POLICE
JAN 1976 - FEB 1978: MILITARY SCHOOL, ASSISTANT TO S-1
FEB 1978 - FEB 1982: ESTADO MAYOR
FEB 1982 - JAN 1983: DM-6
JAN 1983 - MARCH 1983: DM-5
APRIL 1983 - NOV 1983: BIRI BELLOSO
NOV 1983 - FEB 1984: 6TH BRIGADE (EXECUTIVE OFFICE)
FEB 1984 - OCT 1984: NATIONAL POLICE (CHIEF OF D 3)
NOV 1984 - FEB 1986: BIRI BELLOSO (COMANDANTE)
FEB 1986 - JULY 1986: DM-3 (COMANDANTE)
JULY 1986 - AUG 1987: ESTADO MAYOR
SEPT 1987 - JUNE 1988: DM-5 (COMMANDER)
30 JUNE 1988 - CIRCA SUMMER 1989: C-2, ESTADO MAYOR
CIRCA SUMMER 1989 - PRESENT: DIRECTOR, ESCUELA MILITAR





TOR: 232206Z JAN 90

232204Z JAN 90

[REDACTED]

ACT ON REQUESTED: NONE, FYI ONLY.

7-
AS THE DEMOCRATIC CONVERGENCE (CD) REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MNR) WHO HAD BEEN DISPATCHED
TO MANAGUA TO EXPRESS THE CD'S DISPLEASURE WITH THE RECENT WAVE
OF FMLN ATTACKS ON SALVADORAN MAYORS. THE ENTRY IS DATED
26 JANUARY 1989. NO OTHER TRACES IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJ.

THESE TWO COPIES COPIED BY TOP CLERKS HAS NUMBER
TWO AND IN THE TOP COPY THE NAME BRADSHAW IS
CORRECTLY SET IN PLAIN BUSINESS AND INFORMATION
TO INDICATE COURTESY AND GENTLE (CORRECT) BEHAVIOR ROMANTICALLY
INVOLVED. SET OVER THE GENTLE PEOPLE HAS A FRONT SOCIAL
DEMOCRAT AND THE TOP COMPANY GENTLE TO MANAGIA.

WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION
ABLE TO PROVIDE

ON THE MURDERS AND POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF PROMINENT RIGHT-WINGER ORLANDO ((DE SOLA)) WRIGHT IN GUATEMALA CITY AT THE TIME OF THE MURDERS.

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NOV 1993

TOR: 222251Z JAN 90

222251Z JAN 90

SUBJECT: RENE FLORES SALVADORAN


NO ACTION REQUIRED; REQUEST
TRANSFER TO NEW YORK (FLORES) FOR
SALVADORAN SECRET


12 REQUEST TRADES ON FURNITURE

ACCOMPANIED HECTOR FRANCISCO MUQUELI, 35, LINDRES, LEFTIST
SALVADORAN POLITICIAN, TO GUATEMALA ON 11 JAN 20. MUQUELI AND
HIS MISTRESS, GILDA AMPARO (FLORES) AREVALO, WERE FOUND SHOT
TO DEATH ON 12 JAN 20 NEAR ALPATAGUA, QUITANA DEPARTMENT,
GUATEMALA. FLORES WAS SEEN WITH MUQUELI LAST AT 1600 ON 11
JAN 20. MUQUELI AND GILDA AMPARO WERE KIDNAPPED BY UNKNOWN
PERSONS THE MORNING OF 12 JAN 20.

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June 1993





TOR: 242215Z JAN 90

242132Z JAN 90

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GARRON FURTHER STATED THAT THE FBI MAY RETURN TO EL SALVADOR FOR ANOTHER FACET OF THE

PAGE 0001
TOR: 271948Z JAN 90

271946Z JAN 90

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: FMLN DECISION TO POSTPONE NATIONAL OFFENSIVE DUE IN
PART TO FRONT GROUPS' INABILITY TO PARTICIPATE;
FRONT GROUP PLANS TO DISRUPT GOVERNMENT

DOI: LATE DECEMBER 1989 - MID-JANUARY 1990

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NOV 1993

PAGE 0002
TOR: 271948Z JAN 90

[REDACTED]

FMLN POLITICAL COMMISSION MEMBERS SAID THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS BASED IN PART ON NATIONAL UNITY OF SALVADORAN WORKERS (UNTS) DIRECTORATE MEMBER JULIO CESAR ((PORTILLO))'S DECLARATION THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE RANK AND FILE MEMBERS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT A NATIONWIDE ARMED OPERATION. MEMBERS WERE UNPREPARED BECAUSE THEY WERE SHOCKED BY THE OFFENSIVE WHICH BEGAN ON 11 NOVEMBER 1989, AND UNTS MEMBERS AND OTHER FRONT GROUP MEMBERS WENT INTO HIDING AND HAVE REFUSED TO EMERGE. THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED STATE OF SIEGE AND SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE ALSO HAMPERED THE GROUP'S OPERATIONS.

3. HOWEVER, PORTILLO PROMISED TO SUPPORT THE NEXT NATIONAL INSURRECTION ONCE THE STATE OF SIEGE WAS LIFTED AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE RESTORED. THE UNTS AND OTHER FRONT ORGANIZATIONS ALSO PLANNED TO MOUNT CAMPAIGNS TO DENOUNCE "HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES" BY

THE ARMED FORCES OF EL SALVADOR: THE 31 OCTOBER 1989 BOMBING OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SALVADORAN WORKERS UNIONS (FENASTRAS), WHICH CLAIMED THE LIVES OF UNION LEADERS, INCLUDING FENASTRAS LEADER FEBE ELIZABETH VELAZQUEZ; AND THE 16 NOVEMBER ASSASSINATIONS OF THE SIX CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JESUIT PRIESTS.

4. PORTILLO CLAIMED THE MPSC BELIEVES THE JESUITS WERE NOT KILLED BY LOW RANKING SOLDIERS, BUT THAT THE KILLINGS WERE ORCHESTRATED BY COLONEL HECTOR HERIBERTO ((HERNANDEZ)), DIRECTOR OF THE TREASURY POLICE, AND ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)), HONORARY PRESIDENT FOR LIFE OF THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) PARTY. THE MPSC PLANS TO PUBLICLY CALL FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF HERNANDEZ AND D'AUBUISSON, IF THEY ARE NOT IDENTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS THE MASTERMINDS OF THE ASSASSINATIONS.

5. [REDACTED] ARMY COLONEL GUILLERMO BENAVIDES AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE ATACATL IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALION HAVE BEEN ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MURDER OF THE JESUITS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE IMPLICATING EITHER HERNANDEZ OR D'AUBUISSON.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 312352Z JAN 90

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 312353Z JAN 90 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] "THE FMLN HAS LOOKED FAVORABLY ON THE UNITED NATIONS AS A MECHANISM FOR PEACE TALKS WITH THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT FOR SOME TIME. CRISTIANI'S VISIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS IS LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE THAT VIEW, AS INDICATED IN THIS REPORT. COLONEL CARLOS ANGEL ((AVILES)), THE ARMY STAFF CHIEF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (C-V), WAS SLATED FOR ASSIGNMENT AS A MILITARY ATTACHE IN THE UNITED STATES; HOWEVER, HE IS SAID TO HAVE IMPLICATED MILITARY ACADEMY DIRECTOR COLONEL GUILLERMO ((BENAVIDES)) IN THE 16 NOVEMBER 1989 MURDER OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS IN SAN SALVADOR, AND HIS ASSIGNMENT IS ON HOLD. THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO DATE IMPLICATING EITHER AVILES OR D'AUBUISSON IN THE MURDERS OF THE JESUITS."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON WHY DENYING AVILES' ASSIGNMENT TO THE U.S. WOULD BENEFIT ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)); THE FMLN TENDS TO SEE THE HAND OF D'AUBUISSON BEHIND ALMOST EVERY NEFARIOUS HAPPENING IN EL SALVADOR AND ABROAD.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

312201Z JAN 90

90

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR/COSTA RICA/UNITED NATIONS

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 0002
TOR: 312205Z JAN 90

TEXT: 1. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL
LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) VISITED COSTA RICA OVER THE WEEKEND OF
27 JANUARY 1990 TO SPEAK WITH PRESIDENT OSCAR ((ARIAS)) SANCHEZ
REGARDING POSSIBLE REINITIATION OF PEACE TALKS BETWEEN THE FMLN
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR ((GIES)). THE FMLN
REPRESENTATIVE, [REDACTED] WAS UNABLE TO MEET WITH
ARIAS, SINCE HE WAS ATTENDING THE INAUGURATION OF RAFAEL
((CALLEJAS)) IN HONDURAS. [REDACTED]

4. WHEN [REDACTED] ASKED [REDACTED] WHY THE FMLN REPRESENTATIVE HAD NOT TRAVELED TO HONDURAS TO MEET WITH ARIAS ON AFOREMENTIONED ISSUES, [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT FMLN HAD NOT YET DEVELOPED A SOLID RELATIONSHIP WITH CALLEJAS AND DID NOT WANT TO CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS. [REDACTED] ALSO SAID THAT SINCE THIS VISIT WAS JUST TO KEEP ARIAS INFORMED OF FMLN PLANS, [REDACTED] WAS CONTENT TO MEET WITH [REDACTED]

OF ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) BEHIND THE KILLINGS OF THE RESUITS
AND CRISTIANI'S MOVE TO CANCEL AVILES' ASSIGNMENT TO THE U.S.

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DIST: 31 JANUARY 1990

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: STATEMENT OF MAJOR MAURICIO BELTRAN THAT SENIOR
SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS ARE GUILTY OF COMPLICITY
IN THE SAN SEBASTIAN MASSACRE.

DOI: SUMMER 1989

SUMMARY: DURING THE SUMMER OF 1989, MAJOR MAURICIO ((BELTRAN)) GRANADOS, WHO WAS ORDERED TO ORDERING THE "SAN SEBASTIAN MASSACRE," COMMENTED THAT HE HAD ORDERED THE SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OF CAPTURED INSURGENTS. HE HAD ALSO ORDERED THE ENSUING COVER UP. THE "MASSACRE" OCCURRED ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1988, WHEN THE FIFTH INFANTRY BRIGADE EXECUTED 10 CAPTURED INSURGENTS IN SAN VICENTE DEPARTAMENT. THE "MASSACRE" WAS THE EXECUTIONS TO LOOK LIKE AN INSURGENT AMBUSH. BELTRAN WAS IN CUSTODY FOR HIS ALLEGED ROLE IN DIRECTING THE "MASSACRE."

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TEXT: 1. DURING THE SUMMER OF 1989, MAJOR MAURICIO ((BELTRAN)) GRANADOS, WHO WAS ORDERED TO ORDERING THE "SAN SEBASTIAN MASSACRE," COMMENTED THAT HE HAD ORDERED THE SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OF CAPTURED INSURGENTS. HE HAD ALSO ORDERED THE ENSUING COVER UP. THE "MASSACRE" OCCURRED ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1988, WHEN THE FIFTH INFANTRY BRIGADE EXECUTED 10 CAPTURED INSURGENTS IN SAN VICENTE DEPARTAMENT. THE "MASSACRE" WAS THE EXECUTIONS TO LOOK LIKE AN INSURGENT AMBUSH. BELTRAN WAS IN CUSTODY FOR HIS ALLEGED ROLE IN DIRECTING THE "MASSACRE."

2. BELTRAN SAID THAT HIS DETENTION AND THE DETENTION OF OTHERS INVOLVED IN THE SAN SEBASTIAN KILLINGS ARE UNDER THE ORDER THEIR ROLE HAD BEEN ONE OF CARRYING OUT ORDERS GIVEN BY THE FIFTH BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL JOSE EMILIO ((CHAVEZ)) CACERES. BELTRAN SAID THAT CHAVEZ CACERES' CLAIMS NOT TO HAVE KNOWN ABOUT HIS "SUBORDINATES" INVOLVEMENT IN THE KILLINGS WERE UNTRUE. HE ADDED THAT HIS LOYALTY TO CHAVEZ CACERES, HE HAD MAINTAINED THE "MASSACRE" THAT THE INCIDENT WAS AN INSURGENT AMBUSH THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EXECUTION INTO THE INCIDENT. BELTRAN ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN COURT BY JUNIOR OFFICERS THAT HE, BELTRAN, HAD ORDERED THE EXECUTIONS WAS FALSE.

3. BELTRAN DESCRIBED THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE "MASSACRE" FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT. HE SAID THAT ON THE MORNING OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1988, A FIFTH BRIGADE COMPANY UNDER THE COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT LUIS GALVEZ ((GALVEZ)) GALVEZ CAPTURED FOUR INSURGENTS IN SAN VICENTE DEPARTAMENT. A FELLOW OFFICER TOLD BELTRAN THAT FOLLOWING THE CAPTURE OF THE INSURGENTS, GALVEZ HAD RECEIVED ORDERS TO EXECUTE THE INSURGENTS; HOWEVER, GALVEZ HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE WHO GAVE THE ORDER.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. THE STORY CURRENTLY MAKING THE ROUNDS [REDACTED] IS THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE AT A 16 NOVEMBER MORNING MEETING AT DNI HEADQUARTERS THAT REVEREND ELLACURIA HAD BEEN KILLED "TRYING TO ESCAPE" OR "RESISTING ARREST" (IMPLYING BY THOSE PHRASES THAT HE HAD BEEN KILLED BY THE MILITARY); THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS GREETED BY APPLAUSE, PROMPTING ONE OFFICER TO DECLARE THAT RESPONSE IN-APPROPRIATE AND SHORT-SIGHTED IN TERMS OF WHAT THE EVENT WOULD MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY; AND THAT THOSE PRESENT OR AWARE OF THE EVENTS OF THE MEETING WERE PART OF A COVER-UP INASMUCH AS THEY DID NOT COME FORWARD WITH THIS INFORMATION. THIS STORY, OR VARIATIONS ON THE THEME, HAVE GAINED ENOUGH CURRENCY AMONG THE U.S. MEDIA REPS HERE THAT WE EXPECT WE MAY WELL SEE SOME REFERENCE TO IT IN THE U.S. MEDIA.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NOV 1993

B. NO U.S. PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT.

C. AT SOME POINT IN THE MEETING, DNI CHIEF OF OPERATIONS CAPTAIN HERRERA INTERRUPTED THE MEETING AND IN A QUIET ASIDE TO (THEN) DNI DIRECTOR COLONEL GUZMAN AGUILAR SAID HE HAD JUST HEARD ON THE RADIO OF THE KILLINGS OF ELLACURIA AND OTHER JESUITS. (NOTE: A STORY IS CIRCULATING THAT THE "RADIO" HERRERA HAD LEARNED THE NEWS FROM WAS THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES TACTICAL NET, SUGGESTING HE HAD MONITORED A MILITARY CALL WHICH IMPLICATED THE MILITARY IN THE MURDERS. HERRERA ENTERED THE MEETING WITH HIS MX RADIO IN HAND. THIS IS NOT UNCOMMON, BUT MAY BE THE GENESIS OF THIS ACCOUNT.) HERRERA HAS SAID HE HEARD THE NEWS ON "COMMERCIAL RADIO".

BECAUSE OF THE "STATE OF EXCEPTION" DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT SHORTLY AFTER THE OFFENSIVE BEGAN, LOCAL COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS DID NOT BEGIN BROADCASTING UNTIL LATER THAT MORNING, BUT THAT THE NEWS WAS OUT ON THE WIRE SERVICES AND WAS BROADCAST BY SHORT WAVE COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, WHICH WERE HEARD IN SAN SALVADOR AS EARLY AS 0630 THAT MORNING. DNI REGULARLY MONITORS SHORT WAVE BROADCASTS IN THE EARLY MORNING.)

D. UPON RECEIVING THE NEWS FROM CAPTAIN HERRERA, COLONEL GUZMAN REPEATED IT TO THOSE IN ATTENDANCE. SOME DID REACT SPONTANEOUSLY WITH APPLAUSE. COLONEL ROBERTO PINEDA GUERRA, THEN DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL AND PRESENT AT THE MEETING, INTERVENED, POINTING OUT BOTH THE INAPPROPRIATENESS AND THE SHORTSIGHTEDNESS OF THAT REACTION.

4. AMBASSADOR, DCM AND SOME OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS ARE AWARE OF THE RUMORS, THE SPECULATION,

U61442Z FEB 90

ACTION REQUESTED: [REDACTED] CONFIRMATION
OF EXISTENCE OF SCHOOL MENTIONED PARAGRAPHS 10 BELOW AND THE
DATES OF GRADUATION CEREMONIES IN RECENT PAST

REPORTED THAT THE SCHOOL REFERRED TO
IS THE ESCUELA BILINGUE WISIA HERMOSA W/ TELEPHONE 69-318
REPEAT 69-3187. SHOULD APPRECIATE

CONFIRMING THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SCHOOL AND THEN THE LAST GRADUATION CEREMONY WERE HEARD

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TOT: 080130Z FEB 80

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] - FURTHER ON OQUELI DEATH

[REDACTED] BACKGROUND, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE DEBATE
SPECULATION OF EITHER FIGHTING OR CLEVERLY FINDING FORMS OF THE
SURVIVORS. WE HAVE NO SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING OQUELI'S OR FLORES' DEATHS NOR OF PROBABLE GUILTY PARTY.
YOU MAY WISH TO PASS ALONG TO [REDACTED] THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE'S STATEMENT TAKEN FROM THE GUATEMALAN PRESS, GUATEMALA, STATE
015725Z, WHICH CONDEMN THE KILLINGS OF GILDA FLORES AND HECTOR OQUELI
IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS. SUCH POLITICAL KILLINGS ARE AN
OUTRAGEOUS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THEY ARE AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE
PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTIVITY IMPOSSIBLE AND ROLL BACK THE GAINS
DEMOCRACY HAS MADE IN THE REGION IN RECENT YEARS. YOUR EMBASSY IN
GUATEMALA CITY HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA.
IT HAS BEEN URGED, IN THE STRONGEST TERMS, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF
GUATEMALA URGENTLY CONSIDER AN URGENT, THOROUGH AND PROFESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION OF THESE MURDERS TO FIND THOSE RESPONSIBLE AND BRING
TO JUSTICE. IT IS NOTED THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VERY THOROUGH AND
BY THE HONOR OF HONORABLE POLITICAL OFFICIALS IN GUATEMALA. IT CANNOT
OCCUR AND ONLY VIOLATIONS OF THIS SORT CAN BE STOPPED BY
STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER. YOUR AMBASSADOR HAS STATED IT
WILL BE ASSISTED BY GUATEMALA AND ASSURED THAT HE WILL PURSUE
AN AGGRESSIVE INVESTIGATION. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION
WELCOMED THIS AMBASSADORIAL INITIATIVE.

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] - BRIEFING OF HPSCI
MEMBERS OF CODEL MOAKLEY

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE, FYI.
2. [REDACTED] BRIEFED THE FIVE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TRAVELLING WITH THE MOAKLEY CODEL WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE HPSCI (REPRESENTATIVES SHUSTER, DORNAN, KENNELLY, MCHUGH AND GLICKMAN) AND HPSCI STAFFERS O'NEILL AND DUPART DURING RUSHED 40 MINUTE SESSION AFTERNOON 12 FEBRUARY 1990. REPRESENTATIVE SHUSTER CHAIRED THE SESSION AND ALLOTTED EACH MEMBER ONLY A FEW MINUTES TO PURSUE TOPICS OF HIS/HER INTEREST. THE QUESTIONS COVERED AREAS AND SUBJECTS EXPECTED AND WERE NON-CONFRONTATIONAL. ALL PARTIES APPEARED TO BE SATISFIED WITH THE ANSWERS PROVIDED [REDACTED] AND NO ISSUES RAISED WERE SKIRTED OR LEFT HANGING. EACH MEMBER CAME UP INDIVIDUALLY AND THANKED [REDACTED] AND EACH ECHOED REPRESENTATIVE GLICKMAN'S COMMENT TO "KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK".
3. SPECIFICALLY, THE MEMBERS RAISED THE KILLING OF THE JESUITS, AND THE RESULTING INVESTIGATION AND ASKED OUR REACTION TO THE SPECULATION THAT COLONEL BENAVIDES DID NOT ACT ALONE. WE BRIEFED ON THE HECTIC, ALMOST HYSTERICAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE CITY AT THE TIME, THE PARALYSIS OF BENAVIDES' SON, THE PRESSURE ON BENAVIDES TO GET HIS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER CONTROL, AND THE GENERAL PERCEPTION OF MOST MILITARY OFFICERS THAT THE JESUITS WERE THE INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF THE FMLN. SEVERAL MINUTES WERE TAKEN ON THE LATTER ISSUE, THE PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE FMLN OF UCA AND THE JESUITS, AND ON WHETHER THERE IS PERSECUTION OF THE CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS PERSONS IN GENERAL. THE REPRESENTATIVES TOOK RATHER EXTENSIVE NOTES, ASKED GOOD QUESTIONS, AND APPEARED TO BE SATISFIED THAT THE MILITARY SEARCHES AND ARRESTS WERE TARGETTED AGAINST SPECIFIC INSTALLATIONS AND PERSONS AND WERE BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND PREVIOUS INFORMATION OF DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE FMLN; THEY WERE NOT PART OF A GENERAL HARASSMENT OF THE CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS ORDERS. THE MEMBERS ALSO ASKED ABOUT D'AUBUISSON'S POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT. WE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION DEVELOPED, AND NO INDICATION THAT D'AUBUISSON WAS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED.

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[REDACTED]

4. THE HPSCI CODEL ALSO WAS INTERESTED IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE RECENT FMLN OFFENSIVE AND IN THE STATE OF PLAY OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE PROVIDED A GENERAL DI BRIEF ON BOTH THESE MATTERS, AND THE COMMENTS AND INTERCHANGES INDICATED THAT THE MEMBERS AND STAFF WERE SATISFIED WITH OUR ANSWERS. JENNIFER CASOLO WAS ONLY MENTIONED IN PASSING, AND INTERESTINGLY WE GOT THE CLEAR IMPRESSION SHE IS NO LONGER THE DARLING OF THE LEFT. MANY MEMBERS EXPRESSED DOUBT AS TO HER INNOCENCE, AND ALL AGREED THAT HER CREDIBILITY WAS SERIOUSLY IN QUESTION.

5. AT REPRESENTATIVE SHUSTER'S REQUEST, LOUIS DUPART ARRANGED A PRIVATE MEETING [REDACTED] EVENING 12 FEBRUARY TO DISCUSS THE CASOLO CASE AND MORE DETAILS OF THE OFFENSIVE AND PRESENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FMLN. SHUSTER AND DUPART DESCRIBED THEIR IMPRESSIONS OF THE VIDEO TAPE MADE AT THE SCENE OF THE ARMS DISCOVERY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WE DECLINED TO COMMENT ON REPORTS THAT CASOLO'S U.S. ACTIVITIES ARE BEING GUIDED BY FMLN FRONT ORGANIZATIONS. THE REST OF THE SESSION WAS GIVEN OVER THE DISCUSSION OF THE STATUS OF THE INSURGENCY AND FUTURE SCENARIOS.

6. AT NO TIME DID ANY OF THE HPSCI MEMBERS OR STAFFERS DEMONSTRATE PRECONCEIVED BIASES OR SUSPICIONS OF WRONG-DOING OR IMPROPRIETY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE QUESTIONS ASKED WERE NEUTRAL IN TONE, AND THE REACTIONS TO [REDACTED] COMMENTS POSITIVE AND COMPLIMENTARY. GLICKMAN, MCHUGH AND KENNELLY WERE GRACIOUS AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL, SHUSTER AND DORNAN OPENLY SUPPORTIVE AND ALL APPEARED SATISFIED WITH OUR BRIEFING. THEY ALL LAMENTED THAT THEIR SCHEDULE DID NOT PERMIT MORE TIME TO PURSUE THE SUBJECTS OF THEIR INTEREST IN MORE DEPTH, BUT WE DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY QUESTIONED IN ANY WAY OUR PROFESSIONALISM OR INTEGRITY. ALL IN ALL, A GOOD VISIT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJECT: FMLN EVALUATION OF 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE; REVISED
FMLN MILITARY PLANS

DDI: 11 NOVEMBER - MID-DECEMBER 1989

TEXT: 1. IN MID-DECEMBER 1989, [REDACTED] STATED THAT THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND INITIATED A THREE PHASE "EMERGENCY" PLAN AFTER THE FMLN'S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN THE FIRST HOURS OF THE 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE.

2. [REDACTED] THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS TO SEIZE PRINCIPAL MILITARY GARRISONS IN THE CITIES OF SAN SALVADOR, SAN MIGUEL, USulután, SANTA ANA, AND ZACATECOLUCA. HE SAID FMLN INSURGENTS FAILED TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES IN THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE BECAUSE OF STRATEGIC ERRORS COMMITTED AT ALL LEVELS OF THE FMLN COMMAND.

3. THE EMERGENCY PLAN CALLED FOR RESERVE FORCES TO REMAIN IN PLACE OUTSIDE TARGET CITIES, RATHER THAN SUPPORTING INSURGENTS ENGAGED IN COMBAT.

4. [REDACTED] ERRORS BY THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND RESULTED IN THE NEED FOR THE EMERGENCY PLAN. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GENERAL COMMAND HAD MADE NO PROVISION FOR THE FAILURE OF FMLN COMBAT UNITS TO ACHIEVE THEIR PRIMARY GOALS. IN ADDITION, FMLN UNITS FAILED TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS. THE FMLN ALSO FAILED TO TAKE OVER RADIO STATIONS, WHICH THEY HAD PLANNED TO USE TO ANNOUNCE THEIR "VICTORY" OVER THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES (ESAF) AND TO RALLY SUPPORT AMONG THE POPULACE. ALSO, MOST FMLN COMMANDERS WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREAS THEIR UNITS WERE FIGHTING IN, WHICH RESULTED IN A SLOWER ADVANCE BY THESE UNITS THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED.

5. IN SAN MIGUEL, THE FMLN SUFFERED A MAJOR SETBACK WITH THE DEATH OF COMMANDER ALIAS "GUATUZO" AND THE WOUNDING OF ALIAS "AMADEO." [REDACTED] THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED THE LOSS OF THESE TWO COMMANDERS CAUSED CONFUSION AMONG COMBATANTS, PREVENTING THEM FROM ATTAINING THEIR OBJECTIVES. [REDACTED] IDENTIFIED GUATUZO AS A NICARAGUAN. [REDACTED] NO OTHER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON WHY [REDACTED] THOUGHT GUATUZO WAS A NICARAGUAN.)

6. IN VIEW OF THE FACTORS CITED ABOVE, THE FMLN INSTITUTED ITS EMERGENCY PLAN. PHASE ONE CALLED FOR FMLN COMBATANTS TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITIONS AND NOT ATTACK MILITARY CUARTELS. IT ALSO INSTRUCTED FMLN UNITS TO FORCE THE ESAF TO USE ARTILLERY AND AIR ATTACKS IN POPULATED AREAS, THUS FOSTERING INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. FMLN UNITS WERE ALSO INSTRUCTED TO FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE TERRAIN, INTERCEPT ESAF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS TO ANTICIPATE COUNTERATTACKS, AND INFILTRATE CIVILIANS INTO ESAF AREAS TO CARRY OUT SURVEILLANCE IN PREPARATION FOR FURTHER FMLN MILITARY ACTION.

7. [REDACTED] THE MURDER OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS ON 16 [REDACTED]

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NOVEMBER AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF ESAF AIR AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATED AREAS CONVINCED THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND TO DELAY THE WITHDRAWAL OF COMBATANTS FROM THE CITIES, AS PHASE ONE ALSO CALLED FOR. THE GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WOULD MAKE THE FMLN RETREAT FROM THE CITIES EASIER, AND ALLOW IT TO CARRY OUT SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE ACTIONS WITH LITTLE OR NO NEGATIVE PRESS COVERAGE.

8. PHASE TWO OF THE PLAN BEGAN ON 4 DECEMBER, AND CALLED FOR "MASS DESTRUCTION" OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE. IT ALSO CALLED FOR AMBUSHES AGAINST ESAF UNITS PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE COFFEE GROWING REGIONS, AND FOR THE TAKEOVER OF MILITARY UNITS IN SMALL CITIES. THE GENERAL COMMAND HOPED THIS STRATEGY WOULD DRAW ESAF UNITS FROM MAJOR CITIES-

9. PHASE THREE, FOR WHICH A DATE WAS NOT SET, CALLED FOR THE USE OF HEAVY SUPPORT WEAPONS

SUCH AS RECOILLESS RIFLES AND MORTARS FOR AN EIGHT HOUR PERIOD AGAINST MILITARY CUARTELS. THE FMLN ERRED IN NOT EMPLOYING HEAVY WEAPONS DURING THE 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE SEEN AS JUSTIFIED IN USING THESE WEAPONS, BECAUSE OF HEAVY INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF ESAF ARTILLERY AND AIR ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATED AREAS, AND THE DEATHS OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS. ALSO CITED UNIDENTIFIED "PRO-SOVIET" COUNTRIES AS SUPPORTING THE FMLN'S PLANS TO USE HEAVY SUPPORT WEAPONS.

10. PHASE THREE WAS INTENDED TO FORCE ESAF UNITS OUT OF THEIR GARRISONS, BY STAGING FMLN ATTACKS IN UPPER CLASS NEIGHBORHOODS. THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED THAT ESAF UNITS COULD THEN BE MORE EASILY AMBUSHED. PHASE THREE WAS TO MAKE EXTENSIVE USE OF FMLN COMBATANTS FORCIBLY RECRUITED SINCE 11 NOVEMBER, BUT ONLY AFTER THEY HAD RECEIVED THREE MONTHS OF MILITARY TRAINING. COMBATANTS WOUNDED IN PHASE ONE WOULD ALSO TAKE PART IN PHASE THREE ONCE THEY HAD RECOVERED FROM THEIR WOUNDS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE THREE MONTH TRAINING PERIOD FOR THE FORCIBLY RECRUITED COMBATANTS--MOST OF WHOM WERE RECRUITED IN DECEMBER INDICATES THAT PHASE THREE OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN WOULD PROBABLY COMMENCE IN MARCH OF 1990.)

11. (SOURCE COMMENT: GIVEN THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR SINCE NOVEMBER 1989, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE THIRD PHASE OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN OUTLINED IN THIS REPORT WOULD STILL BE A CONSIDERATION IN THE FMLN'S PLANNING IN 1990.)

031845Z MAR 9

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE. FYI ONLY.

THE EMBASSY [REDACTED] CONTINUES TO CLOSELY MONITOR THE COURT'S PROGRESS IN PROSECUTING THE CASE. UNFORTUNATELY, PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW AND THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT THE PROCESS WILL BE SPED UP IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

PREDICTABLY HE WAS APPREHENSIVE, BUT FINALLY AGREED TO PROVIDE A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF WHAT HE SAW AND HEARD BEFORE AND DURING THE NIGHT OF 15 NOVEMBER. TO DATE THE YOUNG MAN HAS PROVIDED A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE OFFENSIVE UP UNTIL 15 NOVEMBER.

THE YOUNG MAN'S VERBAL ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED SHOWS PROMISE

THE YOUNG MAN IS THE FIRST NON-MILITARY EYEWITNESS WITH WHAT MAY WELL BE VALUABLE INFORMATION.

4. COMPLETED HIS INVESTIGATION INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF AIR FORCE INVOLVEMENT IN THE KILLINGS AND CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO POINT TO ANY AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMES.

REPORTED THAT ON THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERS A UNIT OF THE LONG RANGE RECON PATROL (PRAL) LEFT AIRBASE AT APPROXIMATELY 2300 HRS. REPORTED THE SAME INFORMATION AND ADDED THAT THE UNIT WAS LEAD BY MAJOR ((PERDOMO)). CONFIRMED THAT THE PRAL DID INDEED LEAVE AT THAT HOUR, WITH THE SPECIFIC MISSION OF PATROLLING THE AREA. THIS WAS A LEGITIMATE MISSION AND IN NO WAY CONNECTED TO THE MURDERS. TO DATE, NO OTHER INFORMATION HAS SURFACED TO IMPLICATE THE AIR FORCE.

6. EMBASSY OFFICERS CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY WITH JUDICIAL OFFICIALS TO OBTAIN UPDATES ON THE PROGRESS IN THE CASE AND TO PRESSURE FOR ADVANCEMENT. SEVERAL OBSTACLES HAVE ARISEN WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT THREATEN THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME

OF THE TRIAL. THE MOST IMPORTANT OBSTACLE CONFRONTING THE COURTS AT THE MOMENT IS FINDING SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO BIND COLONEL GUILLERMO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO OVER FOR TRIAL. JUDGE RICARDO ((ZAMORA)), WHO CURRENTLY HAS JURISDICTION, ADVISED [REDACTED] THE CASE AGAINST BENAVIDES IS VERY WEAK AND SAID IT IS POSSIBLE HE COULD BE FREED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. ACCORDING TO SALVADORAN LAW, AN INDICTED CO-CONSPIRATOR CAN NOT TESTIFY AGAINST A FELLOW CO-CONSPIRATOR. THEREFORE, AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS NO WITNESS TO IMPLICATE BENAVIDES IN THE CRIME AND BENAVIDES STEADFASTLY DENIES ANY INVOLVEMENT. ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATING. CONFLICTING INFORMATION FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES DIFFERS AS TO WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO "UNINDICT" ONE OF THE LIEUTENANTS IN THE CASE AND USE HIM AS A WITNESS AGAINST BENAVIDES. JUDGE ZAMORA CLAIMS THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, WHILE OTHERS ARGUE THAT IT IS ACCEPTABLE UNDER EXISTING LAWS.

7. [REDACTED] JUDGE ZAMORA'S HANDLING OF THIS CASE CAN BE DESCRIBED AS LESS THAN ADEQUATE. PERHAPS THE EXPLANATION FOR JUDGE ZAMORA'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO FEAR FOR HIS LIFE SHOULD HE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE THIS CASE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE FEARS THE ARMED FORCES, SPECIFICALLY THE "TANDONA", WILL SEEK REVENGE AGAINST HIM SHOULD HE PROSECUTE THE CASE TO ITS FULLEST. ZAMORA HAS GONE AS FAR AS TO ASK FOR PROTECTION AND VISAS TO SEND HIS FAMILY TO THE UNITED STATES.

8. WHILE ZAMORA'S PERCEPTION OF A THREAT IS UNDERSTANDABLE GIVEN THE HISTORICAL REALITIES OF EL SALVADOR, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THERE IS A THREAT AGAINST HIS LIFE. IN FACT [REDACTED] THE ARMED FORCES AS AN INSTITUTION WANT TO SEE THIS CASE PROSECUTED TO ITS FULL EXTENT, IF FOR NOTHING ELSE THAN TO CLEAR THE NAME OF THE ESAF. ADDITIONALLY, COLONEL PONCE HAS STATED, PUBLICLY

AND PRIVATELY THE GUILTY MUST BE PROSECUTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, PONCE HAS NOT GIVEN ZAMORA ANY SPECIAL ASSURANCES OR GUARANTEES. PONCE IS UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE FROM AT LEAST SOME TANDONA MEMBERS TO PROTECT FELLOW TANDONA MEMBER BENAVIDES. THIS PRESSURE MAY BE ONE OF THE REASONS PONCE HAS ARGUED REPEATEDLY TO USG OFFICIALS AND THE PRESS THAT THE MILITARY HAS DONE ITS PART IN THE INVESTIGATION (THE HONOR TRIBUNAL) AND THAT NOW IT IS UP TO THE COURTS. THE U.S. VICE PRESIDENT RECENTLY WARNED PONCE THAT THE MILITARY MUST ENSURE THAT THE GUILTY ARE PROSECUTED AND PROVIDE THE NECESSARY GUARANTEE SO THAT THE JUDICIAL PROCESS CAN GO FORWARD WITHOUT INTERFERENCE OR THREATS.

[REDACTED]

1207

WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE A HANDFUL OF THE APPROXIMATELY 30 PERSONS WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING MAY HAVE CLAPPED OR EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION THAT THE JESUITS HAD BEEN KILLED, THERE IS NOTHING TO CONFIRM THE ALLEGATION OF GENERAL APPLAUSE.

082200Z MAR 90

1. THE AMBASSADOR RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM

3. [REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED THAT U.S. CONGRESSMAN MOAKLEY IS AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION, AND MAY TRAVEL SOON TO MEXICO CITY TO INTERVIEW SIERRA.

4. AMBASSADOR PASSED ABOVE INFORMATION TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 8 MARCH USING SECURE TELEPHONE. [REDACTED]

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

101845Z MAR 90

1. [REDACTED] CITED A NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT'S STATEMENT THAT PRIVATE JORGE ALBERTO ((SIERRA)) ASECIO, A DEFENDANT IN THE NOVEMBER 1989, WILL SURFACE IN MEXICO CITY AND NAME SALVADORAN VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE COLONEL JUAN ORLANDO ((ZEPEDA)) HERRERA AS THE INTELLECTUAL AUTHOR AND TACTICAL SUPERVISOR OF THE MURDERS.

NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

2. SIERRA WILL ALLEGEDLY CLAIM THAT LIEUTENANT JOSE RICARDO ((ESPINOZA)), ALREADY IN CUSTODY IN CONNECTION WITH THE MURDERS, WAS IN CONSTANT RADIO CONTACT WITH ZEPEDA THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION TO MURDER THE JESUITS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 142203Z MAR 90

[REDACTED] 142157Z MAR 90 [REDACTED]

CITE SAN SALVADOR 35039

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] ARCHBISHOP OF SAN SALVADOR'S REACTION
TO RECENT FMLN PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT CHURCH

[REDACTED]

3. ON 22 JANUARY 1990, THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) SENT AN EIGHT-PAGE, OPEN LETTER SIGNED BY THE GENERAL COMMAND, TO RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR. THE LETTER WAS ON FMLN LETTERHEAD. IN THE LETTER, THE FMLN STRESSED THAT THE CHURCH AND THE FMLN PURSUED A COMMON GOAL, THAT IS, TO LOOK OUT FOR THE COMMON MAN AND TO FIGHT FOR PEACE. THE FMLN EMPHASIZED THAT THE CHURCHES HAVE MADE GREAT CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM, AND TO THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE CIVIL WAR. THE GENERAL COMMAND POINTED OUT THAT IT HAS PRESENTED SEVERAL PROPOSALS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR, BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED WITH MORE REPRESSION, SUCH AS THE FENASTRAS BOMBING, WHICH FORCED THE FMLN TO LAUNCH THE NOVEMBER 1989 OFFENSIVE

[REDACTED]

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IN MEMORY OF THOSE WHO WERE KILLED. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDED BY BOMBING CIVILIAN TARGETS AND KILLING HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE SIX JESUIT PRIESTS. THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES ARE AN INVITATION TO WAR. THUS, THE FMLN MUST CONTINUE ITS MILITARY OFFENSIVE, ALTHOUGH IT WANTS TO END THE WAR TO AVOID GREATER SOCIAL, HUMAN, AND MATERIAL COST. GROUPS PURSUING THE SAME CAUSE MUST UNITE THEIR RESOURCES. ALTHOUGH DIFFERENT CHURCHES HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SCRIPTURE, THEY STILL WORK TO HELP THE POOR. THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND ENCOURAGES THE CHURCHES TO CONTINUE TO USE THEIR RESOURCES TO WORK TOWARD PEACE, AND TO ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE FMLN TO END THE WAR.

4. ON 5 FEBRUARY, IN A GENERAL NEWSLETTER TO PRIESTS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS IN EL SALVADOR, ARCHBISHOP OF EL SALVADOR ARTURO ((RIVERA Y DAMAS)) RESPONDED TO THE FMLN MEMORANDUM DIRECTED AT THE CHURCH. IN REFERENCE TO THE DOCUMENT, THE ARCHBISHOP SAID HE WANTED EVERYONE TO BE QUITE CLEAR ON WHAT HE, AS THE PASTOR OF THE ARCHDIOCESE, THOUGHT ON THE SUBJECT. HE WROTE THAT THE DOCUMENT WAS PROPAGANDA; THAT IT SOUGHT TO WIN SYMPATHY FOR THE FMLN'S CAUSE IN THE WAKE OF THE KILLINGS OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS; AND THAT THE METHOD THE FMLN USED WAS NOT CHRISTIAN. THE ARCHBISHOP ADDED THAT THE MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY OF THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND IS IN CRISIS WORLDWIDE. IT HAS NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE IN NICARAGUA, AND IN EASTERN EUROPE IT IS BEING COMPLETELY RESTRUCTURED. THE ARCHBISHOP SAID THE CHURCH BELIEVES THAT BUILDING INSTITUTIONS MORE HUMANE, MORE JUST, AND MORE RESPECTFUL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN IS IMPORTANT. HOWEVER, HE SAID ONE MUST ALSO BE AWARE THAT EVEN THE BEST, MOST IDEAL SYSTEMS CAN QUICKLY BECOME INHUMANE, IF THE INHUMANE INCLINATIONS OF MAN ARE NOT CORRECTED.

FOR 2024294-100000

2325Z MAR

ADORAN INVOLVEMENT

IMPRESSION OF GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT
VIN (O'D) (CEREZO) COMMENT IN THAT HE DOES
NOT HAVE EVIDENCE THAT SALVADORAN RIGHTISTS ASSASSINATED DIRECTOR
(O'D) AND ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE JUAN JOSE (RIVAS).
LOPEZ IS SUCH AS HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY HE BELIEVES THAT
THIS WAS THE CASE. INFORMATION FROM SALVADORAN
EMBASSY WOULD BE THAT GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT
OF THE YEAR (O'D) (CEREZO)
THIS WAS SALVADORAN PRESIDENT OF THE YEAR IN 1974
1974-1975

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

TO: 287329Z MAR 90

TEXT

ERNESTO PANAMA MOLINA

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NOV 1993

IN NOVEMBER 1983, PANAMA'S NAME WAS PLACED ON THE AVLOS WATCHLIST, FOR INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM.

C. IN JULY 1989, PANAMA REPORTEDLY HAD ACTED AS ARENA LIAISON TO THE MLN IN GUATEMALA FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS AND HAD RECENTLY RETURNED TO EL SALVADOR TO ESTABLISH A CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTE (NFI), [REDACTED]

D. PANAMA HAS A MEMBER OF REGALADO'S ARENA
PARAMILITARY UNIT. [REDACTED]

TO: 020031Z MAY 90

SUBJECT

MARIO DENIS MORAN ECHEVERRIA

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY ON MARIO DENIS
OPOR: 12 AUGUST 1939 IN

...A RIGHTIST
...NON DEFUNCT), WAS
...OTHER LIEUTENANT, BOTH
...NATIONAL GUARD

HIS JOB
TRANSFERRED

TRANSFERRED
RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES

D. ON 1 MAY 1981 [REDACTED] REPORTED THE
INADVERTENT DISCOVERY BY THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL POLICE OF A

SUSPECTED RIGHT WING TERRORIST GROUP WITH APPARENT LINKS TO RIGHTIST MILITARY OFFICERS. THE MILITARY OFFICERS IDENTIFIED INCLUDED MAJOR MORAN, WHO SUPPORTED THE ARMED FORCES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE LEFT.

E. [REDACTED] MORAN, FORMER HEAD OF THE NATIONAL GUARD'S INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DIRECTED A "DEATH SQUAD" FUNDED BY SALVADORAN BUSINESSMAN RICARDO ((SOL)) MESA, A LONGTIME LOYALIST OF ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)), FOUNDER AND HONORARY PRESIDENT FOR LIFE OF NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE ((ARENA)). [REDACTED] REPORTED SOL MESA AND MORAN USED THIS DEATH SQUAD TO KILL RODOLFO ((VIERA)), FORMER HEAD OF THE SALVADORAN AGRARIAN REFORM INSTITUTE ((ISTA)) AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN SAN SALVADOR ON 4 JANUARY 1981. U.S. CITIZENS MIKE ((HAMMER)) AND MARK ((PEARLMAN)) OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT ((AIRFLD)) WERE KILLED BECAUSE THEY HAPPENED TO BE WITH VIERA AT THE TIME AND BECAUSE THEY SUPPORTED VIERA'S AGRARIAN REFORM ACTIVITIES. HAMMER AND PEARLMAN APPARENTLY WERE NOT TARGETS OF THE LEFT-WING GROUPS KNOWN AS THE SHERATON BURGERS.

MARCH 1983 THAT [REDACTED] REPORTED IN
SALVADOR, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF [REDACTED] NILOR
(MOLINA). [REDACTED] MOLINA'S DEATH SQUAD PLANNED AND CARRIED
OUT THE ASSASSINATION OF MARCH BISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO (ROMERO). IN
MARCH 1981. [REDACTED]

... G. ... (continued) ... INFLUENCE IN THE ... OFFICE ...

1. MORAN, FORMER SENATOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND
COMMANDER OF THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD (CNG), WAS
ATTEMPTING TO SECURE EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CALIFORNIA
FOR HIM AT CLIFA, AND WAS EMPLOYED AS A LABORER (NAYA).
ROSA, A DEATH SQUAD MEMBER, AND EMPLOYED IN THE SHERATON
MURDER CASE, TO RESIGN FROM HIS POSITION AS CHIEF OF SECURITY
FOR THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND TO ACCEPT A POSITION AT
CLIFA.

1. [REDACTED] REPORTED IN MARCH 1984, LT. COLONEL MORAN, COMMANDER OF CIIFA IN THE DEPARTMENT OF LA PAZ HAD BEEN PRESSURING THE GENERAL POPULACE TO VOTE FOR ARENA. MORAN HAD BEEN GIVING POLITICAL SPEECHES IN TOWNS AND VILLAGES OF HIS COMMAND, URGING THE CITIZENS TO VOTE "ANTI-COMMUNIST." THE ACTIVITIES OF MORAN VIOLATED THE "APOLITICAL POSITION" OF THE ARMED FORCES. [REDACTED]

K. [REDACTED] REPORTED IN MAY 1984 THE INTENTIONS OF THE SALVADORAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)) TO REMOVE CERTAIN MILITARY OFFICERS WHICH INCLUDED LT. COLONEL MORAN.

SECURITY WHILE REGALADO HAD ORIGINATED ONE OF HIS
SUBORDINATES TO PLAN AND CARRY OUT ASSASSINATIONS OF KEY
LEADERS OF THE SALVADORAN LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE POPULAR
DEMOCRATIC UNION (UPD). REGALADO COUNTED UPON AMMUNITION
RESUPPLY FROM THE TREASURY POLICE, AND ARMY LT. COLONEL NONO
REGULARLY PROVIDED MILITARY CREDENTIALS FOR USE BY REGALADO
PERSONNEL.

PERSONNEL

PAGE: 0001
TOT: 080631Z MAY 90

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ON
JESUIT CASE

1. [REDACTED]

TEXT FROM 7 MAY 1990 NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE.

2. BEGIN QUOTE: CRUCIAL EVIDENCE VANISHES IN CASE OF 6 SLAIN JESUITS. A SETBACK IN EL SALVADOR. FOUR SOLDIERS TIED TO INQUIRY ARE TRANSFERRED ABROAD - DISMAY GROWS IN U.S., BY LINDSEY GRUSON. SAN SALVADOR, MAY 6. SEVERAL VITAL PIECES OF EVIDENCE THAT COULD HELP CONVICT A COLONEL CHARGED WITH THE SLAYING OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS AND TWO WOMEN IN NOVEMBER HAVE DISAPPEARED, SALVADORAN SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL OFFICIALS SAY.

COURT AUTHORITIES SAID AT LEAST FOUR SOLDIERS WITH POTENTIALLY INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE WERE SENT ABROAD TO STUDY AND WERE UNAVAILABLE TO TESTIFY. TWO OTHER MAJOR WITNESSES HAVE FAILED TO APPEAR AS REQUIRED, THE OFFICIALS SAID.

SENIOR JUDICIAL OFFICIALS SAID THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE FOUR SOLDIERS' TRANSFER ABROAD WERE A SEVERE AND POSSIBLY FATAL BLOW TO AN EXTREMELY WEAK CASE AGAINST THE COLONEL, GUILLERMO ALFREDO BENAVIDES MORENO.

COLONEL'S DIARY MISSING

THE LOSS OF EVIDENCE ALSO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS THAT OTHER SENIOR COMMANDERS WERE INVOLVED IN OR TRIED TO COVER UP THE KILLING OF THE JESUITS, THEIR COOK AND HER DAUGHTER, SAID THE OFFICIALS, WHO ASKED NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED.

ONE PIECE OF MISSING EVIDENCE IS COL. BENAVIDES DIARY,

[REDACTED]

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WHICH JUDICIAL OFFICIALS HOPED WOULD BE USEFUL IN THE CASE AGAINST HIM. LIKE ALMOST ALL SENIOR SALVADORAN COMMANDERS, COL. BENAVIDES ALWAYS CARRIED A NOTEBOOK IN WHICH HE KEPT NOTES OF HIS ACTIVITIES AND OF THE MEETINGS HE ATTENDED. BUT THE DIARY HAS DISAPPEARED, THE OFFICIALS SAID.

THEY SAID THEY REQUESTED THE LOG OF A MILITARY SCHOOL FROM THE TRIBUNAL THAT INVESTIGATED THE SLAYING. BUT THE SUPREME COURT SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT THE TRIBUNAL REPLIED THAT THE LOG, IN WHICH THE NAME OF ANYONE ENTERING OR LEAVING THE CAMPUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECORDED, HAD ALSO BEEN LOST. COL. BENAVIDES WAS THE HEAD OF THE MILITARY SCHOOL AND IN CHARGE OF THE ZONE WHERE THE KILLINGS TOOK PLACE.

FOUR SOLDIERS SENT ABROAD

THE FOUR SOLDIERS ON GUARD DUTY AT THE SCHOOL ON THE NIGHT OF THE SLAYINGS HAVE BEEN SENT ABROAD TO STUDY. THAT HAS MADE IT ALL BUT IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND OUT WHO WAS AT THE CAMPUS THAT NIGHT, A SETBACK TO EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER OTHER COMMANDERS BESIDES COL. BENAVIDES WERE INVOLVED IN THE KILLINGS.

THE JUDICIAL OFFICIALS SAID THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IS THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF OBSTACLES PLACED IN THE WAY OF THEIR INVESTIGATION. THEY SAID THE AUTHORITIES HAD PROVIDED ALMOST NO COOPERATION AND AT TIMES APPEARED TO BE DELIBERATELY OBSTRUCTIVE.

THE DISCLOSURE THAT EVIDENCE IS MISSING COMES AS IMPATIENCE WITH THE SLOW PACE OF THE INVESTIGATION IS BUILDING IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS. IT IS LIKELY TO SPUR EFFORTS TO CUT UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR, WHICH AMOUNTS TO \$85 MILLION THIS YEAR, ALMOST A THIRD OF THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE BUDGET.

THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, WHO UNTIL NOW HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE CASE IN ANY DETAIL, DISCLOSED THE LOSS OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE SOLDIERS' TRANSFER TO AN EFFORT TO COUNTERACT CRITICISM HERE AND ABROAD THAT THEY HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENTLY AGGRESSIVE IN THEIR INQUIRY.

DEMOCRATS CRITICIZE JUDGE

IN THE LATEST CRITICISM, A PANEL OF HOUSE DEMOCRATS THAT HAS BEEN MONITORING THE INVESTIGATION LAST WEEK PLACED MOST OF THE BLAME FOR ITS SLOWNESS ON THE JUDGE IN CHARGE,

RICARDO A. ZAMORA. 'THE JUDGE IS SITTING ON HIS HANDS,' SAID REPRESENTATIVE BUD SHUSTER, A PENNSYLVANIA REPUBLICAN WHO RECENTLY VISITED EL SALVADOR WITH THE PANEL. HIS VIEWS WERE ECHOED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER BUSH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. ONE OFFICIAL SAID JUDGE ZAMORA ILLUSTRATED 'THE FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESSES OF THE SALVADORAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM.'

BUT THE JUDGE, WHO HAS HANDLED SOME OF THE MOST SENSITIVE CASES IN EL SALVADOR IN RECENT YEARS, REJECTED THE CONTENTION THAT HE HAS BEEN LESS THAN VIGOROUS IN THE INVESTIGATION. HE DECLINED TO DISCUSS THE CASE IN DETAIL. BUT JUDICIAL OFFICIALS SAID THE INVESTIGATION HAD BEEN SLOWED BY THE AUTHORITIES' LACK OF COOPERATION AND BY THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE. THE OFFICIALS SAID JUDGE ZAMORA WAS CAUGHT BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANTED HIM TO HURRY SO THAT HE MADE A MAJOR MISTAKE AND THOSE WHO WANTED HIM TO SLOW DOWN SO THAT THE CASE COULD BE FORGOTTEN.

"I'M WALKING THE RAZOR'S EDGE," JUDGE ZAMORA SAID IN HIS ONLY ON-THE-RECORD COMMENTS ON THE INVESTIGATION.

U.S. AID COULD BE AT STAKE

THE CASE IS CONSIDERED THE MOST DELICATE IN SALVADORAN JUDICIAL HISTORY AND A VITAL TEST OF UNITED STATES-BACKED EFFORTS TO FORTIFY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUT THE ARMED FORCES UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL AND FORCE THEM TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS. THE MILITARY HAS LONG HAD A DE FACTO VETO OVER ALMOST ALL MAJOR GOVERNMENT DECISIONS.

AT STAKE, AMERICAN OFFICIALS SAY, MAY BE THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES AID, WHICH SUSTAINS THE ALL-BUT-BANKRUPT SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND ACCOUNTS FOR MORE THAN HALF THE BUDGET. PRESIDENT ALFREDO CRISTIANI SAID LAST WEEK THAT EVEN

WHERE'S THE COLONEL'S DIARY?
AND WHY WERE 4 MEN TRANSFERRED?

A SMALL CUT IN MILITARY AID WOULD HAVE A BROAD EFFECT THROUGH THE COUNTRY. HE SAID IT WOULD HEIGHTEN THE INTRANSIGENCE OF LEFTIST REBELS AT THE COMING PEACE TALKS AND FORCE A REDUCTION IN EL SALVADOR'S ALREADY STRAINED SOCIAL SERVICES.

THE SLAIN PRIESTS, THEIR COOK AND HER DAUGHTER WERE KILLED WITH HIGH-POWERED RIFLES BEFORE DAWN ON NOV. 16 AT THE JESUIT-RUN CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CAPITAL. AT FIRST, MANY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND ARMY

COMMANDERS TRIED TO BLAME THE REBELS, WHO HAD BEGUN A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE CAPITAL THE PREVIOUS WEEK.

COLONEL BENAVIDES AND SEVEN LOWER-RANKING OFFICIALS WERE CHARGED WITH THE SLAYINGS IN JANUARY. BUT THERE IS STRONG DOUBT WHETHER THE COLONEL CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED. THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM IS LARGELY LIMITED TO STATEMENTS BY SUBORDINATES THAT HE ORDERED THE KILLINGS. BUT CO-DEFENDANTS HERE ARE PROHIBITED FROM TESTIFYING AGAINST EACH OTHER. AND IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER CHARGES CAN BE DROPPED AGAINST OTHER DEFENDANTS IN RETURN FOR THEIR TESTIMONY.

WESTERN DIPLOMATS WHO HAVE CLOSELY MONITORED THE CASE SAID NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE HAD BEEN UNCOVERED TO IMPLICATE OTHER OFFICERS BESIDES COLONEL BENAVIDES, THE HIGHEST-RANKING OFFICER EVER CHARGED IN A HUMAN RIGHTS CASE HERE. THE DIPLOMATS SAID THE ARMY INVESTIGATION, ESPECIALLY THE FORENSIC WORK, WAS EXTREMELY WELL DONE--BUT ONLY AS FAR AS IT WENT.

TWO MEETINGS NOT INVESTIGATED

THE DIPLOMATS SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO SERIOUS INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF AN ATTEMPTED COVER-UP BY THE ARMY, WHICH IS RUN BY A TIGHTLY KNIT GROUP OF OFFICERS. THEY ALSO CRITICIZED THE FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE WHAT HAPPENED AT TWO MEETINGS--ONE HELD BY SENIOR COMMANDERS HOURS BEFORE THE KILLINGS, THE OTHER SEVERAL HOURS AFTERWARD.

THE FIRST MEETING IS VITAL IN DETERMINING WHETHER COLONEL BENAVIDES ACTED UNDER ORDERS, AS HE HAS SOMETIMES SAID TO FRIENDS AND FAMILY MEMBERS, OR WHETHER HE WENT BEYOND INSTRUCTIONS TO REDOUBLE ATTACKS ON REBEL STRONGHOLDS AND COMMANDERS, AS CONTENDED BY THE HIGH COMMAND. JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, WHO HAVE YET TO QUESTION MANY PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING, HAD HOPED THAT COLONEL BENAVIDES'S MISSING DIARY WOULD CLEAR UP THE DISPUTE.

SINCE THE SLAYINGS, IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT SENIOR COMMANDERS AT THE MEETING WERE CLOSE TO PANICKING. SOME DIPLOMATS SAID THAT AND A DECISION TO TAKE THE WAR TO THE GUERRILLAS MAY HAVE CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE KILLING OF THE JESUITS WOULD BE TOLERATED, EVEN IF NOT DIRECTLY ORDERED. OTHER DIPLOMATS AND SALVADORAN OFFICIALS SAY THEY BELIEVE THE SLAYING OF THE JESUITS, WHOM THE EXTREME RIGHT CONSIDERED REBEL SYMPATHIZERS WAS DIRECTLY ORDERED.

IN THE SECOND MEETING, A ROUTINE REUNION OF



PAGE 0005
TOT: 080631Z MAY 90

INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, PARTICIPANTS REPORTEDLY CHEERED WHEN A JUNIOR OFFICER INTERRUPTED WITH NEWS OF THE SLAYINGS. DIPLOMATS SAY IT IS ALMOST UNIMAGINABLE THAT THE HIGH COMMAND DID NOT KNOW OF THE ARMY'S INVOLVEMENT WITHIN HOURS OF THE SLAYINGS. AN INVESTIGATION OF THE MEETING IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE COULD HELP SHOW WHO KNEW WHAT AND WHEN THEY KNEW IT. AND THAT, THE DIPLOMATS SAY, COULD SHOW IF THERE WAS AN ATTEMPTED COVER-UP. END OF QUOTE.

FOLLOWING IS CAPTION OF PHOTO: "WITH IMPORTANT WITNESSES UNAVAILABLE AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF VITAL EVIDENCE, HOPE IS FADING FOR THE CONVICTION OF A SALVADORAN ARMY COLONEL IN THE KILLING LAST YEAR OF SIX PRIESTS AND TWO WOMEN. AS A RESULT, MOMENTUM IS BUILDING IN CONGRESS TO CUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE COUNTRY. YESTERDAY WAS THE DAY OF THE SALVADORAN SOLDIER, AND AS PART OF THE CELEBRATION, RECRUITS WERE INDUCTED IN THE ARMY."

END OF MESSAGE

REVIEWING HQS FILES, MARTINO WAS ABDUCTED ON 22 MARCH 1983 AND
THERE IS NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON MARTINO.



151427Z MAY 90

1. [REDACTED] DURING THE APRIL 1990 FIDAE AIR SHOW IN CHILE, GENERAL (FNU) ((VIA MARIOSO)), CHIEF OF THE SALVADORAN AIR FORCE, PRIVATELY TOLD A VISITING AMERICAN [REDACTED] THAT IT WAS "STUPID" FOR THE SALVADORAN MILITARY TO HAVE KILLED THE JESUITS, BUT THEY "NEEDED KILLING."

NOV 1993

TO: 171457Z MAY 90

DIST: 17 MAY 1990

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: JOINT GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS' EVALUATION OF PUBLIC
COMMENTS BY FORMER COLONEL SIGIFREDO OCHOA PEREZ ON
THE MURDER OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS

DOI: LATE APRIL 1990

TEXT:

2. IN LATE APRIL 1990 SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE JOINT GENERAL

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

STAFF (EMCFA) ANALYZED PUBLIC COMMENTS BY FORMER COLONEL SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ, PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE HYDROELECTRIC COMMISSION OF THE LEMPA RIVER (CEL), IN WHICH OCHOA STATED THAT SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES MUST HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE MURDER OF JESUIT PRIESTS IN SAN SALVADOR IN NOVEMBER 1989. THE OFFICERS CONCLUDED THAT OCHOA SHOULD BE FIRED FROM THE CEL FOR SLANDERING THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT (GOES) AND THE ARMED FORCES (ESAF). AT THE SAME TIME, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT FIRING OCHOA WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO LABOR DIFFICULTIES AT CEL, AND POSSIBLY WITHIN LABOR AS A WHOLE.

3. THE OFFICERS AGREED THAT OCHOA'S COMMENTS REPRESENT A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE GOES AND THE ESAF FOR SEVERAL REASONS: FIRST, OCHOA IS ONE OF THE THREE MOST WIDELY KNOWN AND RESPECTED MILITARY FIGURES IN EL SALVADOR, ALONG WITH FORMER MAJOR ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) AND DECEASED LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOMINGO ((MONTERROSA)); SECOND, OCHOA HAS A REPUTATION AS AN ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT FIGURE WILLING TO CONFRONT DIFFICULT ISSUES; THIRD, HE OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POSITION, AND IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXTREME RIGHT WING OF THE GOVERNING NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) PARTY. THEREFORE, THE EMCFA OFFICERS AGREED THAT OCHOA IS SEEN AS A CREDIBLE, HIGH LEVEL SOURCE BY THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THE FACT THAT OCHOA IS A DISCREDITED FIGURE WHO IS CONSIDERED TO BE IRRATIONAL BY SENIOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL CIRCLES IS NOT WIDELY KNOWN: HIS REMARKS THEREFORE HAVE A CREDIBILITY UNMATCHED BY THOSE OF OTHER OFFICIALS. THE OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT WHILE FIRING OCHOA MIGHT ENHANCE HIS CREDIBILITY, IGNORING THE ISSUE WILL ENHANCE IT EVEN MORE.

4. THE EMCFA OFFICERS ALSO AGREED THAT WHILE OCHOA SHOULD GO, THIS WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO LABOR PROBLEMS; EVEN IF HE DID NOT ENCOURAGE LABOR UNREST IN CEL, EXISTING TENSIONS THERE WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE GOES. THEREFORE, THE OFFICERS AGREED THAT THE GOES, AND NOT THE ESAF, SHOULD MAKE THE FINAL DECISION ON OCHOA'S FATE.

6. [REDACTED] ON 30 APRIL PRESIDENT ALFREDO ((CRISTIANI)) MET WITH CALDERON, OCHOA, AND D'AUBUISSON TO DISCUSS OCHOA'S REMARKS. CALDERON [REDACTED] OPENED THE DISCUSSION WITH HARSH CRITICISM OF OCHOA, ACCUSING OCHOA OF CREATING A DIFFICULT SITUATION FOR CRISTIANI AND ARENA. CALDERON [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT OCHOA'S COMMENTS WOULD WORSEN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ESAF AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND RAISED SERIOUS CHARGES AGAINST THE MOST SENIOR ESAF OFFICERS.

7. [REDACTED] CRISTIANI THEN SAID HE REALIZED OCHOA'S [REDACTED]

IMPRESSION THAT OCHOA WAS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE STATEMENTS IN ORDER TO DISCREDIT THE ESAF. OCHOA THEN OFFERED TO RESIGN FROM THE CEL, [REDACTED] CRISTIANI SAID IMMEDIATELY THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT OCHOA'S RESIGNATION.

9. [REDACTED] (CRISTIANI) HAS THREE OPTIONS: FIRST, ACCEPT OCHOA'S RESIGNATION AND THE LIKELY POLITICAL FALLOUT; SECOND, LEAVE OCHOA AS CEL PRESIDENT; AND THIRD, WAIT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AND THEN REPLACE OCHOA. CRISTIANI CHOSE THIS THIRD OPTION, SAYING HE WOULD ACCEPT OCHOA'S RESIGNATION ONLY AFTER AT LEAST THIRTY DAYS HAD PASSED. ACCORDING TO CALDERON, D'AUBUISSON DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE CONVERSATION.

10. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE ESAF HAS PUBLICLY DENOUNCED OCHOA'S COMMENTS ON THE JESUIT CASE, AND BOTH THE ESAF AND PRESIDENT CRISTIANI CALLED ON OCHOA OR ANY OTHER PERSON WITH INFORMATION ON THE CASE TO PRESENT THE INFORMATION TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES.)

221534Z MAY 90

2. DUE TO THE HIGH INTEREST IN INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE JESUIT MURDER CASE, [REDACTED] BELIEVE [REDACTED] INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMED IN INTEL FORMAT.

3. [REDACTED] INFORMATION APPEARS TO BE WELL-SOURCED AND HAS A RING OF TRUTH. LT. COLONEL CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ)) WAS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY SCHOOL AT THE TIME OF THE JESUIT MURDERS AND HAS NOT BEEN NAMED IN ANY WAY IN THE CASE, AT LEAST UP UNTIL NOW. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HERNANDEZ WAS TRANSFERRED TO BE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE BELLOSO BATTALION IN EARLY MARCH 1990. HE IS A FAVORITE OF CHIEF OF STAFF RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)) AND, IN A MUCH TALKED ABOUT RECENT SHUFFLING OF CLASS RANKINGS, JUMPED CONSIDERABLY TO BECOME NUMBER ONE IN HIS CLASS.

4. COLONEL JOSE MARIO ((GODINEZ)) CASTILLO'S REMARKS THAT COLONEL ROBERTO ((PINEDA)) GUERRA KNOWS OF PONCE'S PROTECTION OF HERNANDEZ IS POSSIBLE. IN FACT, COLONEL PINEDA WAS GIVEN A BRIGADE COMMAND (CHALATENANGO) AND IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT PINEDA IS VERY AMBITIOUS AND OUTSPOKENLY CRITICAL OF THE CURRENT ESAF

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 0002
TOR: 221536Z MAY 90 [REDACTED]

LEADERSHIP ("TANDONA"). IT IS ALSO CREDIBLE THAT PONCE WOULD SAY THAT PINEDA GAINED HIS PROMINENCE THROUGH HIS CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH "THE COMPANY AND SOME SENATORS." PINEDA WAS THE FIRST DIRECTOR OF THE STATION-SUPPORTED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL, AND BEFORE THAT WAS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DNI).

[REDACTED]

PAGE: 0001
TOR: 291922Z MAY 90

291920Z MAY 90

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON JESUIT KILLINGS CASE

2. AN ARTICLE IN THE 29 MAY 90 EDITION OF THE "MIAMI HERALD," SOURCING THE PAPER'S WIRE SERVICES. IT REPORTS THAT POSSIBLE KEY EVIDENCE IN THE SLAYING OF THE JESUITS MAY HAVE BEEN DESTROYED, ACCORDING TO THE COURT. ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS, LT. YUSSHY RENE ((MENDOZA)), REMOVED LOGS RECORDING MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERS AND ALLEGEDLY BURNED THEM LAST DECEMBER. THE COURT SAID THAT THE ACADEMY'S THEN-DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MAJ. (SIC) CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ)) ORDERED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE LOGS WHICH COULD SHOW WHO WAS IN THE ACADEMY THE NIGHT OF THE KILLINGS.

1 /

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 042359Z JUN 90

[REDACTED] 042355Z JUN 90 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] REPORTED
INVOLVEMENT OF ARMY OFFICER IN PLAN TO EXECUTE
SUSPECTED INSURGENTS

1. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BELOW BETWEEN TEAR LINES HAS
BEEN SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM. BOTH AGREE THAT ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO CORROBORATE IT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. THE AMBASSADOR [REDACTED] ASKS THAT THIS INFORMATION BE
SHARED ORALLY WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARONSON AND THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-----TEAR LINE-----

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: ARMY OFFICER'S PLAN TO ARREST AND EXECUTE INSURGENTS

DOI: APRIL 1990

2. ON 12 DECEMBER 1989, MAJOR JUAN VICENTE ((EGUIZABAL)) FIGUEROA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE C-II (INTELLIGENCE) OF THE SALVADORAN GENERAL STAFF, ORDERED THAT A LIST OF FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) INSURGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS BE PREPARED. THE LIST WAS TO BE PREPARED BY RESEARCHING INACTIVE ARCHIVES OF KNOWN COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS AS WELL AS BY UTILIZING CURRENT INFORMATION. EGUIZABAL'S INTENTION WAS TO USE THE LIST AS THE BASIS FOR A CLANDESTINE CAMPAIGN TO PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE THE LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT APPARATUS OF THE FMLN.

3. ALTHOUGH THE LIST WAS PREPARED, EGUIZABAL DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH WITH HIS PLAN BECAUSE OF THE NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE

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NOV 1993

PAGE: 0003
TOR: 042359Z JUN 90

NOVEMBER 1989 KILLING OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS.

5. IN APRIL 1990 THEN LT. COLONEL EGUIZABAL APPROACHED A MEMBER OF THE C-II AND SAID HE HAD BEEN ORDERED TO IDENTIFY 200 FMLN INSURGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS WHO WERE TO BE DETAINED. THOSE DETAINED WOULD NOT BE TURNED OVER TO THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES FOR INVESTIGATION, AS REQUIRED BY SALVADORAN LAW, BUT WOULD BE INTERROGATED IN CLANDESTINE JAILS, THEN EXECUTED.

COMMENT: IN THE EARLY 1980'S EGUIZABAL PARTICIPATED IN THE CLANDESTINE ARREST AND EXECUTION OF SUSPECTED FMLN INSURGENTS.)

TEAR LINE

END OF MESSAGE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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PAGE 0001
TIME: 047324Z JUN 90

042323Z JUN 90
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SUBJECT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE, FYI ONLY.

2. ON 29 MAY 1990 [REDACTED] NEWSPAPER "DIARIO DE HOY" CARRIED A STORY ON THE JESUIT MURDER CASE WHICH MENTIONS MAJOR CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ)) AS POSSIBLY IMPLICATED IN THE CASE. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU) DETERMINED THAT MAJOR HERNANDEZ HAD CONTROL OF THE MISSING LOG BOOKS FROM THE MILITARY SCHOOL AND, SOMETIME DURING THE PERIOD 1-16 DECEMBER 1989, RELINQUISHED THE LOG BOOKS TO LT. YUSSHY RENE ((MENDOZA)). ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, LT. MENDOZA ALLEGEDLY TOOK THE LOG BOOKS AND HAD THEM INCINERATED. THE ARTICLE ALSO STATES THAT JUDGE RICARDO ((ZAMORA)), WHO REMAINS THE PRESIDING JUDGE ON THIS CASE, INTENDS TO CALL MAJOR HERNANDEZ TO TESTIFY CONCERNING HIS PARTICIPATION IN THIS INCIDENT.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

PAGE 0002
TOR: 0021242 JUN 90

PAGE 001
TOR: 052016Z JUN 90

052013Z JUN 90

SUBJECT: 16 MAY 1990 MEETING

2. [REDACTED] DISCUSS, AMONG OTHER TOPICS, THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE KILLING OF THE JESUITS. [REDACTED] BEGAN BY DISCUSSING THE IMPACT THE CASE HAS HAD ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.G. AND THE GOES, AND THE IMPACT IT MAY HAVE ON U.S. AID TO EL SALVADOR. [REDACTED] THE FEELING AMONG MOST OF THE OFFICER CORPS IS THAT AID WILL BE CUT TO SOME DEGREE REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE, GIVEN THE EVENTS IN NICARAGUA AND EASTERN EUROPE.

3. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD ATTENDED THE MEETING HELD AT THE GENERAL STAFF THE NIGHT BEFORE THE JESUITS WERE KILLED. HE SAID THE MEMBERS OF THE HIGH COMMAND WERE VERY NERVOUS ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE OFFENSIVE, WHILE THOSE COMMANDERS WHO WERE DOING THE FIGHTING BELIEVED THEY WOULD WIN. [REDACTED] SAID THAT AT THAT MEETING THE DECISION WAS MADE TO COUNTERATTACK INTO THE AREAS HELD BY THE INSURGENTS, AS THAT WAS THE ONLY WAY TO DRIVE THEM OUT. IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WOULD BE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, [REDACTED] STRESSED THAT AT NO POINT, WHILE HE WAS PRESENT, DID ANYONE SUGGEST KILLING THE JESUITS, OR TAKING ANY STEPS BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF LEGALITY. THE SUBJECT OF A TRUCE CAME UP, AND ALL PRESENT AGREED THAT THE INSURGENTS HAD STARTED THE OFFENSIVE AND THE ARMED FORCES WOULD FIGHT UNTIL IT WAS OVER, AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT A TRUCE. [REDACTED] ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK HIS INFANTRY UNIT COULD TAKE ITS OBJECTIVE WITHOUT SUPPORT, SO HE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED ARMORED UNITS TO SUPPORT HIM.

4. AT THE END OF THE MEETING [REDACTED] COLONEL DIONISIO ((MACHUCA)) LED THE GROUP IN PRAYER, AND ASKED FOR GOD'S PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIANS CAUGHT UP IN THE FIGHTING. [REDACTED] SAID THAT WHEN HE RETURNED TO HIS COMMAND POST TO BRIEF HIS OFFICERS ON THEIR MISSIONS, HE ALSO STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID UNNECESSARY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

5. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING MORNING HE HEARD OVER THE ARMED FORCES TACTICAL RADIO NET THAT THE JESUITS HAD BEEN KILLED. HE BELIEVED AT FIRST THAT THE FMLN HAD COMMITTED THE KILLINGS, BECAUSE THE DEATHS WOULD NOT AID THE GOES IN ANY WAY. IN ADDITION, HE SAID THAT WHEN THE NEWS OF THE KILLINGS WAS BROADCAST LATER OVER THE COMMERCIAL RADIO, HE WAS TOLD BY HIS OFFICERS IN THE FRONT

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

LINEs THAT THE INSURGENTS OPPOSITE THEM BEGAN CHEERING AND CLAPPING, WHICH REINFORCED HIS BELIEF THAT THE FMLN WAS RESPONSIBLE.

6. [REDACTED] SAID THE FEELING AMONG THE OFFICERS HE HAS SPOKEN WITH IS THAT THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE JESUIT KILLINGS SHOULD CONTINUE AND THOSE FOUND GUILTY SHOULD BE PUNISHED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE SALVADORAN LEGAL SYSTEM IS SLOW AND CUMBERSOME, AND TO TRY TO RUSH THE PROCESS MAY LEAD TO ERRORS, SUCH AS AN INCOMPLETE INVESTIGATION OF ALL PERSONS INVOLVED. HE SAID THE U.S.G. SHOULD UNDERSTAND THIS AND NOT TRY TO PRESSURE THE GOES INTO REACHING A HURRIED, AND POSSIBLY FLAWED, CONCLUSION. HE SAID HIS PERSONAL OPINION, BASED ON HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF COLONEL RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)), IS THAT PONCE DID NOT RPT NOT ORDER THE KILLINGS. HE IS LESS CERTAIN ABOUT COLONEL JUAN ORLANDO ((ZEPEDA)).

7. ON A SEPARATE TOPIC, [REDACTED] SAID HE LEARNED THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE "TANDONA" HELD A PARTY AT A HOTEL IN SAN SALVADOR TO CELEBRATE THE SALVADORAN "DAY OF THE SOLDIER," AND THE PARTY EVENTUALLY MOVED TO PONCE'S HOUSE. DURING THE PARTY, MEMBERS OF THE TANDONA SAID THAT PONCE MUST BECOME MINISTER OF DEFENSE (MOD) IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TANDONA. [REDACTED] FINDS THIS DISTRESSING, SINCE HE HAD HOPED PONCE'S PROMOTION TO MOD WOULD ALLOW PONCE TO REMOVE FROM COMMAND POSITIONS THOSE MEMBERS OF THE TANDONA WHO ARE CORRUPT, INCOMPETENT, OR BOTH. HE IS CONCERNED THAT THIS MEETING, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WAS HELD AT PONCE'S HOUSE, INDICATES THAT PONCE WILL NOT "CLEAN HOUSE," WHICH COULD LEAD TO DISCONTENT AMONG LOWER RANKING OFFICERS. [REDACTED] SAID REMOVING TANDONA MEMBERS WILL IMPROVE THE IMAGE AND CAPABILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTION, AS WELL AS OPEN UP PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES FOR OTHER OFFICERS, SO TANDONA MEMBERS FACING REMOVAL SHOULD NOT COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF JUNIOR OFFICERS.

8. RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF CUTS IN AID, [REDACTED] SAID MANY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT IF AID IS CUT THE US MILITARY ADVISORS SHOULD BE REMOVED, SINCE THEIR EXPENSES ARE DEDUCTED FROM THE AID MONEY.

9. [REDACTED] ALSO COMMENTED ON THE SERIES OF MEETINGS PONCE AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF COLONEL GUILLERMO ((RUBIO)) HAVE HAD WITH JUNIOR OFFICERS. [REDACTED] SAID THE MEETING ON MONDAY, 14 MAY WAS DISTURBING TO PONCE AND RUBIO BECAUSE THE OFFICES DID NOT SEEM INTERESTED IN PONCE'S TALK, AND ASKED VERY FEW QUESTIONS. ON TUESDAY 15 MAY MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL HUMBERTO ((LARIOS)) SPOKE FOR ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF, AND THOSE PRESENT THOUGHT HIS REMARKS SOUNDED LIKE A FAREWELL SPEECH. [REDACTED] TOOK THIS, COUPLED WITH THE TANDONA PARTY AT PONCE'S HOUSE, TO MEAN THAT LARIOS WOULD SOON BE REPLACED BY PONCE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] THE JESUIT INCIDENT

SUBJECT: ALLEGATIONS THAT SALVADORAN CHIEF OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF PROTECTED A MILITARY OFFICER FROM PROSECUTION IN THE JESUIT MURDER CASE

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] EL SALVADORAN

ARMED FORCES (ESAF) CHIEF OF STAFF RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)) PROTECTED LT. COL. CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ)) FROM PROSECUTION IN THE JESUIT MURDER CASE. HERNANDEZ, [REDACTED] WAS THE OFFICER WHO ASSEMBLED ALL THE OFFICERS WHO ARE NOW UNDER ARREST IN THE JESUIT CASE. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE SOURCE DID NOT CLARIFY WHAT WAS MEANT BY HERNANDEZ ASSEMBLING THE OFFICERS.) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMENT: HERNANDEZ WAS DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY SCHOOL AT THE TIME OF THE JESUIT MURDERS AND HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN NAMED IN ANY WAY IN THE CASE.) [REDACTED]

HERNANDEZ WAS TRANSFERRED TO BE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE BELLOS BATTALION IN EARLY MARCH 1990. HE IS A FAVORITE OF PONCE AND, IN A MUCH TALKED ABOUT RECENT SHUFFLING OF CLASS RANKINGS, JUMPED CONSIDERABLY TO BECOME NUMBER ONE IN HIS CLASS.) [REDACTED]

COMMENT: THE JESUIT MURDER CASE REFERS TO THE MURDERS OF SIX JESUIT PRIESTS AND TWO LAY INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE MURDERED ON THE NIGHT OF 16 NOVEMBER 1989 BY MILITARY TROOPS. IT IS STILL UNCLEAR WHO ORDERED THE SOLDIERS TO COMMIT THE MURDERS AND AN INVESTIGATION IS STILL ENSUING.)

2. [REDACTED] COL. PONCE HAD CONFIDED THAT [REDACTED]

HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE PROMINENCE THAT COL. ROBERTO ((PINEDA)) GUERRA HAD OBTAINED THROUGH HIS CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH SOME U.S. OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS. HE SAID PINEDA KNEW THAT PONCE HAD PROTECTED HERNANDEZ AND FEARED THAT PINEDA WOULD USE THIS INFO TO HARM PONCE AND CLEAR HIS (PINEDA'S) WAY TO THE TOP. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMENT: COL. PINEDA WAS RECENTLY GIVEN COMMAND OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE IN CHALATENANGO, AND IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT PINEDA IS VERY AMBITIOUS AND OUTSPOKENLY CRITICAL OF THE CURRENT ESAF LEADERSHIP ("TANDONA"). HE WAS THE FIRST DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL AND BEFORE THAT WAS THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DNI).)

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0002
TOR: 080839Z JUN 90

4. THE FOLLOWING TIDBITS MAY BE OF INTEREST

A. PONCE'S HEALTH: DESPITE REPORTS HE IS BACK TO WORK IN GOOD HEALTH, [REDACTED] REPORTED THAT PONCE "LOOKS LIKE HELL," AND CLEARLY SHOWS HIS RECENT TRAUMA.

B. RESIGNATION OF SIU DIRECTOR MANUEL ANTONIO ((RIVAS)): RIVAS LEFT OUT OF FRUSTRATION. CHARGES BY THE JUSTICE MINISTER OF MISMANAGEMENT OF SIU FUNDS WERE THE LAST STRAW: HOWEVER THE ASSIGNMENT OF LT. COL JOSE EDUARDO ((ANGEL)) ORELLANA, AN EXCELLENT OFFICER, AS NEW COMMANDER OF THE BIRI ATACATL, INDICATED THAT THE EMC IS INTENT ON TREATING THIS CONTROVERSIAL UNIT AS IF NO PROBLEMS EXISTED. RIVAS COMPLAINS THAT EFFORTS TO GET ESAF COOPERATION IN HIS INVESTIGATION OF THE JESUIT KILLING HAVE BEEN CONSTANTLY FRUSTRATED BY THE EMC.

D. THE 1973 TANDA, WHICH INCLUDES LT. COL JUAN VICENTE ((EQUIZABAL)) FIGUEROA AND LT. COL CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ)), ENJOYS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TANDONA (CAMILO IS A PONCE FAVORITE - HE WAS JUST GIVEN A MERITORIOUS AWARD EVEN THOUGH AS DEPT COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY SCHOOL HE WAS SUSPECT IN THE JESUIT CASE.)

E. D'AUBUISSON IS LOSING POWER WITHIN ARENA,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0003
TOR: 080839Z JUN 90

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MERINO IS NOT
PICKING UP THE FORMER D'AUBUISSON SUPPORTERS, NOR IS
COL (RET) OCHOA NOR SAN SALVADOR MAJOR CALDERON SOL. THE YOUNGER
ARENA MILITANTS ARE INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT, AND THEIR
ALLEGIANCE UP FOR GRABS.

F. THE PRESIDENT OF THE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
DR. JOSE ARMANDO ((PENA)) ARQUETA, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED ON
4 JUNE WAS PREPARING CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST TWO AIR FORCE
OFFICERS ACCUSED OF EXTORTION AND THEFT. ABOUT THREE DAYS
BEFORE HE WAS KILLED HE PRESENTED PRELIMINARY CHARGES.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOH: 091900Z JUN 90

091804Z JUN 90

SUBJECT: INFORMATION [REDACTED] ON JESUIT MURDER CASE

HE REPORTED ON A CONVERSATION HE HAD SOME MORNING WITH [REDACTED] MILITARY POLICE (SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES - ESAP), WHO WAS ON GUARD AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY ON 15 AND 16 NOVEMBER 89, WHEN THE JESUIT PRIESTS, THEIR HOUSEKEEPER AND HER DAUGHTER WERE MURDERED ON THE CAMPUS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (UCA).

HE RESENTED THE WAY THE LOWER RANKING MILITARY MEN WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO PAY FOR THE CRIME WITH YEARS IN JAIL WHILE THE HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS, SUCH AS FORMER MILITARY ACADEMY DIRECTOR COLONEL GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO, WOULD LIKELY GET OFF LIGHTLY OR GO FREE.

HE WAS ON GUARD AT THE
OUTER STREET GATE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY FROM BEFORE UNTIL AFTER

THE MURDERS ON EARLY MORNING OF 16 NOVEMBER 89. WHEN [REDACTED] ASKED WHETHER HE WAS UNDER INVESTIGATION IN THE CRIME, [REDACTED] ANSWERED THAT HE WAS NOT, BUT THAT HE KNEW MUCH ABOUT WHAT HAD OCCURRED THOSE TWO DAYS. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] WAS ON GUARD DUTY FOR A 24-HOUR PERIOD THROUGHOUT THE AFTERNOON AND NIGHT OF 15 NOVEMBER. AT ABOUT 7:00 PM ON 15 NOVEMBER, HE SAID, ATACATL IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALION (BIRI) 2ND LIEUTENANT GONZALO ((GUEVARA)) CERRITOS (WHO IS ONE OF THE OFFICERS UNDER DETENTION FOR THE MURDERS) ORDERED HIM AND ABOUT SEVEN OTHER MILITARY POLICE GUARDS TO COME WITH HIM. GUEVARA CERRITOS TOLD THE GROUP THEY WERE GOING TO THE PUBLIC SECURITY ACADEMY (CETIPOL) IN SANTA TECLA TO PICK UP SOME UNIFORMS. [REDACTED] HE AND THE OTHERS WENT ALONG WITH NO QUESTIONS ASKED AND RECEIVED ABOUT 15 BOXES OF BRAND NEW CAMOUFLAGE UTILITY UNIFORMS FROM THE ACADEMY DIRECTOR, COLONEL RIGOBERTO ((SOTO)) MARTINEZ. AS THEY DEPARTED, [REDACTED] SOTO CALLED OUT TO THE GROUP, "DON'T FAIL IN YOUR MISSION." [REDACTED] AND THE OTHERS DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT HE REFERRED, BUT ASKED NO QUESTIONS.

6. UPON RETURNING WITH THE UNIFORMS TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY, LT. GUEVARA CERRITOS PASSED OUT THE NEW UNIFORMS TO A GROUP OF BIRI ATACATL TROOPS WHO WERE AT THE ACADEMY. THIS GROUP WAS CLUSTERED AROUND THE ACADEMY SOCCER FIELD, WHERE THEY PUT ON THE UNIFORMS AND THEN BEGAN TO SMEAR CAMOUFLAGE PAINT ON THEIR FACES, DON BLACK GLOVES AND CHECK THEIR WEAPONS. THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY, LT. COLONEL CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ)) HAD TAKEN CHARGE OF THE BIRI ATACATL GROUP, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] WHO SAID HE WAS STILL PRESENT AFTER HELPING PASS OUT THE UNIFORMS. [REDACTED] SAID THAT HERNANDEZ WAS WALKING AMONG THE ATACATL TROOPS AS THEY PREPARED THEMSELVES, OFFERING ENCOURAGEMENT, WHICH [REDACTED] SAID HE NATURALLY OVER-HEARD. [REDACTED] HERNANDEZ TOLD THE MEN, "YOU HAVE BEEN CHOSEN FOR THIS SPECIAL MISSION BECAUSE YOU ARE THE BRAVEST AND YOU WILL BE REWARDED."

7. [REDACTED] SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED TO DUTY AT THE FRONT GATE GUARD POST AND REMAINED THERE THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT OF 15-16 NOVEMBER; HE SAID HE LEARNED OF THE JESUIT MURDERS IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 16 NOVEMBER. AT ABOUT 0900 [REDACTED] COL. BENAVIDES, WHO HAD BEEN UP AND IN RADIO CONTACT WITH UNIDENTIFIED UNITS ALL NIGHT LONG AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY, GATHERED TOGETHER ALL THE MILITARY SCHOOL INSIDE GUARD PERSONNEL. [REDACTED]

AS WELL AS THE MILITARY POLICE FROM OUTSIDE THE GATE. COL. BENAVIDES ORDERED THE GROUP TO MAINTAIN TOTAL SILENCE ABOUT THE MURDERS. HE INSISTED THAT NO ONE SAY ANYTHING ABOUT ANYTHING TO ANYONE OR, "WE'RE ALL DEAD." COL. BENAVIDES TOLD THE GROUP THAT THE OFFICIAL STORY TO WHICH THEY WOULD ALL STICK ON THE KILLINGS WAS THAT INSURGENT GUERRILLA FORCES HAD INFILTRATED THE UCA CAMPUS AND MURDERED THE JESUITS AND TWO LAY WOMEN. BEYOND THIS, THEY WERE TO KEEP THEIR MOUTHS SHUT.

8. LATER INDIVIDUALS FROM SIU DID GATHER THE GROUP OF MILITARY POLICE TOGETHER AND QUESTIONED THEM TOGETHER ABOUT WHAT THEY KNEW OF THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERS. ALL SAID THEY KNEW NOTHING AND HAD SEEN NOTHING. THE MATTER WAS NOT PURSUED WITH ANY OF THEM, AND HE HAD NOT SPOKEN OF HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVENTS UNTIL NOW.

9. IN ADDITION TO THESE SPECIFIC EVENTS, BECAUSE HE WAS ON DUTY THE WHOLE DAY AND NIGHT FROM 15-16 NOVEMBER, HE NOT ONLY REMEMBERS ALL THOSE WHO PASSED THROUGH THE GATES OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY, BUT ALSO KNOWS THAT THERE EXISTS A SEPARATE MILITARY POLICE LOG FROM THE ONE BURNED BY LT. YUSSHY RENE ((MENDOZA)) WITH ENTRIES OF ALL THE VEHICLES, LICENSE PLATES AND PERSONS WHO CAME AND WENT DURING THOSE 24 HOURS. THE MILITARY POLICE ALWAYS KEEP SUCH A RECORD IN THE GUARDHOUSE JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY BUT NO ACADEMY OFFICERS EVER SEE IT AND IT IS SIGNED OFF ON BY ONLY LOW-RANKING MILITARY POLICE THEMSELVES. THIS LOG FOR THOSE TWO DAYS IS STILL AT THE GUARD POST. HE SAID THAT NO ONE EVER REQUESTED TO CHECK THIS LOG NOR EVEN THOUGHT ABOUT ITS EXISTENCE.

10. DURING THE DAY OF 15 NOVEMBER ALL OF THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND, INCLUDING MINISTER OF DEFENSE, GENERAL RAFAEL HUMBERTO ((LARIOS)) LOPEZ; CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, COLONEL RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)); THEN-MILITARY ACADEMY DIRECTOR, COLONEL GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO; THEN-ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE ACADEMY, LT. COLONEL CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ)); NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL, DIONISIO ISMAEL ((MACHUCA)); THEN-AIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL, JUAN RAFAEL ((BUSTILLO)); AND OTHERS ALL CAME AND WENT DURING THE DAY OF 15 NOVEMBER.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 132209Z JUN 90 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 132158Z JUN 90 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: INFORMATION [REDACTED] ON JESUIT MURDER CASE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. DURING MEETING [REDACTED] REPORTED [REDACTED]
THAT HE HAD MET AGAIN WITH THE [REDACTED] MILITARY POLICE
[REDACTED] WHO WAS ON GUARD AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY ON
15 AND 16 NOVEMBER 1989 WHEN THE JESUIT PRIESTS, THEIR HOUSE
KEEPER AND HER DAUGHTER WERE MURDERED ON THE CAMPUS OF THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (UCA). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WANTS THE INFORMATION TO REACH INVESTI-
GATIVE AUTHORITIES [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HOWEVER, HE IS AFRAID TO REVEAL THE INFORMATION
DIRECTLY TO THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (SIU) BECAUSE HE DOES
NOT TRUST ANY SALVADORAN ON THE SIU AND FEARS HE WOULD BE KILLED
TO QUASH THE FACTS AND PROTECT HIGH-RANKING SALVADORAN ARMED
FORCES (ESAF) OFFICERS. HE CONTINUES TO TALK FREELY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] BELIEVES [REDACTED] CAN
PASS ALONG THE INFORMATION WHILE STILL PROTECTING HIM.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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4. IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, [REDACTED] PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT WHAT HE OBSERVED AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY ON 15 AND 16 NOVEMBER 90. ABOUT THE GATHERING OF HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS AT THE SCHOOL ON THE AFTERNOON OF 15 NOVEMBER, [REDACTED] SPECIFICALLY REMEMBERS THAT THEY ALL BEGAN

TO ARRIVE AT ABOUT 2:00 P.M., BEGINNING WITH CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, COLONEL RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)), WHO CAME IN WITH TWO JEEP CHEROKEES WITH POLARIZED WINDOWS. IN SHORT ORDER, OTHERS ARRIVED INCLUDING: THEN AIR FORCE COMMANDER, GENERAL JUAN RAFAEL ((BUSTILLO)); THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL POLICE (PN), COLONEL DIONISIO ISMAEL ((MACHUCA)); FIRST BRIGADE COMMANDER, COLONEL FRANCISCO ((ELENA)) FUENTES; THEN-DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE TREASURY POLICE, LIEUTENANT COLONEL HERIBERTO ((HERNANDEZ)) HERNANDEZ, WHO ARRIVED WITH A CAPTAIN FNU ((CHAVEZ)) [REDACTED] COMMENT: PROBABLY THEN CEAT COMMANDER CAPTAIN JOSE ALFONSO ((CHAVEZ)) GARCIA); THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL GUARD (GN), COLONEL JUAN CARLOS ((CARRILLO)) SCHLENKER, WHO ARRIVED WITH THE S-11 OF THE GN, MAJOR RICARDO ((ARANGO)) MACAY; THE COMMANDER OF THE ATLACATL IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALION (BIRI), LIEUTENANT COLONEL OSCAR ALBERTO ((LEON)) LINARES; THE THEN-DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DNI), COLONEL CARLOS MAURICIO ((GUZMAN)) AGUILAR, WHO ARRIVED THROUGH THE INNER GATE FROM DNI TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY WITH TWO (NFI) LIEUTENANTS; AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY HOSPITAL (NFI). SOME OF THESE WERE ALSO MENTIONED REF AS PARTICIPATING IN THE 15 NOVEMBER 89 MEETING AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY AND SOME OF THE NAMES ARE NEW. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE CANNOT SAY WHEN THE MEETING ENDED OR WHEN THE PARTICIPANTS DEPARTED THE MILITARY ACADEMY, BECAUSE HE WAS OFF DUTY DURING PART OF THE AFTERNOON. [REDACTED] COMMENT: PERHAPS THIS IMPRESSIVE RECALL OF INFORMATION IS EXPLAINED BY THE FACT THE MURDERS BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE THE NEXT MORNING, AND THE VISITS BECAME SIGNIFICANT. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] AT ABOUT 6:00 P.M. ON 15 NOVEMBER 89, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY, MAJOR CARLOS ((CAMILO)) HERNANDEZ BEGAN TO CALL INDIVIDUALS BY RADIO TO ORDER THEM TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. HE SAID THAT CAMILO [REDACTED]

HERNANDEZ FIRST SPECIFICALLY BY NAME CALLED LIEUTENANT YUSHI RENE ((MENDOZA)) VALLECILLOS AND LIEUTENANT GONZALO ((GUEVARA)) CERRITOS, WHO PROMPTLY PRESENTED THEMSELVES. CAMILO HERNANDEZ TOLD THE TWO THAT MILITARY ACADEMY DIRECTOR COLONEL GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO WANTED TO SPEAK WITH THEM. WHEN THEY CAME OUT FROM TALKING TO BENAVIDES, MENDOZA VALLECILLOS AND GUEVARA CERRITOS GATHERED THE TROOPS OF THE BIRI ATLACATL, WHO WERE ALREADY PRESENT ON THE MILITARY ACADEMY GROUNDS, AND BEGAN TO CALL OUT SEVERAL NAMES FROM EACH PLATOON, USING ONLY NICKNAMES.

6. AT ABOUT THIS POINT, CIRCA 7:00 P.M., GUEVARA CERRITOS ORDERED [REDACTED] AND THE OTHERS TO GO WITH HIM TO CETIPOL, THE POLICE TRAINING ACADEMY IN SANTA TECLA, FOR THE UNIFORMS. [REDACTED] THE UNIFORMS THEY PICKED UP WERE NEW, AMERICAN "LUXURY" MODELS, COMPLETE WITH "JUNGLE BOOTS". [REDACTED] UNDERSTANDING THAT THE UNIFORMS WERE BEING GIVEN AS PERKS TO THE BIRI ATLACATL INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MISSION. DURING THE TIME THAT THESE SELECTED TROOPS WERE GETTING DRESSED IN THE NEW UNIFORMS AND PUTTING ON CAMOUFLAGE PAINT ETC., CAMILO HERNANDEZ WAS CIRCULATING AMONG THEM AND [REDACTED] REMEMBERS HEARING HIM TELL THE TROOPS, "YOU WILL HAVE ALL OF MY AND MY COLONEL'S (I.E., BENAVIDES') SUPPORT".

7. [REDACTED] THE SELECTED TROOPS, INCLUDING MENDOZA VALLECILLOS AND GUEVARA CERRITOS, DEPARTED THE MILITARY ACADEMY IN A BEIGE MILITARY PICKUP TRUCK SOMETIME BETWEEN 8:00 P.M. AND 9:00 P.M. WHEN THEY RETURNED, [REDACTED] AT ABOUT 3:00 A.M. OR 4:00 A.M. 16 NOVEMBER, COLONEL BENAVIDES GREETED THE TRUCK AT THE GATE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY. ONE OF THE SOLDIERS ASKED [REDACTED] FOR A CUP OF COFFEE, [REDACTED] AND OVER THE COFFEE THE SOLDIER TOLD [REDACTED] "WE JUST KILLED THE HEADS OF THE FMLN. I THINK THE WAR WILL END NOW BECAUSE MY COLONEL SAID KILLING THEM WOULD END IT." THEN, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE TROOP TOLD HIM THEY HAD ALL BEEN GIVEN SEVERAL DAYS OFF.

8. A DAY OR TWO LATER, ON 17 OR 18 NOVEMBER, [REDACTED] HE WENT TO THE ON-SITE TAILOR'S SHOP AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY WITH LT. VALLECILLOS TO GET THE TAILOR TO MEND ONE OF LT. VALLECILLOS' MILITARY BLOUSES. WHILE IN THE SHOP, [REDACTED] LT. VALLECILLOS SAID TO THE TAILOR (AN OLD MAN WHO HAS WORKED FOR DECADES AT THE ACADEMY): "I SURE HOPE MY COLONEL WON'T TURN ME IN." HE ADDED THAT HE FELT BADLY ABOUT THE KILLING OF THE JESUITS AND HAD NOT WANTED TO DO IT, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE ONE OF THE PRIESTS, IGNACIO MARTIN ((BARO)) HAD ONCE BEEN HIS PROFESSOR. BUT, HE ADDED, IT HAD BEEN A DIRECT ORDER, AND BESIDES, HE SAID THAT

[REDACTED]

AIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL BUSTILLO HAD OFFERED HIM PILOT TRAINING AS REWARD. [REDACTED] COL. BENAVIDES AT SOME POINT WENT TO THE TAILOR AND WARNED HIM NOT TO TALK ABOUT ANYTHING HE MIGHT HAVE SEEN OR HEARD REGARDING THE JESUIT CASE.

9. [REDACTED] LT. VALLECILLOS [REDACTED] HAD BEEN SENT TO THE UCA CAMPUS ON/ABOUT 13-14 NOVEMBER AND ORDERED BY COL. BENAVIDES TO CONDUCT A SCOUTING MISSION FOR POSSIBLE FMLN ARMS CACHES. DURING THIS MISSION, VALLECILLOS SPOKE WITH FR. BARO, APPARENTLY IN A FRIENDLY WAY. UPON HIS RETURN TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY, VALLECILLOS PRESENTED HIS REPORT TO COL. BENAVIDES AND ONLY REALIZED LATER, ON 15 NOVEMBER, THAT THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE SCOUTING MISSION HAD BEEN TO PREPARE FOR THE MISSION TO KILL THE JESUITS ON THE NIGHT OF 15 NOVEMBER.

10. [REDACTED] HE SAID THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE FAMILIES OF THOSE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS DETAINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE KILLINGS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN RECEIVING WRITTEN DEATH THREATS; [REDACTED] DID NOT SPECIFY WHOSE FAMILIES AND NO ONE APPARENTLY KNOWS FROM WHOM THE NOTES COME. [REDACTED] ALSO SAID THE DETAINED BIRI ATLACATL MEMBERS ARE BEING HELD AT THE NATIONAL POLICE AND WELL-TREATED, EVEN TO THE POINT OF BEING REGULARLY TAKEN OUT FOR OUTINGS TO THE BEACH AND TO MEET WOMEN, SOME OF THEM TO SPEND NIGHTS IN THEIR OWN HOMES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO BE FROM THE RUMOR MILL, AS ALLEGATIONS OF "SPECIAL" TREATMENT, INCLUDING BEACH OUTINGS, ARE WIDELY DISCUSSED HERE.) HE SAID THEY HAD BETTER ENJOY WHAT THEY HAVE NOW BECAUSE IT IS "COMMON KNOWLEDGE" THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY ORDERED THAT THEY ALL BE CONDEMNED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON. MEANWHILE, THEY ARE ALL BITTER BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT/U.S. EMBASSY ARE CONSPIRING WITH THE "TANDONA" TO ENSURE THAT THE OFFICERS IMPLICATED ALL WILL GO FREE. [REDACTED] COMMENT: APPEARS TO BE MORE RUMOR MILL. [REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED] NEITHER HE NOR ANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY BELIEVE THAT THE ACADEMY LOG BOOKS CONTAINING NAMES AND VEHICLES OF ENTRIES AND EXITS ON 15 AND 16 NOVEMBER WERE REALLY BURNED. HE AND THE OTHERS THINK THAT SOMEONE SUCH AS BENAVIDES IS HOLDING THE LOGBOOKS FOR THEIR PERSONAL DEFENSE AND THAT IF IT LOOKS LIKE THE INVESTIGATION WILL ACCUSE OR CONVICT THEM, THEY WILL PULL THEM OUT TO IMPLICATE THE REST OF THOSE WHO WERE REALLY INVOLVED. [REDACTED]

TOU: 2023J02 JUN 90

202210Z JUN 9

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING THE MURDER OF JESUIT
PRIESTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA

DOI: 15-16 NOVEMBER 1990

Approved for Release
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2.

ON 15 NOVEMBER 1989 AT APPROXIMATELY 1800 HOURS, MILITARY SCHOOL DEPUTY COMMANDER CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ)) ORDERED, BY RADIO, ATACATL BATTALION LIEUTENANTS YUSHY RENE ((MENDOZA)) AND GONZALO ((GUEVARA)) TO REPORT TO THE MILITARY SCHOOL. UPON THEIR ARRIVAL, MAJOR HERNANDEZ ADVISED THEM THAT MILITARY SCHOOL COMMANDER COLONEL GUILLERMO ((BENAVIDES)) WISHED TO SPEAK WITH THEM, AND THE TWO LIEUTENANTS WENT IMMEDIATELY TO BENAVIDES' OFFICE. AFTER THE MEETING WITH BENAVIDES, THE TWO LIEUTENANTS ASSEMBLED THE ATACATL BATTALION TROOPS PRESENT AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL AND BEGAN TO CALL OUT SEVERAL NAMES FROM EACH PLATOON, USING ONLY NICKNAMES.

3. AT APPROXIMATELY 1900 HOURS, LIEUTENANT GUEVARA ORDERED SEVERAL SOLDIERS ON DUTY AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO THE PUBLIC SECURITY ACADEMY (CETIPOL) IN SANTA TECLA TO PICK UP SOME UNIFORMS. THE GROUP, LEAD BY LIEUTENANT GUEVARA, ARRIVED AT CETIPOL AND WAS MET BY CETIPOL DIRECTOR COLONEL RIGOBERTO ((SOTO)) MARTINEZ, WHO GAVE THE GROUP APPROXIMATELY 15 BOXES OF NEW CAMOUFLAGE UTILITY UNIFORMS WITHOUT INSIGNIA OR PATCHES OF ANY KIND. THE GROUP RETURNED TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY AND THE NEW UNIFORMS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO THE BIRI ATACATL TROOPS SELECTED BY LIEUTENANTS MENDOZA AND GUEVARA. AS THE SOLDIERS DRESSED IN THE NEW UNIFORMS AND PUT ON CAMOUFLAGE PAINT, MAJOR HERNANDEZ CIRCULATED AMONG THE SOLDIERS OFFERING THEM ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT.

4. BETWEEN 2000 HOURS AND 2100 HOURS THE SELECTED GROUPS, ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANTS GUEVARA AND MENDOZA, DEPARTED THE MILITARY SCHOOL IN A BEIGE MILITARY PICK-UP TRUCK. SHORTLY AFTERWARD, A SECOND BEIGE MILITARY PICK-UP TRUCK WITH SEVERAL SOLDIERS DEPARTED THE MILITARY SCHOOL AS WELL.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 0400 HOURS ON THE MORNING OF

16 NOVEMBER 1989 THE PICK-UP TRUCKS RETURNED TO THE MILITARY SCHOOL. COLONEL BENAVIDES MET THE TRUCKS AT THE FRONT GATE OF THE ACADEMY. AS THE TROOPS DISPERSED, ONE SOLDIER WAS OVERHEARD TO SAY THAT THE SOLDIERS HAD JUST KILLED "THE HEADS OF THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN)." THE SOLDIER EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT, AS A RESULT OF THESE KILLINGS, THE WAR WOULD END SOON BECAUSE COLONEL BENAVIDES HAD SAID KILLING THE "FMLN HEADS" WOULD END IT.

6. ON 16 NOVEMBER 1989 AT APPROXIMATELY 0900 HOURS COLONEL BENAVIDES GATHERED ALL OF THE SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEEN ON GUARD DUTY AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL ON 15 AND 16 NOVEMBER. COLONEL BENAVIDES ORDERED THE GROUP TO MAINTAIN TOTAL SILENCE ABOUT THE MURDERS OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS AND TWO OTHERS. HE INFORMED THEM THAT THE OFFICIAL STORY THEY WOULD ALL ADHERE TO WAS THAT THE FMLN HAD INFILTRATED THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA CAMPUS AND MURDERED THE JESUITS AND TWO LAY PERSONS. COLONEL BENAVIDES

REITERATED THAT THE SOLDIERS WERE NOT TO SPEAK TO ANYONE ABOUT THE MURDERS OR "WE WILL ALL BE DEAD."

7. ON APPROXIMATELY 18 NOVEMBER 1989 LIEUTENANT MENDOZA PRIVATELY EXPRESSED REMORSE AT HAVING KILLED THE JESUIT PRIESTS AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT COLONEL BENAVIDES WOULD NOT "TURN US IN." LIEUTENANT MENDOZA SAID THAT HE HAD NOT WANTED TO KILL THE JESUIT PRIESTS BUT HAD RECEIVED A DIRECT ORDER TO DO SO. HE ADDED THAT THE KILLINGS WERE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR HIM BECAUSE ONE OF THE MURDERED PRIESTS, IGNACIO MARTIN ((BARO)), HAD BEEN HIS PROFESSOR AT ONE TIME. LIEUTENANT MENDOZA ALSO SAID THAT THEN AIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL JUAN RAFAEL ((BUSTILLO)) HAD OFFERED HIM PILOT TRAINING AS A REWARD FOR HIS (MENDOZA'S) PARTICIPATION IN THE KILLINGS.

8. [REDACTED] ON 15 NOVEMBER 1989 AT 1400 HOURS SEVERAL HIGH RANKING OFFICERS HAD ARRIVED AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL. THESE OFFICERS INCLUDED CHIEF OF THE JOINT STAFF COLONEL RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)); THEN AIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL BUSTILLO; THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, COLONEL DIONISIO ISMAEL ((MACHUCA)); FIRST BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL FRANCISCO ((ELENA)) FUENTES; THEN-DIRECTOR OF THE TREASURY POLICE, LIEUTENANT COLONEL HECTOR HERIBERTO ((HERNANDEZ)) HERNANDEZ; THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GUARD (GN), COLONEL JUAN CARLOS ((CARRILLO)) SCHLENKER, WHO ARRIVED WITH GN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF MAJOR RICARDO ((ARANGO)) MACAY; THE COMMANDER OF THE ATLATACL BATTALION, LIEUTENANT COLONEL OSCAR ALBERTO ((LEON)) LINARES; THE THEN-DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE, COLONEL CARLOS MAURICIO ((GUZMAN)) AGUILAR; AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY

[REDACTED]

HOSPITAL. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [THE SOLDIER] DID NOT KNOW THE REASON FOR THE MEETING AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY NOR DID HE KNOW WHAT WAS DISCUSSED THERE.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: ALL OF THE ABOVE NAMED OFFICERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECTORS WITHIN THE METROPOLITAN ZONE DURING THE NOVEMBER 1989 FMLN OFFENSIVE. ADDITIONALLY, THE MILITARY ACADEMY SERVED AS A ZONAL COMMAND POST, UNDER THE COMMAND OF COLONEL BENAVIDES.)

[REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED] COLONEL PONCE PROTECTED LIEUTENANT COLONEL HERNANDEZ FROM PROSECUTION IN THE JESUIT MURDER CASE. HERNANDEZ [REDACTED] WAS THE OFFICER WHO ASSEMBLED ALL THE OFFICERS NOW UNDER ARREST IN THE JESUIT CASE. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] DID NOT CLARIFY WHAT HE MEANT BY HERNANDEZ' ASSEMBLING THE OFFICERS. HERNANDEZ WAS DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY SCHOOL AT THE TIME OF THE JESUIT MURDERS. HE WAS TRANSFERRED TO BE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE BELLOSO BATTALION IN EARLY MARCH 1990. HERNANDEZ IS A MEMBER OF THE SALVADORAN MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS OF 1973. HE IS A FAVORITE OF PONCE, AND IN A MUCH TALKED ABOUT RECENT SHUFFLING OF CLASS RANKINGS, MOVED UP CONSIDERABLY TO BECOME NUMBER ONE IN HIS CLASS. HE WAS RECENTLY NAMED BY LIEUTENANT MENDOZA AS HAVING ORDERED THE DESTRUCTION OF LOGS AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL USED TO RECORD THE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF VEHICLES THERE.)

11. (AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: IF THE CALENDAR OF EVENTS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 2-4 IS ACCURATE, THEN WE HAVE TO REEXAMINE THE QUESTION OF WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHOM THE DECISION WAS MADE TO SEND ELEMENT OF ATLACATL INTO THE UCA CAMPUS. TO DATE, A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION AND INTERPRETATION HAS GONE INTO RECONSTRUCTING THE 11 NOVEMBER EVENING MEETING OF THE ESAF HIGH COMMAND, TO DETERMINE IF SOMETHING SAID OR MISINTERPRETED DURING THAT DISCUSSION WAS THE GENESIS OF THE JESUIT OPERATION. AVAILABLE INFORMATION HAS THE HIGH COMMAND MEETING AT THE ESTADO MAYOR BEGINNING AT 1900 HOURS AND ENDING SOME THREE AND A HALF HOURS LATER. THIS SOURCE'S SEQUENCE OF EVENTS HAS MAJOR HERNANDEZ ORDERING THE TWO LIEUTENANTS TO REPORT TO COLONEL BENAVIDES SOMETIME BETWEEN 1800 AND 1900 HOURS. THAT WOULD INDICATE A PRE-1800 HOURS DECISION, HENCE NOT ONE TAKEN AT THE HIGH COMMAND MEETING.

12. THERE ARE OTHER AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THIS STORY AND OTHER VERSIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THEIR ORIGINAL DECLARATIONS

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0005
TOR: 202230Z JUN 90

THE THREE IMPLICATED LIEUTENANTS (ESPINOZA, MENDOZA AND CERITOS)
ALL TOLD OF RECEIVING THE ORDER FROM COLONEL BENAVIDES ON, OR
ABOUT 2330 HOURS. ALTHOUGH THE THREE STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN DIS
AVOWED IN THEIR OFFICIAL TESTIMONY, WE HAVE WORKED UNDER THE

ASSUMPTION THAT THIS IS WHEN THE LIEUTENANTS WERE GIVEN THE
COMMAND, NOT, AS THIS REPORT STATES, SOME FOUR-FIVE HOURS
EARLIER.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 221921Z JUN 90 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 221916Z JUN 90 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON SALVADORANS ACCUSED OF JESUIT MURDERS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CHECK TO SEE WHETHER ANY OF THE ARMY PERSONNEL CHARGED IN
THE JESUIT MURDERS, LISTED BELOW, ATTENDED THE SCHOOL:

COL. GUILLERMO ALFREDO BENAVIDES MORENO
LT. YUSHY RENE MENDOZA VALLECIOS
LT. JOSE RICARDO ESPINOZA GUERRA
SUB. LT. GONZALO GUEVARRA CERRITOS
SUB. SGT. ANTONIO RAMIRO AVALOS VARGAS
SGT. TOMAS ZAPATE CASTILLO
CPL. ANGEL PEREZ VASQUEZ
PVT. OSCAR MARTIN AMAYA GREMALDI
PVT. JORGE ALBERTO SIERRA ASECIO

[REDACTED]

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TOR: 0218512 JUL 90

[REDACTED] ACCORDING
TO SUBJECT, NEITHER HE NOR THE MILITARY ATTACHE, COLONEL
(MORAN), WERE IN ANY WAY INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION.
SUBJECT CONTENDS THAT OQUELI WAS NOT EVEN THE TARGET OF THE
HIT. GILDA (FLORES) WAS THE INTENDED TARGET. BY WAY OF
EXPLANATION, SUBJECT SAID FLORES WAS AN OUTSPOKEN CRITIC OF THE
CEREZO GOVERNMENT AND ALSO MADE PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS IMPLICATING
EDOUARD PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (CABRALES) IN DRUG TRAFFICKING
WITH THE MEXICAN ARMY. SUBJECT GAVE HIS OPINION THAT THE
GUATEMALAN ARMY PROGRAM COULD BE USED TO BRING HIM OR
THAT OQUELI SERVED AS A TARGET. SUBJECT SAID THIS WAS ONE
OF THE MAIN REASONS.

[REDACTED]

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1 /

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOR: 031753Z JUL 90

[REDACTED] 03 744Z JUL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] FRANCISCO R.R. DE SOLA

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2

2. REQUEST TRACES ON THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL:

NAME: FRANCISCO R. R. DE SOLA (SUBJECT)

NATIONALITY: SALVADOREAN, RESIDENT IN GUATEMALA

REGRET INSUFFICIENT BIO DATA AVAILABLE.

3. [REDACTED] RECEIVED THIS REQUEST FROM THE AMBASSADOR WHO
RECEIVED A LETTER FROM SUBJECT WHO STATED THAT HE WAS NOT
INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF HECTOR OQUELI COLINDRES, OF EL
SALVADOR, AND HILDA FLORES, A GUATEMALAN ATTORNEY. FRANCISCO
DE SOLA SAID THAT HIS COUSIN ORLANDO DE SOLA, MENTIONED AS
IMPLICATED IN THE OQUELI CRIME, WAS INNOCENT. THE
AMBASSADOR HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN FINDING OUT SOMETHING ON
SUBJECT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] SERVED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS IN EL SALVADOR AND MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SENIOR OFFICERS. IN EARLY AUGUST 1990 HE VISITED SAN SALVADOR WHERE HE MET WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE LARIOS AND CHIEF OF STAFF PONCE. ONE OF THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WAS THE KILLING OF THE JESUITS LAST YEAR. [REDACTED] SAID THAT LARIOS TOLD HIM THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHO KILLED THE PRIESTS, BUT BELIEVED IT WAS COLONEL BENAVIDES. LARIOS SAID THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER. LARIOS DID SAY THAT NEITHER HE NOR PONCE HAD GIVEN THE ORDER FOR THE MURDERS.

[REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

4. THE JESUIT CASE AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONCERN AMONG THE OFFICER CORPS CONCERNING THE JESUIT CASE HAD INCREASED SHARPLY OVER THE PAST WEEK DUE TO TWO EVENTS:

A. AN ANTI-CRIPDES (ANTI FMLN) RELIGIOUS GROUP HELD A SEMINAR ON 23 JULY AT THE HOTEL PRESIDENTI, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY OVER 100 OFFICERS;

B. ON 25 JULY A U.S. PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERT FROM WASHINGTON, D.C. PRESENTED A TALK AT THE ESTAIKI MAYOR CONFERENCE HALL, WHICH DREW AN OVERFLOW CROWD OF OFFICERS (THOUGH NONE FROM THE HIGH COMMAND). IN BOTH CASES THE MESSAGE WAS THE SAME: UNTIL ALL THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE JESUIT KILLINGS ARE IDENTIFIED AND BROUGHT TO JUSTICE NONE OF EL SALVADOR'S FRIENDS CAN PREVENT A CUT OFF BY CONGRESS OF MILITARY AID. THIS CASE OVERSHADOWS ALL THE GOOD THINGS THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING, INCLUDING THE DIALOGUE WITH THE FMLN.

[REDACTED]

JESUIT CASE: THE FOUR OFFICERS IDENTIFIED BY LT. COLONEL MANDEZ AS BEING KEY OFFICERS AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL THE JESUIT MURDERS OFFER A NEW LINE OF INVESTIGATION.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE OFFICERS ARE: MAJOR VIDES LUCHA, WHO WAS THE CADET COMMANDER AND NOW ASSIGNED TO THE CEFA (ARMED FORCES TRAINING CENTER); MAJOR CASTILLO GONZALEZ, NOW AT THE SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS AT FT. BENNING; CAPTAIN JULIO GARCIA OLIVA, STILL AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL; AND CAPTAIN FUENTE RODAS, NOW AT THE DM IV. [REDACTED] FUENTE RODAS WANTS TO RESIGN HIS COMMISSION, AND MAY BE THE WEAK LINK. [REDACTED] ALL SHOULD BE RE-CALLED BY JUDGE ZAMORA AND ASKED TO GIVE NEW STATEMENTS, THUS GIVEN THE CHANCE TO CHANGE OR ADD TO THEIR ORIGINAL STATEMENTS. GENERAL VILLAMARIONA, COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE, TOLD [REDACTED] THAT ALL FOUR MAY BE READY TO TALK. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET AUG 90

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
TOR: 102129Z AUG 90
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. AS OF EARLY AUGUST 1990 NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) PARTY MEMBERS CLOSE TO ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)) WERE DISCUSSING WAYS TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT ALFREDO ((CRISTIANI)), HIS CLOSEST PERSONAL ADVISORS AND SELECTED CABINET MINISTERS. ONE POSSIBILITY DISCUSSED WAS ASSASSINATING CRISTIANI AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES AT A SOCIAL EVENT. ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN, CRISTIANI, HIS ADVISORS AND SELECTED CABINET MEMBERS WOULD BE INVITED TO AN IMPORTANT SOCIAL EVENT WHICH WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY D'AUBUISSON LOYALISTS. DURING THE COURSE OF THE EVENT, THE D'AUBUISSON LOYALISTS WOULD KILL THEIR INTENDED TARGETS AND ESCAPE.

2. A SECOND POSSIBILITY DISCUSSED INVOLVED KILLING CRISTIANI AND HIS ASSOCIATES DURING A FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) OFFENSIVE. THE D'AUBUISSON LOYALISTS BELIEVE THAT, SHOULD ANOTHER FMLN OFFENSIVE OCCUR, IT WOULD BE A PERFECT OPPORTUNITY TO ASSASSINATE CRISTIANI AND HIS ADVISORS. ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN, D'AUBUISSON LOYALISTS COULD ASSASSINATE THEIR INTENDED TARGETS USING THE CONFUSION OF AN FMLN OFFENSIVE AS CONCEALMENT OF THE ACT. THE ASSASSINATIONS WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE BLAMED ON THE FMLN. THE D'AUBUISSON LOYALISTS COMPARED THIS PLAN TO THE ALLEGED MILITARY KILLING OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS ON 15 NOVEMBER 1989, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE D'AUBUISSON LOYALISTS ARE CONFIDENT THEIR INVOLVEMENT WOULD NOT BE DISCOVERED.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THERE ARE INCREASING INDICATIONS THAT D'AUBUISSON IS FRUSTRATED OVER HIS INABILITY TO PENETRATE THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES DUE TO THE VIRTUAL BLOCKADE PRESENTED BY CRISTIANI'S "INNER CIRCLE." D'AUBUISSON'S LOYALISTS WITHIN ARENA ARE PROBABLY REACTING TO D'AUBUISSON'S OUTWARD MANIFESTATION OF THIS FRUSTRATION AND HAVE BEGUN TO DISCUSS MEANS BY WHICH THEY CAN ELIMINATE THE SOURCE OF D'AUBUISSON'S PROBLEMS, I.E., CRISTIANI, HIS ADVISORS, AND SELECTED CABINET MINISTERS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT IN MIND THAT MANY OF D'AUBUISSON'S LOYALISTS ARE POLITICALLY UNSOPHISTICATED AND QUICK TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE TO REMEDY THEIR PROBLEMS, WHICH MAKES THEM ALL THE MORE DANGEROUS.)
[REDACTED]

[illegible]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DIST: 17 AUGUST 1990

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: DISSATISFACTION IN THE OFFICER CORPS OVER THE FAILURE
OF CHIEF OF STAFF PONCE TO RESOLVE THE JESUIT CASE AND
REMOVE CORRUPT AND INCOMPETENT SENIOR OFFICERS

DOI: MID-AUGUST 1990

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
TOT: 171506Z AUG 90 [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] A LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICERS ARE UNHAPPY WITH CHIEF OF STAFF COLONEL RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)) BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE CASE OF THE NOVEMBER 1989 MURDERS OF JESUIT PRIESTS, AND TO REMOVE CORRUPT AND INCOMPETENT OFFICERS FROM SENIOR ARMY POSTS.

2. [REDACTED] THE DISSATISFIED SEGMENTS OF THE ARMY INCLUDE A GROUP OF CAPTAINS (THE SAME GROUP WHO PRESENTED A LIST OF COMPLAINTS TO PONCE IN LATE 1989), A GROUP OF MAJORS AND LIEUTENANTS WHO SHARE THEIR GOALS, AND A NUMBER OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS FROM THE 1970 AND 1971 TANDAS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: A TANDA IS A MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATION CLASS.) THE SENIOR OFFICER SAID THAT AMONG THE LIEUTENANT COLONELS ARE THE COMMANDERS OF ALL THE IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALIONS, AND THE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF MANY BRIGADES. THESE OFFICERS PLAN TO REMOVE PONCE AS DEFENSE MINISTER IF HE DOES NOT TAKE CLEAR AND DECISIVE STEPS TO RESOLVE THE JESUIT KILLINGS AND REMOVE THE CORRUPT SENIOR OFFICERS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT PONCE WILL BE NAMED MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON 31 AUGUST.)

3. [REDACTED] THESE OFFICERS BELIEVE COLONEL GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) ACTED ON ORDERS FROM THE HIGH COMMAND WHEN HE KILLED THE JESUITS. ALTHOUGH NO CONCRETE INFORMATION ON SUCH INVOLVEMENT HAS YET EMERGED, THEY CLAIM THAT MANY OFFICERS ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE HIGH COMMAND'S INVOLVEMENT AND ARE BEGINNING TO TALK, NOT ONLY TO FELLOW OFFICERS BUT TO OTHERS OUTSIDE THE ARMED FORCES.

4. [REDACTED] THE JESUITS CLAIM TO HAVE "PROOF" THAT BENAVIDES ACTED ON ORDERS AND THAT THEY WILL MAKE THIS INFORMATION PUBLIC IF THE HIGH COMMAND DOES NOT. IN ADDITION, MANY AIR FORCE OFFICERS HAVE DISCUSSED A MEETING AT THE AIR FORCE ON THE EVENING OF 15 NOVEMBER 1989 (FOLLOWING THE COMMANDERS MEETING AT THE ESTADO MAYOR) AT WHICH THEN AIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL JUAN ((BUSTILLO)) REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO KILL THE LEADERSHIP OF THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN), SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING IGNACIO ((ELLACURIA)), "WHETHER OR NOT IT IS APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT." [REDACTED] COMMENT: THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS THAT BUSTILLO MENTIONED THE NEED/DESIREABILITY OF KILLING THE JESUITS AT A MEETING AT THE AIR FORCE ON THE NIGHT OF 15 NOVEMBER, BUT NO AIR FORCE OFFICER TO DATE HAS ADMITTED THIS.)

5. [REDACTED] WHEN ARMY INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE BECAME KNOWN AS A RESULT OF STATEMENTS BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
TOT: 171506Z AUG 90 [REDACTED]

COLONEL CARLOS ((AVILES)), PONCE ANGRILY COMMENTED AT A COMMANDER'S MEETING THAT "AVILES IS A TRAITOR." AT A SEPARATE COMMANDER'S MEETING IN DECEMBER, PONCE COMMENTED THAT "NONE OF US WOULD BE HERE IF I HAD NOT MADE HARD DECISIONS." [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS LATTER REMARK DID NOT APPEAR TO BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE JESUIT MURDERS AT THE TIME, ALTHOUGH IN RETROSPECT MANY OFFICERS NOW BELIEVE THAT PONCE WAS REFERRING TO THE JESUIT KILLINGS.)

6. SEPARATELY MANY OFFICERS ARE SAYING THAT THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON THE JESUIT MURDERS IS ACCURATE. PRESIDENT ALFREDO ((CRISTIANI)) COMMENTED THAT THE REPORT CONTAINED ONLY ALLEGATIONS, AND THAT THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM WOULD EVENTUALLY UNCOVER THE TRUTH. A RELATIVE OF COLONEL BENAVIDES STATED THAT BENAVIDES IS READY TO NAME PONCE AS THE AUTHORITY WHO ORDERED THE MURDERS OF THE JESUITS. A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD (BY A SOURCE HE REFUSED TO IDENTIFY) THAT BENAVIDES IS READY TO NAME PONCE AS THE AUTHOR OF THE MURDERS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THESE TWO REPORTS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY CITING DIFFERENT SOURCES.)

7. [REDACTED] IN EARLY AUGUST, THE FATHER-IN-LAW OF AIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL RAFAEL ((VILLAMARIONA'S)) DAUGHTER STATED THAT THE ORDERS TO KILL THE JESUITS CAME FROM AN AMERICAN ADVISOR AND THAT BENAVIDES WAS SET UP TO TAKE THE BLAME FOR THE MURDERS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS ALLEGATION HAS NO CREDIBILITY, BUT SHOWS HOW DESPERATE THE HIGH COMMAND HAS BECOME AND TO WHAT LENGTHS SOME ARE WILLING TO GO TO PROTECT THE PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME.)

8. [REDACTED] COMMENT: BENAVIDES' PURPORTED WILLINGNESS TO IDENTIFY PONCE COULD WELL BE A RED HERRING, OR AN INDICATION OF A DESPERATE BENAVIDES WHO MAY FINALLY REALIZE THAT THE "TANDONA" (MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS OF 1966, OF WHICH BENAVIDES AND PONCE ARE MEMBERS) WILL NOT SAVE HIM. OBVIOUSLY, IF HE TESTIFIES THAT PONCE ORDERED THE MURDERS OF THE JESUITS, THE CASE WILL TAKE ON AN ENTIRELY NEW DIMENSION. FOR THE MOMENT, SUCH TESTIMONY BY BENAVIDES IS UNLIKELY. NOTWITHSTANDING THE INFORMATION ABOVE, THERE IS NO CONCRETE PROOF THAT ANYONE IN THE HIGH COMMAND GAVE THE ORDER WHICH RESULTED IN THE MURDER OF THE JESUITS. IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT MANY IN THE ARMED FORCES, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, DISLIKE THE TANDONA AND HAVE A STAKE IN SEEING ITS POWER IN THE UPPER ECHELONS OF THE MILITARY BROKEN.)

9. [REDACTED] THE OFFICERS SAY THAT PONCE MUST ALSO REMOVE CORRUPT OFFICERS AS HE PROMISED TO DO BEFORE DECEMBER 1989. THE OFFICERS PRESENTED HIM WITH A LIST OF IMPLICATED OFFICERS WHO WERE MAINLY MEMBERS OF THE "TANDONA." ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE MOST EGREGIOUS OFFENDERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED, THE REMAINING
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OFFICERS WHO MUST BE REMOVED INCLUDE:

- A. SECOND BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL JOSE HUMBERTO ((GOMEZ));
- B. FIFTH BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL JOSE EMILIO ((CHAVEZ)) CACERES;
- C. SIXTH BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL HECTOR HERIBERTO ((HERNANDEZ));
- D. MILITARY DETACHMENT FIVE COMMANDER COLONEL ORLANDO ((CARRANZA));
- E. NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER COLONEL JUAN CARLOS ((CARRILLO)) SCHLENKER;
- F. TREASURY POLICE COMMANDER COLONEL CIRO ((LOPEZ)) ROQUE;
- G. NATIONAL POLICE COMMANDER COLONEL DIONISIO ISMAEL ((MACHUCA));
- H. VICE MINISTER FOR PUBLIC SECURITY COLONEL INOCENTE ORLANDO ((MONTANO)).

[REDACTED] COMMENT: MACHUCA HAS A REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AND COMPETENCE. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY HE WAS INCLUDED ON THE LIST OF SENIOR OFFICERS WHO MUST GO. [REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED] THE DISGRUNTLED OFFICERS HAVE DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL THE PUBLICATION OF THE 31 AUGUST GENERAL ORDER BEFORE APPROACHING PONCE DIRECTLY. MANY ARE REPORTEDLY ARGUING THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE UNTIL AFTER THE U.S. CONGRESS RECONVENES AND DECIDES THE MATTER OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR.

11. (AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: I HAVE HEARD, DISCUSSED AND REPORTED ON MUCH THE SAME EXPRESSION OF RESENTMENT AND CALLS FOR CHANGE FROM OFFICERS BELOW THE TANDONA. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT, TO DATE, NO ONE HAS COME FORWARD WITH "CONCRETE PROOF THAT ANYONE IN THE HIGH COMMAND" ORDERED THE KILLINGS, MUCH OF THE DEMAND FOR PERSONNEL CHANGE IS BASED, NOT ON PROVEN CULPABILITY IN THE KILLINGS, BUT ON GROSS INCOMPETENCE IN MANAGING THE ARMED FORCES' RESPONSE TO THE JESUIT CRISIS. MANY OFFICERS BELIEVE AND ARE BEGINNING TO SAY THAT THE PRESENT HIGH COMMAND, INCLUDING PONCE, IS GUILTY OF BRINGING THE INSTITUTION INTO DISREPUTE AND HUMILIATION BY ITS INEPT AND DANGEROUS

[REDACTED]